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INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the change in the Supreme
Court's judicial philosophy, as a new, ascendant majority2 has been
able successfully to implement its emerging notions of judicial reticence and self-abnegation.3 This fundamental turnabout in judicial
perspective is hardly coincidental, since it reflects the fulfillment of
an oft-repeated campaign pledge of Richard Nixon, who in 1968
promised, if elected, to appoint so-called strict constructionists to
1. See, e.g., Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YAr L.J. 1103 (1977); Gunther, Supreme Court 1971
Term, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court:A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YMz L.J. 1165
(1977); Swindler, The Court, the Constitution, and Chief Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L. REv.
443 (1974); Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARv. L. Ray. 1065 (1977).
2. With regard to the ideological composition of the Court, Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist seem to represent one wing of the Court while Justices Brennan and
Marshall represent another. The remaining Justices stand somewhere in between. The voting
patterns of the Justices evidence this composition. During the 1976-77 term, for example,
while Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist agreed in 78.4% of the decisions in which
both took part, Chief Justice Burger agreed with Justices Brennan and Marshall only 36.9%
and 37.4% of the time respectively. Similar differences occurred between Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan and Marshall. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HA.v. L. REv.
72, 296 (1977). On many specific issues, however, it seems that the Burger-Rehnquist position
has prevailed. See, eg., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and the Burger Court, 31 VnD. L.
REV. 33 (1978).
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the Court.' In a basic way his appointees have succeeded in modifying the activist stance that prevailed on the Court during much of
the tenure of Earl Warren as Chief Justice. With notable exceptions
in some areas,5 the new majority has a much more modest view of
the judicial function within our democratic society.' Elements of
4. In October 1968 Mr. Nixon expressed the opinion that Supreme Court Justices had
"gone too far" by injecting "social and economic ideas" into their opinions, and he promised
to appoint Justices who would "interpret the Constitution strictly and fairly" instead of
writing the law. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1968, at 50, col. 2.
5. The primary exceptions are the abortion cases. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down numerous state restrictions on the sales, the advertising of,
and the right to purchase contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976) (striking down a state statute requiring parent's or husband's consent before an abortion may be performed); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (striking down a state statute
prohibiting abortion except in narrowly defined medical circumstances and requiring procedural conditions beyond the mere approval of the attending physician); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (although admitting there was a "wide divergence of thinking on this
most sensitive and difficult question," the Court struck down a state statute prohibiting
nontherapeutic abortions). But see Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (equal protection clause allows a state participating in the medicaid program to pay for childbirth expenses of indigent women and not for nontherapeutic
abortions). Furthermore, in the environmental area Justice Blackmun has been willing to
adopt a more interventionist approach. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) CI would permit an imaginative expansion of our traditional
concepts of standing in order to enable an organization such as [plaintiff] possessed, as it
is, of pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and purposes in the area of environment, to litigate environmental issues."). CompareUnited States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973) (association has standing to challenge the ICC's failure to suspend a temporary surcharge on railroad freight rates; plaintiffs alleged the surcharge would indirectly damage the
natural environment they enjoyed) with Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26 (1976) (barring standing to a group challenging Treasury regulations that grant favorable
tax treatment to nonprofit hospitals, even though they do not provide significant nonemergency medical care to indigents). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).
6. See generally A. BicKaL,THE LEAsTDANGEROUS BRANcu (1962); Bickel, The Supreme
Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Hnv. L. Rav. 40 (1961); see also
Wright, ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition,and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. Rv.
769 (1971). This view has been articulated well in recent decisions that contract the concept
of standing. See notes 298 & 324 infra. Pursuing JusticelHarlan's suggestion in dissent in Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116 (1968), Justice Powell's concurrence in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974), sets a tone of judicial modesty:
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial
power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift
away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated and essentially
head.on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches
of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. . . .We should be ever
mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit general
oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large
measure insulated, judicial branch.
The Powell view expressed in Richardson-urginga distinction between constitutional (article HI) and prudential standing rules-was adopted by the majority in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In
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this philosophy have emerged and been acted upon in such fields
as individual rights (especially equal protection), 7 access to the federal courts (for example, standing),8 and federal-state relations (for
example, revivification of the eleventh amendment and resurrecspecific response to the argument that narrowed standing rules may permit governmental
abuse of power to go unreviewed, Chief Justice Burger has argued that "the absence of any
particular individual or class to litigat... gives support to the argument that the subject
matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
7. In a series of cases, the Court has declined to extend more rigorous review to interests
in education, welfare, and housing. See, eg., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973), in which parents challenged on equal protection grounds a state
scheme of financing public education through a property tax in each school district. The
Court refused to label education as a fundamental interest or to apply the strict scrutiny equal
protection test, in part because when complex and unsettled questions of educational finance
are involved, "the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible
constitutional restraints;" Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (upholding larger state
reductions in a welfare program than in an old-age program despite the fact that blacks and
Mexican-Americans were the primary recipients under the welfare program); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding a state statute which, in eviction proceedings for
nonpayment of rent, required a trial to be held almost immediately after service of the
complaint and severely limited litigable issues; the Court declined to accord special status
to, or to review stringently, interests in housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970) ("In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.).
8. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (indigents
have no standing to sue the Treasury Department for granting favorable tax treatment to
nonprofit hospitals that limit indigent aid to emergency care; plaintiffs did not establish that
their asserted injury was the consequence of the Treasury's actions, or that victory in the suit
would remove the harm); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding, inter alia, that a
plaintiff challenging exclusionary zoning practices must allege facts showing that the practices actually are causing harm to him, and that he will benefit from the court's action in a
direct and tangible way); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayer has no
standing to sue to obtain information on how the CIA spends its funds; taxpayer did not allege
he was "in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury" as a result of nondisclosure of
the information). See note 6 supra.
Access also has been limited in other ways. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974), a federal class action suit, the Court required individual notice to be mailed to
over two million class members and required plaintiff to bear the entire cost of this notice.
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that when a state has provided an
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" of a fourth amendment claim, a state prisoner may
not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that illegally obtained evidence was
introduced at trial); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (adopting a narrow
definition of the term "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and holding that municipalities are not "persons"). But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978)
(overruling City of Kenosha).
9. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting), holding that while Ex ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), authorized
prospective injunctive relief against unlawful actions by state officials, the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to make retroactive payments of
funds wrongfully withheld by the state under a federal-state program. The Court found that
retroactive payments were indistinguishable from an impermissible "award of damages
against the State." 415 U.S. at 668. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (in a
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tion of the doctrine of comity 0 as limitations on federal judicial
activity)." The overriding themes appear to include judicial self-

restraint, 2 reliance on and faith in the democratic process, 3 skeptischool desegregation case, a requirement that the state pay one-half of the additional cost of
a remedial education plan is not prohibited by the eleventh amendment because, unlike
Edelman, the funds would operate prospectively to unify the school system); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (the eleventh amendment does not bar a back-pay award when
Congress, pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, authorizes money damages against
a state government that had discriminated against its employees).
10. Comity has been defined as "[t]he principle in accordance with which the courts
of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not
as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 334 (rev.
4th ed. 1968).
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court, relying on the comity doctrine,
substantially narrowed Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Court had
upheld a federal injunction against threatened bad-faith state prosecutions under an overly
broad subversive activities statute. In Younger the Court refused to uphold a federal injunction against a pending state criminal suit even though the defendant in that suit challenged
the statute under which he was indieted as violative of the first amendment. Justice Black
wrote that the defendant could raise his constitutional claim in the state criminal proceeding
and that the federal district court should not interfere in an ongoing state criminal proceeding
absent evidence of harassment or a showing that the state forum would not fully and fairly
adjudicate the federal constitutional claim. 401 U.S. at 49. The companion cases to Younger
and subsequent decisions have further strengthened the Younger encroachment on
Dombrowski. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Younger counsels against
federal court intervention in state court civil proceedings in which the state seeks return of
welfare payments that were allegedly wrongly received); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
(Younger applies to cases involving the state's contempt process); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975) (Younger applies when state criminal proceedings are instituted after the filing of
the federal complaint but before any substantial proceedings on the merits in the federal
court); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Younger principles held applicable to
some state civil actions); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (declaratory relief denied
in a situation similar to Younger).
11. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), the Court indicated that the
tenth amendment is only a "truism." In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975),
however, the Court indicated that the tenth amendment might have more vitality. Justice
Marshall stated that the amendment "expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system." Gerald Gunther described the Fry footnote as a
"straw in the wind." G. GuNTmm , CAsES AND MATERILS ON CoNsTrrnoNAL LAw 125 n.1 (9th
ed. 1975). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court invoked the
tenth amendment as a rationale for limiting federal power under the commerce clause, the
first such decision in almost forty years.
12. See generally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,479 (1977) ("when an issue involves policy
choices as sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the
appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature"); Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976) (holding that the federal district court exceeded its authority in ordering
the city of Philadelphia to establish a program to deal with complaints of unconstitutional
police mistreatment of citizens; the Court found that the lower court decree too sharply
limited the city government's discretion to deal with its internal affairs); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 75 (1973).
13. A recent example of the Court's faith in the democratic process is shown by Morris
v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). In Morris the Court forbade judicial review of the U.S.
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cism about the wisdom and effectiveness of active judicial intervention in the resolution of basic societal disagreements," and a certain
nervousness about continual confrontations between the Court-an
institution perceived by many as undemocratic and countermajoritarianl-and popularly elected, and therefore politically accountable, legislative and executive officials. 6
Attorney General's failure to object within the statutory period to a state reapportionment
plan. Although Justice Marshall in dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, objected strongly that
the Court's holding would make unreviewable an Attorney General's blatant abuse of authority-such as his acquiescence in an apportionment plan in exchange for electoral votes-the
majority lightly dismissed this possibility in a footnote, stating "we place no weight on the
prospect that an Attorney General someday will trade electoral votes for preclearance [of an
apportionment plan]." Id. at 506 n.23. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (without
the limitations of standing, "courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide
public significance even though other governmental institutions may he more competent to
address the questions"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) ("Slow, cumbersome and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times,
our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens
convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them."); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
(holding that a state legislative apportionment scheme calling for at-large election of legislators in a certain county does not illegally cancel the voting power of a racial minority in the
county ghetto; the Court concluded that the minority simply had been outvoted and had not
been denied accesss to the political system); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)
("the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public
welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court.").
14. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding, in the face of an equal
protection clause challenge, a decision by the Connecticut legislature to subsidize medical
expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth, but not to subsidize expenses incident to
nontherapeutic abortions). See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976) (overruling the district court's denial of a motion to modify an injunction requiring
that there not be a majority of students of any minority group in Pasadena schools; the Court
concluded that the school board was not answerable for demographic shifts that resulted in
some resegregation of Pasadena's schools after a court order had achieved a desegregated,
unitary system-even if for only a single school year).
15. E.g., Wright, supra note 6. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 794
(1944), dissenting from the majority's invalidation of a state law limiting the length of interstate passenger trains, Justice Black argued that "[r]epresentatives elected by the people
to make their laws, rather than judges appointed to interpret those laws, can best determine
the policies which govern the people." In Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,650 (1943),
Justice Frankfurter in dissent wrote:
The reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial authority to nullify legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye is that it serves to prevent the full play of the
democratic process. The fact that it may be an undemocratic aspect of our scheme of
government does not call for its rejection or its disuse. But it is the best of reasons, as
this Court has frequently recognized, for the greatest caution in its use.
16. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
viewed standing issues as being "founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society." Id. at 498. Without the standing limitation,
Justice Powell feared that "courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide
public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to
address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights." Id. at 500.
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This general retrenchment from judicial interventionism has
not been reflected, however, in the new majority's decisions in the
commerce clause area. 7 The commerce clause gives Congress the
power to "regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the
several States ..... " At least since 1851,19 the Court has construed the commerce clause not only as a conferral of authority on
Congress, but also as a significant, independent limitation on state
power. The Supreme Court has applied the commerce clause, by its
negative implication, to strike down state taxation" and regulatory2 1
17. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (striking down a North Carolina statute, which required that all apples shipped into
North Carolina in closed containers bear no grade other than the applicable federal grade,
on the grounds that the statute stripped the Washington apple industry of the competitive
advantage it had earned through the use of a state grading system more stringent than the
federal system); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (striking down
a New York statute that taxed securities transactions involving out-of-state sales more heavily than those involving sales within the state); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424
U.S. 366 (1976) (striking down a Mississippi regulation providing that out-of-state milk could
be sold in Mississippi only if the producing state would accept Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis); Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974) (holding unconstitutional as
a violation of the commerce clause a state's refusal to enforce a contract for the purchase of
cotton entered into by a foreign corporation that had not qualified to do business in the state,
on the grounds that cotton, although delivered to a local warehouse, is part of a stream of
interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (striking down an
Arizona regulation that, in effect, required an Arizona cantaloupe grower to build packing
facilities within Arizona instead of utilizing out-of-state packing facilities).
18. U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See also Willson v.
Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244 (1829).
20. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (license tax imposed only upon itinerant
salesmen who sold goods produced outside the state). See also Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) (state tax on all salesmen soliciting orders for the purchase
of goods to be shipped interstate); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886) (tax on nonresidents selling liquor produced out-of-state); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1880) (license
tax on sellers of out-of-state merchandise); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) (tax for
use of public wharves imposed upon vessels laden with goods produced outside Maryland).
21. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925) (North Dakota statute providing
for grading and inspection of grain, together with profit and dockage regulation, constitutes
a direct interference with and a direct burden upon interstate commerce); Lemke v. Farmers
Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (North Dakota statute requiring purchasers of grain to obtain
a license, pay a license fee, submit to a system of grading, inspection and weighing, and to
adhere to price and profit regulation, held invalid as a direct burden on interstate commerce);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921) (Kentucky statute requiring
foreign corporations that conduct business in the state to qualify to do business is invalid as
applied to corporations engaged in interstate commerce). For a more recent treatment of the
state regulation problem, see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the
Court struck down an Arizona cantaloupe-packaging statute, .concluding that the state's
minimal interest in identifying the origin of cantaloupes to enhance the goodwill of local
growers did not justify the substantial capital expenditures necessary to build and operate a
packing plant.
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legislation that unduly interferes with commerce. 22 In some commerce clause cases, however, the Court has permitted incidental
regulation of interstate commerce by states seeking to promote legitimate police power objectives" and has even permitted states to
tax interstate commerce directly, 24 recognizing that interstate transactions can reasonably be required to pay their fair share of the cost
of running government.2s The Court's problem has been to determine in individual cases whether a given regulation or tax is acceptable or excessively burdensome on commerce;28 that is, recognition
that states can regulate and tax interstate commerce to some extent
necessarily involves the Court in a balancing process27 to determine
the permissible scope of state authority.
22. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
23. E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The Huron
Court quickly dispensed with appellants contention that the municipal air pollution code
imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce:
State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally
stand.
It has not been suggested that the local ordinance, applicable alike to "any person,
firm, or corporation" within the city, discriminates against interstate commerce as such.
It is a regulation of general application, designed to better the health and welfare of the
community. And while the appellant argues that other local governments might impose
differing requirements as to air pollution, it has pointed to none. The record contains
nothing to suggest the existence of any such competing or conflicting local regulations
(citations omitted). We conclude that no impermissible burden on commerce has been
shown.
Id. at 448.
24. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (net
income from exclusively interstate operations of foreign corporations may be subjected to
state taxation provided that the tax is nondiscriminatory and is properly apportioned to local
activities within the taxing state). Cf. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920) (state tax held
not an impermissible burden on interstate commerce because it was imposed not upon gross
receipts but only upon net proceeds). See also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977).
25. The basic principle upon which these decisions are based was expressed by the
Court in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938): "It was not the
purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business." Id. at
254.
This concern has reappeared in recent cases. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,
410 U.S. 623 (1973); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972).
26. See generally Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
27. In recent cases the Court has weighed the state's interest in promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens against the federal interest in uniform regulation of interstate commerce. See generally Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). See also
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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It is self-evident that judicial evaluation of the impact on commerce of state activity (to determine whether it unduly interferes

with the flow of commerce) involves the Court actively in the review
of state legislative actions.2e Indeed, over the years a significant
controversy has arisen among members of the Court about the ap-

9
propriate judicial role in this kind of commerce clause litigation.
One view, represented most forcefully by Justice Black,"e found an
activist stance inappropriate because it was incompatible with in-

herent limitations in the judicial role. For Justice Black, the determination of when state interference with commerce becomes too
extensive involves an essentially political and economic choice; 31 an
unelected and unaccountable branch of government, the Supreme
Court, should not thrust itself into such a decision with only the
bare language of the commerce clause, which establishes no specific

criteria, as guidance.
The other view, which with exceptions 32 seems to have prevailed
28. See generally Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393
U.S. 129 (1968); see also Southern Pa. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784-95 (1945) (Black,
J., dissenting).
29. It is interesting to note Justice Frankfurter's position in regard to judicial activism.
Generally, Justice Frankfurter favored judicial restraint. In commerce clause cases, however,
he felt that the parochial pull toward balkanization required the Court to vindicate national
interests. For a discussion of Justice Frankfurter's role in commerce clause cases, see Brown,
The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurterand the Positionof the Judiciary,67 YALE L.J. 219
(1957).
30. See Justice Black's dissent in Southern Pao. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784
(1945), and his unanimous opinion for the Court in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
31. In Southern Pacific, for example, the Court struck down an Arizona statute regulating the length of trains for safety reasons. Justice Black accused the Court of acting as a
"super-legislature" and argued that:
[Tihe determination of whether it is in the interest of society for the length of trains to
be governmentally regulated is a matter of public policy. Someone must fix that policy-either the Congress, or the state, or the courts. A century and a half of constitutional history and government admonishes this Court to leave that choice to the elected
legislative representatives of the people themselves, where it properly belongs both on
democratic principles and the requirements of efficient government.
Id. at 789.
32. Among the exceptions are Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), and
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In Breard the
Court considered the constitutionality of a local ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation by salesmen. The majority refused to apply a less burdensome alternatives test, declaring
that "[w]hen there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished
from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this Court because of the Commerce
Clause to deny the exercise" of local control. 341 U.S. at 640. In Barnwell, which involved
regulation of the weight and width of trucks, the Court applied a simple rational basis test
stating that the regulation's "constitutionality [was] not to be determined by weighing in
the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice." 303 U.S. at 191. See also Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, RI. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968), in which Justice
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over time," sees the Court as the representative of federal as opposed to state authority, acting to thwart the natural tendency toward economic balkanization among the states., This approach
emphasizes the need for assertion of federal authority to safeguard
a national marketplace-a free trade area among the states-which
has been a source of national economic strength.5 The Court's concern for preservation of federal interests in commerce is warranted,
according to this view, because state political institutions are diBlack reproved the lower court for applying a balancing test, remarking that it was "difficult
at best to say that financial losses should be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of
workers." Id. at 140.
For an example of a state court's explicit refusal to use a balancing analysis in an
environmental protection context, see American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n,
15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). See also Note, State EnvironmentalProtectionLegislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARv. L. Ray. 1762 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike the Court reviewed an Arizona regulation which required that locally grown cantaloupes be packed instate. The regulation's purpose was to insure that the high quality fruit be identified as
Arizona-grown in marketing. Balancing the state interest against the burden imposed on
interstate commerce, the Court found the regulation invalid. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Stewart stated the general rule: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." 397 U.S. at 142. See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
34. For an example ofjudicial hostility to state laws that foster economic balkanization,
see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). In Hood the Court struck down
a New York law under which an interstate milk distributor was denied a license to establish
an interstate receiving depot. Operation of the depot would have had the effect of diverting
milk from local markets, which would have prejudiced the interests of local distributors. See
also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313
(1890). In Baldwin the Court held invalid a New York statute under which a license was
denied to a milk dealer who had purchased out-of-state milk at a price lower than the New
York minimum. In Barber the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that banned the sale
of meat not inspected by a local official within one day of slaughter.
35. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1949):
[Olur economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to
control of the economy ....
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman
shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every
market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from
exploitation by any.
See also Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974). In Allenberg a Tennessee buyer
who had not qualified to do business in Mississippi sued to enforce a Mississippi contract for
the purchase of Mississippi cotton. The cotton was destined for resale in interstate and foreign
markets. The Court held Mississippi's refusal to enforce the contracts repugnant to the
commerce clause. The Court in Allenberg quoted approvingly the expansive commerce clause
language of Hood. 419 U.S. at 31-32.
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rectly responsive to parochial influences" rather than to a national
constituency. Moreover, while ultimate deference to the political

judgment of Congress in these matters is underscored, 7 the Court,
it is argued, must be in a position to protect federal free trade
interests when they arise in litigation because the political process
is not sufficiently fine-tuned to cope with isolated or incipient
breaches of the free-inarket concept.3 8 The Court's role in deciding
negative commerce clause cases is therefore informational (for Con-

gress) and also helpful in inhibiting isolationist and fragmentationist political currents in the states." The relative political disadvantages of out-of-state business and commercial interests is further

justification for this judicial solicitude."0
Since 1970, the members of the Court have achieved remarkable agreement in many commerce clause taxation and regulatory

cases. Indeed, in three of the most significant regulatory" and two
of the most important taxation cases,12 the Court has been unani36. See generally McAllister, Court, Congress and Trade Barriers, 16 Tim. L.J. 144
(1940). For a discussion of the role of the Court and Congress as umpires over the growth of
the national economy "amidst an 'immense mass' ofstate and municipal legislation," see id.
at 146.
37. Congress has overruled Supreme Court decisions in numerous tax cases. After the
decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959),
Congress passed a restrictive law. See Hartman, "Solicitation"and "Delivery" Under Public
Law 86 -272: An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L. Rv. 353 (1976). Congress also overrode
the state enplaning taxes authorized in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), by passing the Airport Development Acceleration Act of
1973, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1711, 1714, 1716, 1717 (Supp. V 1975). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946), which held that a South Carolina tax on foreign insurance
companies did not violate the commerce clause in light of congressional legislation specifically authorizing such state taxation. See generallyL. TIUB, AmmcAN CONsnTrnONAL LAW
401-04 (1978).
38. See generally Brown, supra note 29, for a discussion of the evolution of Justice
Frankfurter's views on'the role of the Court in negative commerce clause cases. See also
McAllister, supra note 36.
39. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1949).
40. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945): "The Court has
often recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests
outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints
normally exerted when interests within the state are affected." See also United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), in which Justice Stone's famous footnote
intimated an exacting degree of judicial scrutiny to protect politically disadvantaged
"discrete and insular minorities." See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon the
Court found that West Virginia's referendum statute requiring 60% of the vote for approval
of a bond issue did not unconstitutionally discriminate against the majority by giving disproportionate power to the minority. No identifiable group was disadvantaged, and no special
judicial scrutiny was therefore deemed necessary or desirable. Id. at 7.
41. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970).
42. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), Justice Blackmun
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mous, while in other cases there has been only a lone dissent. 4 In

both the taxation and the regulatory cases, the Court has been
extremely searching in its review of state regulatory4 and tax 5 legislation that adversely affects interstate commerce. Discrimination
against interstate commerce has been dealt with especially
harshly."
writing for a unanimous court overruled the doctrine of Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which held that state taxation of the "privilege" of doing
business within that state violated the commerce clause. Complete Auto Transit involved a
challenge, brought by a motor carrier delivering cars to be sold in Mississippi, to a Mississippi
"privilege" tax based on gross income from sales. The Court upheld the tax, noting that the
Spector doctrine had "no relationship to economic realities" and that the plaintiff had not
alleged the tax to be discriminatory or unfairly apportioned.
In the same year a unanimous Court in Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318 (1977), struck down a New York transfer tax on securities transactions, which placed
a heavier burden on out-of-state than in-state sales. Holding by implication that investment
funds are an object of commerce, Justice White writing for the Court concluded that the
greater tax liability on out-of-state sales violated the negative implications of the commerce
clause because the tax was a discriminatory burden on out-of-state exchanges; the Court also
held that this diversion of commerce was inconsistent with the "free trade purpose" of the
commerce clause. Id. at 335.
43. In Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974), a regulatory case, Justice
Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. The Court there held that a state could not, consistent with
the Constitution, refuse to enforce a contract made in interstate commerce, even if the foreign
corporation had not qualified to do business in the state. Justice Stewart filed a lone dissent
in Colonial Pipe Line Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975). He argued that the case was
indistinguishable from prior precedent-Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951), and Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954)-and that a contrary result was dictated unless the Court straightforwardly would overrule the prior cases.
Justice Stewart, however, in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue,
419 U.S. 560 (1975), joined a unanimous Court in upholding Washington's business and
occupation tax on the unapportioned gross receipts of sales from appellant to its principal
Washington customer. Although appellants only Washington employee was an engineer who
was consulted regarding the sales but who did not take sales orders, the Court held that there
was no multiple taxation because all the activities taxed were intrastate. Finally, in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), a unanimous Court overruled Spector. See
generally J. Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce Clause: An Historical
Perspective, 29 V*D. L. Ray. 335 (1976); W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of InterstateBusiness and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62
VA. L. REv.149 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
45. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); United Airlines,
Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
46. See generally Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448
(1960) ("State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against
interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally
stand"); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)
("The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or method . . ").
Examples of strict scrutiny of discriminatory legislation include Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (striking down a city ordinance outlawing the sale of milk not
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Despite this apparent agreement on the propriety of an activist
role in protecting commerce against excessively burdensome or discriminatory state intrusions, the Court's solicitude for federalism

values47 and especially its respect for and deference to the quasisovereign nature of state government8 are distinct counterthemes. 9
processed at an approved plant within five miles of the city; despite the city's "unquestioned
power" to protect its citizens' health, the ordinance failed because "reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives" were available to effectuate the state's purpose), and Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), in which the Court struck down a
North Carolina statute that required apples sold in North Carolina to bear a federal grade or
be marked "not graded," and prohibited display of more stringent Washington State grades;
the Court held that discrimination against the Washington apple industry outweighed local
benefits and that nondiscriminatory alternatives were available.
In the taxation area, the Court has invalidated revenue measures that applied only to
out-of-state businesses, Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (license tax imposed only on
itinerant salesmen who sold goods produced out-of-state), and statutes that provide a competitive advantage to local business while nominally treating all businesses alike, Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) (license tax on "drummers"-salesmen
soliciting orders for the purchase of goods to be shipped interstate-where only out-of-state
manufacturers depended on drummers' services) (principle affirmed in Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946)). See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S.
64 (1963) (Louisiana sales-use tax system struck down because the tax favored local equipment construction and sales without adequate justification). More recently the Court struck
down a discriminatory tax scheme in Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318 (1977).
47. See Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Fiss, supra note 1. See generally Friendly, Federalism:A Foreword,
86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
48. See the Court's 1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), in which the Court invalidated the application of the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act to state and local employees performing essential or integral governmental functions. On
the same day, the Court decided Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), in
which the Court concluded that the negative force in the commerce clause did not apply to a
state when acting as a purchaser. In Hughes, a Virginia scrap processor challenged a Maryland statute that, in providing bounties for the destruction of junked automobiles formerly
titled in Maryland, required much stricter proof of title from non-Maryland processors. The
Court concluded that the commerce clause does not forbid a state from entering the market
as a purchaser and favoring its own citizens.
In these cases the Court relied upon principles of state sovereignty, which limited the
reach of the federal power over state authority. Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth
Amendment, and the New Federalism,89 HARv.L. Rnv. 1871 (1976). In Usery, however, the
basis of the Court's decision is unclear. Much of the opinion relied on the idea, suggested in
a footnote from Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975), that the tenth amendment
prohibits Congress from acting so as to impair the role of states in the federal system. In
casting the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation on federal power, the Usery Court
seemingly rejects the "truism" characterization of the amendment in United States v. Derby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The holding in Usery, however, is not that precise. Despite the
suggestion that the tenth amendment serves as an affirmative limitation, the Court's conclusion seems to be that application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local employees
is beyond congressional power under the commerce clause. The Court in footnotes, 426 U.S.
at 852 n.17, 854 n.18, explicitly reserves decision on federal power under the spending clause,
the war power, and the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment; a ruling on tenth
amendment grounds potentially could have been much broader because of its impact on these
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The opinion in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery5" has gained considerable notoriety,"1 since it was the first Supreme Court decision
in forty years to invalidate congressional legislation passed under
the authority of the commerce clause. 2 The Usery decision reflects
the Court's willingness to disinter early commerce clause doctrines
in an effort to identify some limitations on federal commerce clause
intervention in what a majority of the Court perceives to be essential
political decisions of state government.53 Whether Usery relies upon
other areas. A conclusion that there is no authority under the commerce clause, out of respect
for tenth amendment values, might be a narrower holding, leaving open the possibility that
a different form of analysis might apply with respect to war power and spending power cases.
It also should be noted that the decision in Usery is a throwback to the analytical
framework of such earlier cases as Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), in which
the Court relied on both grounds discussed here: that federal regulation exceeded federal
power under the commerce clause, and that it intruded upon state police power prerogatives
protected by the tenth amendment. Usery seems neither to choose one theory nor to embrace
both. The Usery line of analysis also, by relying upon concepts of essential function, appears
to resurrect the doctrine of logical nexus or logical connection that was discarded in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and has not been used since. See note 53
infra.
49. The counterthemes also were reflected in the Burger Court's early decisions in the
preemption area. E.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (Federal Immigration and
Nationality Act not intended to displace consistent state authority to regulate employment
of aliens); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (copyright clause does not require
inference that power to grant copyrights is exclusively federal); 74 CoLum. L. REv. 960 (1974).
In the economics sphere, however, the Court may very well be playing a different tune.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 988 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S.
265 (1977) (federal laws preempt Virginia statute prohibiting nonresidents from catching
menhaden in Virginia waters); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (federal statute
preempts state regulating disclosure of average weight of a lot of goods). See City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
50. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
51. See Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability
of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Friendly, supranote 47; Michelman, supranote
1; Tribe, supra note 1; Note, supra note 48.
52. The last case in which the Court invalidated a federal law under the commerce
clause was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See L. TamE, supra note 37, at
308 n.1.
53. Early commerce clause decisions evolved two lines of analysis. In United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court indicated that Congress could invoke the
commerce power to reach local economic activities only if the activity had a "direct" rather
than an "indirect" effect on interstate commerce. By distinguishing between
"manufacturing" and "commerce," the former having only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce, this analysis served to invalidate certain federal social legislation directed at
manufacturing. In contrast, in the Shreveport Rate case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), the Court
utilized a "practical effects" test, stating that congressional authority extended to "all matters having such a close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce. Id. at 351. The
Shreveport analysis eventually superseded the "direct-indirect" test in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Language in Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), reflected the height of the
Court's disinclination to examine practical economic consequences in its analysis of federal
power under the commerce clause. The Court drew logical distinctions between commerce,
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a notion of inherent limitations on congressional commerce clause
authority or upon a form of qualified state immunity-either theory
which was subject to federal regulation, and production or manufacturing, which occurred
prior to commerce. Id. at 307-08. See note 332 infra. The analysis used by Justice Rehnquist
in Usery in many respects was similar to the "logical nexus" approach of CarterCoal, a point
made by Justice Brennan in his dissent. 426 U.S. at 867-68. Most significantly, citing Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975), Justice Rehnquist emphasizes that the ability of
states to function effectively in the federal system is an aspect of sovereignty. 426 U.S. at
852. The Usery approach, therefore, examines whether the functions at issue are attributes
of sovereignty and whether they are essential functions integral to governmental operation.
See Blurnstein & Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a Medical Services
Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in ConstitutionalPerspective,1978 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming). Although, as Justice Brennan notes, the majority in Usery is not specific about what
constitutes an attribute of sovereignty or an essential governmental function, it seems clear
that logical reasoning rather than economic analysis is the proper means of identifying such
attributes and functions, since the Court "disclaimfed] any reliance on the costs of compliance." 426 U.S. at 874. For Justice Rehnquist, federal displacement of state decisionmaking
was critical irrespective of the dispute about the actual cost impact of the federal law. Thus,
it seems clear that the natureof the activity and not its actual effect controls. Id. at 846, 851.
This analysis parallels the logical relationship standard of cases such as CarterCoal.See note
48 supra.
The throwback to the logical nexus analysis in Usery drew a stinging rebuke from Justice
Brennan, who argued that abandonment of such doctrines "preserved the integrity" of the
Court. Id. at 868. Yet, in a subsequent footnote Justice Brennan accurately pinpointed the
difficulty a court would have in playing a power-allocation role in commerce clause cases in
which the constitutional standard was economic effects. Thus, he noted that the decision not
"to rely on the cost of compliance to invalidate this legislation is advisable." Id. at 874 n.12.
The reason, he observed, is that "[sluch matters raise not constitutional issues but questions
of policy. They relate to the wisdom, need, and effectiveness of a particular project. They are
therefore questions for Congress, not the courts." Id. (quoting Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508, 527 (1941)).
Justice Brennan's insight is important for an understanding of the doctrinal thrust of
Usery. If the Court is to reestablish a role for itself in limiting federal power under the
commerce clause-not a universally shared aspiration, see Choper, supra note 51-it necessarily must develop doctrines that do not require a direct confrontation with Congress on
empirical questions of degree. Abandonment of Carter Coal's logical nexus approach for the
modern "practical effects" or "affecting commerce" standard virtually assured a permissive
judicial stance toward expanding federal power. It is extremely difficult for the Court explicitly to second guess a legislative judgment when the standard of review relies upon a judicial reassessment of the very same evidence used by the legislative branch to make its decision. Consequently, a formula that emphasizes practical economic effects is destined to serve
as no serious restraint on legislative decisionmaking, since the legislative body will have
advantages of legitimacy, because of its political accountability and competency, and because
of its ability to gather and assess empirical data.
A standard that turns on the nature of the governmental activity allows a potentially
broader role for the Court, as in the cases prior to NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). The use of a nature or logical relationship standard in Usery, therefor?,
appears to reflect the desire, by at least a bare majority of the Justices, to formulate a
standard that would allow the Court a more active, participatory role in defining the breadth
of federal power under the commerce clause. In the view of Justice Brennan, this is precisely
the wrong direction for the Court, and Professor Choper, supra note 51, supports Justice
Brennan's stance, arguing that the Court should leave these power-allocation questions entirely to Congress. Professor Choper goes so far as to declare that such questions are improper
for adjudication-i.e., that they are committed to the legislative branch.
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being premised upon immunities that emanate from the tenth
amendment-is unclear. 4 Nevertheless, Usery evidences both an
abiding concern for the maintenance of an effective state role in the
federal system and a willingness by the Court's majority to use its
authority to nurture and sustain that role. The opinion by Justice
Rehnquist in Usery reflects the majority's attempt to breathe new
life into commerce clause doctrines of an earlier era in order to
restore the Court's role as a check on federal congressional intrusion
55
on certain of the state's undefined essential functions.
On the same day that the Court handed down Usery, it decided
a much less publicized case involving, not congressional power
under the commerce clause, but rather the negative force of the
commerce clause on state activity. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,"5 the Court reversed a three-judge district court decision that
had held a discriminatory state program unconstitutional. 7 Maryland had adopted a system of paying bounties for abandoned old
cars in order to encourage wreckers and processors to clear the highways of junked automobiles. The program made it easier for processors located in the state of Maryland to prove ownership of the
vehicles and thereby become eligible to collect the bounty. Out-ofstate processors had a much heavier burden of proving ownership,
although they were permitted to receive bounties if they furnished
extra documentation. The effect of this discrimination was that outof-state processors lost about one-third of the business they had
developed prior to the amendment of the Maryland law. 8
Following the analysis of the Supreme Court's negative commerce clause cases,59 the lower court held that this form of economic
discrimination warranted strict judicial scrutiny. In reversing, the
Supreme Court concluded that the state bounty program was not
the kind of activity that the commerce clause was concerned with
at all." The Court reasoned that a state purchase program, which
54. See generally note 48 supra.
55. See note 53 supra.
56. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
57. 391 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md. 1975).
58. 426 U.S. at 801 n.11.
59. 391 F. Supp. at 58-63.
60. The Court stated: "We do not believe the Commerce Clause was intended to require
independent justification for such action." 426 U.S. at 809.
This definitional approach is consistent with the modes of analysis used by the new
majority in considering other constitutional problems. See text accompanying notes 389-403

infra. First, in the procedural due process area, in decisions commencing with Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the applicability of procedural due process turns on
the nature of the interest involved rather than on its importance or the degree of harm to it.
In Roth the Court stated that the procedural due process analysis looks "not to the 'weight'
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it analogized to a form of government largesse or subsidy,"' need not
be dispensed beyond the borders of the state any more than welfare

payments need be disbursed to nonresidents. The Court claimed
that this distinguished the state's bounty program from the taxation
but to the natureof the interest at stake." Id. at 571. Thus if a "liberty" or "property" interest
is not within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property, there is no due
process protection at all. This is essentially a threshold analysis in which the Court ignores
the potential extent or effect of the deprivation and focuses only on the nature of the interest
affected. If the threshold is not met, then due process does not apply.
The new majority has used a similar approach in the area of eighth amendment cruel
and unusual punishment. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court concluded
that the eighth amendments bar to cruel and unusual punishment did not apply outside of
the criminal process, stating that "an examination of the history of the Amendment and the
decisions of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes." Id. at 664. In Ingraham
the Court refused to apply a cruel and unusual punishment analysis to school disciplinary
action where plaintiff claimed that an excessively severe paddling was cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court refused to apply any
eighth amendment analysis at all, basing its conclusion on the premise that the eighth
amendment was inapplicable, in that context, to any form of punishment. This raised an
outcry from the four dissenters, speaking through Justice White, who noted that the majority's opinion would leave open the possibility that a teacher could "cut off a child's ear for
being late to class" and not violate the eighth amendment, while someone who did the same
to a convicted murderer would violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 684. The majority
rejected this hypothetical as "rhetoric" which "bears no relation to reality or to the issues
presented in this case," stating that "[tihe laws of virtually every State forbid the excessive
physical punishment of schoolchildren." Id. at 670 n.39. The majority's faith in the system
leads it to conclude that Justice White's hypothetical is a horrible that is not realistic, but
even in the case of such a breach of normalcy, the majority's definitional approach would not
allow the Court to act.
The new majority has applied the same definitional approach in at least two other areas.
With respect to immigration, in Kleindienst v. Mandell, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court
recognized that first amendment interests were at stake in the Justice Department's refusal
to grant a visa to a well-known European Marxist academician. Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that since the area of immigration was committed to the executive branch, first
amendment interests would not be considered at all.
With regard to interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, in Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S.
491 (1977), the Court held judicial review inapplicable to certain decisions, which thereby
were committed to the unreviewable discretion of the attorney general. The potential for
abuse of discretion was dismissed in much the same manner as in Ingraham. See note 13
supra.
Finally, the Court's decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), is consistent
with this definitional approach. In that case, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, provision that "every person" who acts under color of state law to deprive
another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages, was
not applicable to a prosecutor acting within the scope of his employment. The Court declined
to allow redress out of concern that "if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each
time a person charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from
the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law." 424 U.S. at 425. See also Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
The decision in Hughes, therefore, conforms to a mode of analysis that has appealed
frequently to the ascendant majority.
61. 426 U.S. at 809.
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and regulatory cases" and declined to apply a commerce clause
analysis. 3
Hughes and Usery, in tandem, reflect the Court's solicitude for
state prerogatives and are responsive to the overall federalism concerns of the new majority. This Article will examine more thoroughly the recent doctrinal developments in the negative commerce
clause area, focusing on both regulatory and taxation cases. It will
then contrast the developments in that area, which has been characterized by moderately active judicial intervention in vindicating
federal free trade interests, with doctrinal developments in other
areas, which reflect deference to state police power regulations and
judicial reluctance to intrude on state prerogatives. The Article will
next analyze the two trends and discuss their confluence in the
Supreme Court's decision in the Hughes case. Finally, in the last
section, the Article will attempt to determine how these conflicting
doctrinal strands can be accommodated in a single specific context.
In this regard, the Article will consider the problem posed when a
state taxes income derived from municipal bonds issued by out-ofstate municipalities while at the same time exempting from income
taxation revenues derived from municipal bonds issued by in-state
municipalities.
L

NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES: THE ROLE OF THE

COURT

The inclination of state political units to enact laws that favor
local economic interests at the expense of interstate commerce has
been difficult to suppress. 4 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
been called upon to review numerous forms of state legislation that
adversely affect commerce., 5 The Court is asked to apply the commerce clause, in its dormant state, to invalidate parochial economic
taxation and regulatory legislation and, simultaneously, to vindicate national interests in the free flow of commerce 66
62. Id. at 809-10.
63. The Court indicated that when a state acts in its proprietary capacity, entering the
market as a purchaser, it acts more like a private party than a governmental unit, When it
exercises its regulatory or taxation authority, a state exercises instead its coercive power.
Presumably this is the exercise of governmental power at which the commerce clause is
aimed. See note 60 supra.For a potentially interesting antitrust implication when the governmental unit is not the state itself but a local unit of government, see City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978). See generallyBlumstein & Calvani, supra
note 53.
64. See generally H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
65. For a recent example, see Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787
(1978).
66. For early cases applying the commerce clause in its dormant state to state and local
legislation, see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) and Willson v.
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At one time, the Court sought to fulfill its responsibility in
negative commerce clause cases by determining whether a state's
legislation involved a subject proper for state regulation. The an-

swer to that question was often sought in precedent that either
upheld or rejected federal power under the commerce clause." Con-

sequently, the problem of accommodating state and federal power
arose only in the context of determining which governmental entity
had exclusive authority to legislate in an area.6" The notion that the
commerce clause contemplated mutually exclusive jurisdictions
had the effect of limiting judicial willingness to permit expansive

congressional power because every such expansion of federal authority was achieved at the direct expense of state regulatory authority.
Moreover, the issues addressed in the context of congressional power
are analytically quite distinct from those that arise in negative com-

merce clause cases, which involve limitations on state power."9

Over time, the Court firmly and finally discarded the exclusive
jurisdiction view and adopted a model of concurrent federal and

state authority10-an

idea that had been in existence in an earlier

Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 244 (1829).
67. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); Lemke v. Farmers Grain
Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Kidd
v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
68. This is the so-called doctrine of dual federalism, which holds that federal and state
power exist in separate spheres. A finding of federal power under the commerce clause would
automatically prohibit state regulatory activity. Conversely, when state police power action
is permitted, federal authority would be nonexistent. For examples of this concern in commerce clause cases, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) and Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) in which the Court stated:
"When the commerce begins is determined, . . . by its actual delivery to a common
carrier for transportation, or the actual commencement of its transfer to another state."
.. . If it were otherwise, all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be
brought under federal control to the practicalexclusion of the authority of the States, a
result certainly not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution when they vested
in Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States.
247 U.S. at 272-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
69. Justice Marshall recently made this point in Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431
U.S. 265 (1977). Although the case was decided on preemption grounds, Justice Marshall did
note that pronouncements made concerning the validity of state laws under the dormant
commerce clause are not used interchangeably as statements of law where the issue is the
power of Congress to regulate under the commerce clause. Id. at 282 n.17.
70. In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court indicated that separate
sovereign status for states would no longer be a limit on federal power. The Court stated that
the tenth amendment "states but a truism" and "has been construed as not depriving the
national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
." Id. at 124.
In contrast to Darby, note the modest rejuvenation of the tenth amendment in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). For a good statement of the current situation
in negative commerce clause cases, see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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era." Under the concurrent authority approach, the Court has
"recognized that, in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure
'
affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it. 72
When state legislation that promotes legitimate local interests
"comes into conflict with the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a national 'common market,'" the Court must accommodate "the competing national and local interests."7 3
This process of accommodation, in which the Court
"[o]ccasionally . . . has candidly undertaken a balancing ap-

proach,"74 implicates the Court in an activist reviewing posture.
This role has hardly been uncontroversial. For example, in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona75 the Court held unconstitutional a state law
that limited the length of trains because of its excessive burden on
interstate commerce. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that the
danger t6 railroad employees was a function of train length 6 and
that the question whether train length should be regulated in the
interest of employee safety required a public policy judgment that
balances safety and economic interests.77 For Justice Black, such
balancing of competing values was not "a matter for judicial determination, but one which calls for legislative consideration. "'
As recently as 1968, Justice Black was able to author an opinion
for a unanimous Court, sustaining an Arkansas full-crew law that
"specified a minimum number of employees who must serve as part
of a train crew.

. . 2,71 Justice Black scolded the district court for

evaluating the evidence to make an independent determination of
the competing state interest in safety and national interests in free
trade. Whereas the district court had concluded that "the financial
burden of compliance

. . .

is out of all proportion to the benefit,"

Justice Black found that the lower court had "indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited authority to review state
legislation under the commerce clause." 8 To Justice Black, the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 794.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 130

(1968).
80. Id. at 136.
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safety issue was one for resolution by the state legislature.,"
Despite such decisions as Firemen,82 the Court, at least since
1970, 8 seems to have concluded that an interventionist reviewing
posture is mandated in appropriate negative commerce clause
cases. Thus, in Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice,8 the
Court held invalid under the negative commerce clause a Wisconsin
provision that barred double trailers from state highways. The state
argued that, under South CarolinaState Highway Department v.
Barnwell Bros., which upheld state truck width and weight restrictions, the appropriate standard for testing the statute's constitutionality was the rationality of the state's decision, not a weighing
of state safety interests against national commerce interests. Acknowledging that language in Barnwell Bros. had suggested that
"no showing of burden on interstate commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations in the absence of some element of discrimination against interstate commerce,"" Justice Powell nevertheless rejected Wisconsin's position "that the inquiry under the
Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety
purpose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce."'1
The balancing approach, which is less deferential to state legislative judgments than the rational relation standard, is based upon
sound historical precedents that have specifically determined that
the Court's role in commerce clause cases can legitimately be more
activist than when the Court reviews state police regulation of intrastate activities. 8 Thus, the Court once barred Pennsylvania from
prohibiting the transportation of oleomargarine into the state9 even
though it had permitted Pennsylvania to ban the manufacture and
distribution of oleomargarine within the state."0 Similarly, the Court
has required preferred treatment for interstate commerce in other
situations. For example, in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,"'
81. Id. at 137.
82. 393 U.S. 129 (1968). See also South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), in which the Court applied a rational relation test rather than a
balancing test. Id. at 190.92.
83. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
84. 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978).
85. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
86. 98 S. Ct. at 795 (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 528-29
(1959)).
87. 98 S. Ct. at 795.
88. See Brown, supra note 29.
89. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).
90. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
91. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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the Court held that New York must permit an interstate milk distributor to open a new receiving depot, despite a refusal by New
York officials to issue a license because of the fear of destructive
competition. The Court implicitly acknowledged that New York
had adequate grounds to regulate the entry of new plants, so if the
firm had sold its milk intrastate, the state's authority; to refuse the
license apparently would have been sustained.2 The interstate character of the business invoked an extra measure of judicial protection, in effect overriding the state's otherwise legitimate police
power regulation.
The Hood approach recently was reaffirnied in Allenberg Cot3 in which the Court held that Mississippi could
v. Pittman,1
Co.
ton
not require a Tennessee cotton merchant, who had contracted in
advance with Mississippi farmers for the delivery of cotton at harvest time, to qualify to do business in Mississippi. 4 Qualification of
foreign corporations presumably provides information to local purchasers about the corporation's financial position and facilitates
collection of taxes owed to the state. Such regulation of corporations
who do intrastate business95 or who have localized their operations
within a state96 is concededly permissible, but the Court held that
interstate transactions could not be so burdened by state regulation. 7
92. Id. at 529-30.
93. 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
94. Id. at 33-34.
95. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
96. See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
97. The examples of regulatory immunity for interstate businesses are, admittedly,
relatively few in number. They are discussed in the text because this form of special treatment is usually overlooked.
On the other hand, there has developed a long line of cases in the taxation area that
purported to establish immunity from state taxation. "The doctrine developed. . . that...
the commerce clause created a tax haven for foreign corporations that conducted an exclusively interstate business, by freeing those corporations of some of the state franchise, license,
gross receipts, and sales taxes imposed on intrastate businesses." J. Hellerstein, supra note
43, at 335-36. Professor Jerome R. Hellerstein traces the repudiation of the "tax-free haven
approach" to the opinion of Justice Stone in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250 (1938). This trend "reached a new milestone in 1959 when, .. the Court held for
the first time, at least explicitly, that the commerce clause does not debar a state from levying
a fairly apportioned net income tax on a foreign corporation that carries on exclusively
interstate business in the state." J. Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 337-38. The landmark 1959
decision about which Professor Hellerstein writes is Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Despite the decision in Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co., the Court did not eliminate the formalistic approach in certain areas of state
taxation. Thus, in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), the Court
"reaffirmed the highly conceptual distinctibn between a franchise tax, measured by apportioned net income, as applied to an exclusively interstate business,. . . and an apportioned
direct net income tax, which it [had] upheld. . . ." J. Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 338.
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Recognition of the Court's more interventionist role in commerce clause litigation's has also led to the formulation of a doctrine

that necessitates stricter judicial scrutiny of state regulatory legislation. One cornerstone of active review is judicial examination of
alternatives available to a state that are less intrusive on important
constitutionally protected interests." In Hannibal & St. Joseph
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 15 Missouri forbade all Texas, Mexican, or
Indian cattle from entering the state for eight entire months. Although acknowledging the state's legitimate interest in preventing
The so-called Spector rule drew considerable criticism in the literature. See, e.g., P.
(1953) (criticizing Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249 (1946)). In 1975, the Court decided two cases that might have provided clarification had they not been decided on narrow grounds. See generallyW. Hellerstein, supra note
43, at 188-92. In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court
overruled the Spector decision, rejecting the previously asserted formalistic distinctions that
had had the effect of focusing analysis on "the language or labeling of the statute" rather
than "on the real effects. . . upon interstate commerce." L. TRiBE, supra note 37, at 345.
See generally W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified
Approach to ConstitutionalAdjudication?, 75 MICH.L. Rav. 1426 (1977).
Despite the decision in Complete Auto Transit, the Court has not overruled such decisions as Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887), which prohibited a tax
on so-called drummers, who entered the state for the purpose of drumming up business for
an out-of-state seller. This would still appear to be a formalistic limitation on a state's ability
to tax interstate business. Nevertheless, the clear thrust of the Complete Auto Transit decision is to reject the view that the commerce clause establishes an "irreducible zone of tax
immunity unrelated to its purposes." W. Hellerstein, supra, at 1445. The clear implication
of Complete Auto Transit is that the Court will be looking at economic pragmatism and
reducing its emphasis on formalism that "merely obscures the question whether the tax
produces a forbidden effect." 430 U.S. at 288. See generally L. Tiuss,supra note 37, at 34469. See also Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 98 S. Ct. 1388
(1978), in which the Court followed Complete Auto Transit and overruled Puget Sound
Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937), and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes
Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
98. Walter Hellerstein suggests that the economic pragmatism approach of Complete
Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), reflects a less interventionist approach in state taxation
matters. W. Hellerstein, supra note 97, at 1448. Because of the Court's past active role in
invalidating state taxation of interstate commerce, that characterization might be correct.
Nevertheless, by adopting a pragmatic approach, the Court inevitably involves itself in a
balancing process that necessarily requires some subtle judgmental decisionmaking. In the
regulatory area, this balancing approach has resulted in a more interventionist stance on the
part of the Court. If the Court does invalidate state taxation under a balancing framework,
then the second-guessing of state legislatures will be readily apparent. A sympathetic view
of the formalism in the taxation area is that the Court was seeking a vehicle for reducing
direct confrontations with legislative judgments, while at the same time establishing parameters for constraining state taxation of interstate business. As Professor Tribe has pointed out,
however, "[t]he rule usually meant. . . that the language of a tax statute rather than its
effect was determinative; by changing an improper label, a state could often avoid invalidation." L. TamE,supra note 37, at 345 n.3.
99. See generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria,27 VAND. L. Rnv. 971 (1974).
100. 95 U.S. 465 (1877).
HARTMAN,STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 201

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:473

diseased cattle from entering, the Court noted that Missouri sought
to achieve its objective by an outright prohibition rather than by a
more precise form of regulation. Consequently, although health and
sanitation laws were deemed permissible, the Court concluded that
a state "may not interfere with transportation into or through the
State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection."10 ,
The thread present in Husen became a centerpiece in Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison.1 2 The city of Madison had regulated the sale
of milk within its jurisdiction in a manner that insulated an important local industry from out-of-state competition. The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the city's regulatory objectives in promoting sanitary milk production, but invalidated the ordinance on
the ground that "reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available.""0 3
Almost twenty years after Dean Milk, the Court in 1970 unanimously held that examination of alternatives was an integral part
of commerce clause analysis. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,' 4" Justice Stewart noted that the extent of the burden of state regulation
on commerce that will be tolerated will depend in part on whether
the state interest "could be promoted as well with a lesser impact
on interstate activities."" 5 In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cottrell,' Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, reemphasized the alternatives language of Dean Milk and Pike in invalidating a Mississippi reciprocity regulation. He articulated the rationale for examining alternatives as follows:
Inquiry whether adequate and less burdensome alternatives exist is, of course,
important in discharge of the Court's task of "accommodation" of conflicting
local and national interests, since any "'realistic' judgment" whether a given
state action "unreasonably" trespasses upon national interests must, of' course,
consider the "consequences to the state if its action were disallowed."'

Accordingly, the Mississippi reciprocity regulation was struck
down, in part because "there are means adequate to serve [the
state's] interest that are substantially less burdensome on commerce." Given the other "available methods of protecting" the
101. Id. at 472.
102. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
103. Id. at 354.

104. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
Breard upheld a so-called Green River ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of
orders to sell goods unless the solicitors were invited by the occupants. The Court in Breard
refused to apply the alternatives standard of Dean Milk, 341 U.S. at 640. See note 32 supra.
105. 397 U.S. at 142.
106. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
107. Id. at 373.
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state's interest, the burden on commerce therefore was unjustifiable.' 0 Most recently, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,"I Chief Justice Burger for a unanimous Court reaffirmed the relevance of considering alternatives in commerce clause
adjudication and went so far as to suggest some' 0 as the Court had
done in Dean Milk.
These cases demonstrate that the Court had adopted a rigorous
reviewing posture in appropriate commerce clause cases. In a variety of contexts, it has required states to show that their interests are
important, and cannot be otherwise served-an analysis traditionally associated with strict scrutiny. The question then arises in what
commerce clause cases will the Court apply this strict reviewing
standard?
III. NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK

Legislative Purpose
Analysis of negative commerce clause issues generally addresses the question of purpose first-that is, whether there is a
"legitimate local public interest.""' The Court has indicated that
traditional police power objectives such as promotion of public
health and safety are permissible state goals. 12 On the other hand,
A.

economic protectionism

3

and the reduction of competition from

interstate commerce"' have been found impermissible state objec108. Id. at 376-77.
109. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
110. Id. at 354. In Hunt the Court considered the constitutionality of a North Carolina
statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into the state in closed containers be marked
with no grade designation other than United States Department of Agriculture (U.S.D.A.)
gradings or an indication that the apples were not graded. In striking down the statute, Chief
Justice Burger suggested that as an alternative method of regulation the state might have
required out-of-state growers to indicate the U.S.D.A. grade in addition to any local grading.
If that alternative were deemed insufficient, Burger suggested that North Carolina might
have banned the use of local grades inferior to corresponding U.S.D.A. categories.
111. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
112. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
113. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,335-36 (1977); Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403.04 (1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1,
13 (1928). In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978), the Court noted that
a benign purpose will not shield a facially discriminatory law since "the evil of protectionism
can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Id. at 2537. Thus, "whatever [the
state's] ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the state unless there is some reason, apart from their origin,
to treat them differently." Id.
114. Compare Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) with Bradley v. Public Util.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 31:473

tives in commerce clause litigation. These impermissible purposes
might be manifest on the face of the statute, but such facial bias is
now unusual because of the Court's unstinting invalidation of it as
violative of commerce clause principles." ' Despite a statute's "facial
neutrality,"'1 however, a plaintiff may still attempt to prove an
illegitimate intent to discriminate. 1 7 A law that appears to promote
a legitimate police power purpose may, in fact, be a disguised form
of economic protectionism. This point was raised recently when
apple growers from the state of Washington alleged that a North
Carolina labeling requirement was sponsored by North Carolina's
apple producers as an anticompetitive device, and not as a consumer protection measure."' Although the Court ultimately did not
rely on the impermissibly discriminatory-motivation rationale,' it
appeared to acknowledge that economic protectionism as a motivating factor would warrant a finding of discrimination."'
"[H]owever, a finding that state legislation furthers matters
of legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer protection areas, does not end the inquiry."'' When a state regulation or
tax promotes legitimate state interests "even-handedly,'"I" the
Court, in reaching a balance between state and national interests,
will focus on the incidental effects of the regulation or tax. In this
regard, the Court will examine both the extent and the nature of the
burden on commerce.
B.

The Extent of the Burden on Commerce

Focusing on the extent of the burden that will be tolerated, the
Court has said that it will consider the "nature of the local interest
Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1938). See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949).
115. Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891). See
also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945). But cf. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963)
(There the Court struck down a Louisiana use tax as applied to labor and overhead costs of
assembling goods brought into Louisiana from out of state. Such costs would not have been
subject to the tax if they had been incurred within Louisiana; thus an unequal tax burden
resulted on in-state and out-of-state manufacturers.).
116. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 383, 352 (1977).
117. Id. at 350.
118. Id. at 352.
119. Id. at 352-53.
120. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See also
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
121. 432 U.S. at 350.
122. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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involved" and the availability of other ways for the state to promote
its legitimate policies,'2 but that it will uphold the state law unless
the burden on commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the
12 4
putative local benefits.
2
The standard enunciated in such recent cases as Pike,'m A&P,
and Hunt'" crystallizes and clarifies a forty-year trend in the Supreme Court's prevailing practice. For example, in South Carolina
State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,es the Court sustained South Carolina's width and weight restrictions on trucks
despite the effect on commerce, because highway regulation was at
the time "so peculiarly of local concern.'! 2 Dicta in Barnwelt indicated that the Court would not even enter a balancing process, but
this hands-off approach has not withstood the test of time. ' Rather,
the Court has given great weight to state regulatory interests in
highway safety, but even in this situation, it has found some burdens on commerce excessive.
Thus in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,'31 the Court held
invalid an Illinois mudguard requirement for trucks that used the
state's highways. Although a unanimous Court recognized that the
state's authority to -regulate the use of its highways was "broad and
pervasive"'' in light of its "peculiarly local nature,"' ' it nevertheless held that the impact on commerce-especially on
"interlining"' 3 -was significant and that the safety benefit to the
state was "too inconclusive,"1 s given the demonstrated burden on
commerce. The Court in Bibb specifically rejected the language in
Barnwell that had suggested that "no showing of burden on inter123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 424 U.S. at 371-72.
127. 432 U.S. at 350, 354.
128. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
129. Id. at 187.
130. See text accompanying note 84 supra.But see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
131. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
132. Id. at 523.
133. Id.
134. "Interlining" is a shipping operation that involves the physical transfer of a trailer
from one carrier to another without unloading the cargo. It is an especially important process
in the trucking of perishables or other cargo that would be spoiled if unloaded before reaching
the final destination. The statute in Bibb would have substantially interfered with interlining
as it would have required the transfer of cargo to a trailer meeting the Illinois standards or
the alteration of the trailer. 359 U.S. at 527-28.
135. Id. at 530.
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state commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations in
absence of some element of discrimination against interstate commerce."' 38 Bibb was therefore a case in which a nondiscriminatory
safety regulation imposed an excessive burden on commerce in violation of the dormant power of the commerce clause.' Because of
the strong state police power interest in highway safety, due deference was given to local interests but in the end, the national interest
in facilitating interstate commerce prevailed. The balancing approach of Bibb, which focuses on the extent of the state's benefit
and the scope of the burden on commerce, has become the prevailing mode of analysis in negative commerce clause cases.13
C.

The Nature of the Subject Matter Regulated (Herein of the
Need for Uniformity)
In addition to examining the extent of the burden on commerce
posed by a state regulation, the Court will scrutinize the nature of
subject matter regulated. Since the decision in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens,'39 the Court has held invalid state regulatory laws that
deal with subjects that by their nature require national uniformity
of regulation. The Court in Cooley noted that some subjects
"imperatively" call for a "single uniform rule, operating equally on
the commerce of the United States"'' while others permit diversity
in regulation. "Whatever subjects. . . are in their nature national,
or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."''
136. Id. at 528-29.
137. See also the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun in Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978):
Nineteen years after Bibb, then, the Court has been presented with another of those

cases-"few in number"--in which highway safety regulations unconstitutionally bur.
den interstate commerce. The contour mudflaps law burdened the flow of commerce
through Illinois in 1959 just as the length and configuration regulations burden the flow

through Wisconsin today. It was shown that neither the mudflaps nor the regulations
contributed to highway safety. Giving the same legislative leeway to Wisconsin that the
Court gave to Illinois, Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines requires reversal of the judgment

of the District Court.
Id. at 799.
138. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978); Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 142 (1970). But
see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).

139. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
140. Id. at 319.
141. Id.
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In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,142 the Court noted that
states cannot excessively burden commerce, nor can they "regulate
those phases of the national commerce which, because of the need
for national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be
prescribed by a single authority."143 Southern Pacific involved an
Arizona statute that as a safety measure limited passenger trains to
fourteen cars and freight trains to seventy cars. Although the Court
acknowledged the great burden on commerce for trains to uncouple
and recouple cars at Arizona's border14 and noted the slight safety
benefit from the law,"' the decision stressed the "confusion" that
would arise "under the varied system of state regulations" and the
"unsatisfied need for uniformity in such regulation." '46 A similar
concern surfaced in Bib b, the mudguard case, in which Justice
Douglas observed that conflicting state requirements as to mudguard specifications militated against permitting diversity of treatment,14 7 at least absent overriding interests not present in that case.
Although the Cooley line of cases is susceptible of a reading that
would focus conclusive attention on whether the nature of a particular regulated subject matter is local or national, it seems more likely
in the modern context that the need for uniformity criterion will be
seen as an important factor weighing in the scales of an overall
balancing process."'
D. The Nature of the Effect on Commerce (Hereinof
Discrimination)
A major theme of the Court's negative commerce clause cases
has been that discrimination against interstate commerce is extraordinarily disfavored. The problem, however, is to ascertain in a
variety- of contexts what the scope of the discrimination label is.
Professor Ernest Brown once concluded that the term
"discrimination" was an abstraction and shibboleth and that
"[s]uch symbols and slogans . . .offer not a great deal in either

understanding or guidance."

'

Professor Laurence Tribe agrees,

142. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
143. Id. at 767.
144. Id. at 775.
145. Id. at 779.
146. Id. at 774.
147. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529.30 (1959).
148. 'The validity of state action affecting interstate commerce must be judged in light
of the desirability of permitting diverse responses to local needs and the undesirability of
permitting local interference with such uniformity as the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce may require." L. Thm, supra note 37, at 325 (emphasis omitted).
149. Brown, supra note 29, at 228.
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arguing that "political unrepresentativeness"'5' is the critical factor
that explains the Court's interventionism to protect the national
economy-that is, regulations that discriminate against commerce
often "result from the inherently limited constituency to which each
state or local legislature is accountable . . . ."I" Discrimination is
seen, then, as a "surrogate" criterion, and not "a wholly satisfactory

alternative" at that. 112

Nevertheless, the Court has used the discrimination concept as
a means of expressing disapproval of particular kinds of state taxation and regulatory legislation that warrant searching judicial scrutiny. Thus, discriminatory state regulatory "3 and taxation legislation'54 has uniformly received the strictest form of judicial protection in commerce clause cases, in large part because such discrimination is deemed antithetical to the fundamental needs of a national marketplace and because, once permitted, such discrimination is contagious and difficult to cabin. Even in cases such as South
CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.' 5 in which
the Court adopted an extremely restrained reviewing posture in
determining the validity of a state highway regulation, the Court
indicated that discrimination .against commerce is extremely disfavored: "The commerce clause, by its own force, prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, whatever its form or
method."s
This prohibition applies to both state regulatory and taxation
legislation: "A burden on interstate commerce is none the lighter
and no less objectionable because it is imposed by a state under the
taxing power rather than under manifestations of the police power
in the conventional sense."' Thus, the Court has endorsed the
"fundamental principle" that "no state may, consistent with the
150. L. Tams, supra note 37, at 327 n.7.
151. Id. at 326.
152. Id. at 327 n.7. See also id. at 326 n.2.
153. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535-36 (1978); Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).

154. See, e.g., Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886) (tax on nonresidents selling
liquor produced out-of-state held invalid); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1880) (license
tax on sellers of out-of-state merchandise held invalid); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1879)
(tax for use of public wharves on vessels laden with goods produced outside Maryland held
invalid); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (license tax imposed only upon itinerant

salesmen who sold goods produced outside the state held invalid). More recently see Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
155.

303 U.S. 177 (1938).

156. Id. at 185; accord, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960).
157.

Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1946).
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Commerce Clause, 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce

. '"'" Indeed, it seems that in the state taxa-

tion situation, the Court has indicated that discrimination against
interstate commerce will continue to be prohibited outright, without consideration of competing state interests or the existence of
adequate, nondiscriminatory alternatives. In the regulatory context,
on the other hand, the Court, though regarding some forms of discrimination as inherently suspect, appears willing nevertheless to
consider at least to some extent alleged state regulatory justifications "both in terms of local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to
preserve the local interests at stake.""' Presumably, tax measures,
which generally are aimed at revenue raising, are not supported by
the same type of independent justifications that might support regulatory, police power laws. Consequently, once discrimination is
found in a tax case, the matter ends without the need for further
weighing of state and national interests. Adequate, nondiscriminatory alternatives always exist in the taxation situation through
other forms of revenue raising, ' and when taxes are designed not
only to generate revenue but also to provide economic incentives,
other types of direct economic subsidies serve as ready substi61
tutes.
That the Court will carefully scrutinize discriminatory legislation does not answer the threshold question of determining when a
tax or regulation is indeed discriminatory, the problem next to be
considered. It is analytically convenient at this point to consider
separately the regulation and taxation cases, examining the several
types of effects on commerce that have been labeled discriminatory.
(1) Regulation Cases
Of the several effects on commerce that can result in the application of a label of discrimination for a regulation, the first and most
obvious

12

is purposeful, differential treatment of in-state and out-

of-state business. The absence of facial discrimination and an in158. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
159. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
See also Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 638 (1951) ('Taxation that threatens
interstate commerce is. . .bad, . . . but regulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the
same basis as local sellers cannot be invalid for that reason.")
160. See generally Powell, State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause,31 YMAL.J.
799, 802 (1922).
161. E.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
162. See Section III (A) supra.
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ability to prove purposeful discrimination, however, are not fatal
to a claim of discrimination under the commerce clause. Even if a
statute is intended to promote a legitimate police power purpose,
the Court can find that it has "the practical effect of not only burdening. . . but also discriminating against"1 3 interstate commerce.
Discriminatory effects have taken numerous forms. Preferential
treatment for local consumers in the use of natural resources has
been held discriminatory and therefore invalid. 164 Similarly, state
laws that restrict the export of natural resources have been held
impermissible when the practical effect is to harm an out-of-state
industry that is dependent on those resources.6 ' Thus, the commerce clause places limits on the ability of the states to reserve, for
their own use, resources that exist or are produced within their
borders. 6
Discrimination has also been found in the converse situation,
in which a state seeks to protect its own industry from external
competition.6 7 This type of discrimination keeps foreign commerce
out of state markets by depriving it of its ability to compete with
local business. A classic illustration of this was a Minnesota meat
inspection statute, which prohibited the sale of meat without a
certificate of inspection from a local health official indicating that
the animal was healthy within one day prior to slaughter. The statute effectively barred from the state all sale of meat slaughtered outof-state. The Court rejected Minnesota's argument that the inspection system was not discriminatory because it was applicable to all
meat sellers alike-in-state and out-of-state.168 Rather, the Court
concluded that the effect of the law was to create "discrimination
against products and business of other States"'69 in violation of the
commerce clause's protection of the rights of nonresidents in reach70
ing the Minnesota market.1
163. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (1978).
164. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Pennsylvania
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
165. E.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
166. See notes 199 & 478 infra. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189
(1925); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921). See Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mont. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978). See alsoBison, Economic ProtectionPowers of States Under
the Commerce Clause, 38 GEo. L.J. 590, 613 (1950) (discussing decisions following Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)).
167. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
168. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 326 (1890).
169. Id. at 323.
170. Id. at 328-29.
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Similarly, the Court found the city of Madison's milk inspection ordinances discriminatory in that they "in practical effect
exclude[d] from distribution in Madison wholesome milk produced
and pasteurized in Illinois."'' Among other things, the city of Madison prohibited the sale of milk within its jurisdiction unless it came
from a source of supply that had been issued a permit after inspection by city officials. The city refused to inspect farms located more
than twenty-five miles from the center of Madison, thereby making
it impossible for out-of-state processors to sell milk on the Madison
market. Although there was no objection to the purpose of the legislation-assuring sanitary operation of milk processing-the Court
1 2
found the exclusionary effect to be inherently discriminatory.
13
Finding that adequate, nondiscriminatory alternatives existed,
the Court concluded that the city could not constitutionally "adopt
a regulation not essential for the protection of local health interests
and placing a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce."'74
There need not be, however, a total exclusion of out-of-state
business in order to support a finding of discrimination against interstate commerce. A competitive disadvantage imposed on an external industry may be enough to warrant a conclusion that discrimination exists. In the case of Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,"'5 for
example, an out-of-state producer challenged the New York Milk
Control Act, which set minimum prices for all wholesale purchases
of milk in New York and which also prohibited the New York sale
of any milk bought for less than the price established by law. Although the regulation arguably applied evenhandedly to local and
foreign industry, the Court held that the Act worked a discrimination against interstate commerce since the practical result of the
pricing arrangement was the mitigation of lower cost competition
from out-of-state milk.1 76 The minimum wholesale price when added
to transportation charges incurred by out-of-state milk, tended "to
suppress or to mitigate the consequences of competition between the
states," and to "neutralize advantages belonging to the place of
origin.' 17 7 The Baldwin rationale was later applied by a unanimous
171. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
172. Id. at 354.
173. Id. at 354-55.
174. Id. at 356.
175. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
176. Id. at 527.
177. Id. at 522, 577. Cf. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (A Washington statute placed a 2% tax on retail sales within Washington and imposed a compensating
use tax on goods purchased out-of-state and brought into Washington. The Court upheld the
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Court to invalidate a state regulatory scheme that in effect reserved
to local producers a substantial share of the local milk market by
requiring state wholesale milk purchasers to buy a certain proportion of their supply from in-state producers at a fixed price.178
Most recently, the Court found an impermissibly discriminatory effect from a North Carolina apple-labeling statute that required all closed containers of apples sold in the state to bear "no
grade other than the applicable U.S. grade or standard." ' The
effect was to disadvantage apples grown in the state of Washington,
which had developed its own classification system and whose apples
were graded in accordance with that scheme. "In all cases, the
Washington State grades.

.

. [were] the equivalent of, or superior

to, the comparable grades and standards adopted by the United
States Department of Agriculture.""'8 The unanimous Court, per
Chief Justice Burger, found three forms of discrimination. First, the
North Carolina statute raised "the costs of doing business in the
North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers,
while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected."" 1 This exacerbated a competitive disadvantage that already existed because of high transportation costs. Second, the
North Carolina statute eliminated the advantages to Washington
producers of that state's superior inspection and grading system.
This effect only harmed the Washington producers, not those in
North Carolina. 82 Third, the statute had a "leveling effect which
insidiously operate[d] to the advantage of local apple producers." 1'1 Without the North Carolina restrictions, Washington producers would have had a market advantage when the Washington
grade was superior, but the North Carolina statute required a
"down grading" that provided the local apple industry "the very
sort of protection against competing out-of-state products that the
' 84
Commerce Clause was designed to prohibit.'

The Court's unanimous conclusion in Hunt is recent evidence
that the effects of state regulatory legislation will be carefully examined to determine whether a competitive disadvantage is imposed
on foreign competitors. In this regard, it reflects reaffirmation of the
tax despite its practical effect of equalizing competitive advantages among dealers in different states.).
178. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 377 (1964).
179. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 339 (1977).
180. Id. at 336.
181. Id. at 351.
182. Id. at 352.
183. Id. at 351.
184. rd. at 352.
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Court's commitment to examine the practical economic consequences of state regulatory legislation and to act sternly and decisively against such measures when they advantage local interests at
the expense of out-of-state interests.
Another economic effect the Court has viewed "with particular
suspicion" results from "statutes requiring business operations to be
performed in the home state that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere."' x In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 88 the state of
Arizona prohibited a cantaloupe grower from transporting uncrated
cantaloupes from its Arizona farm to a packing and processing plant
located in California. The state claimed that it sought to "promote
and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging,"' l but the Court struck down the regulation,
finding it an unjustifiable burden on commerce. The practical effect
of the regulation was to require that the company relocate its packing operation from California to Arizona and construct a new
$200,000 packing plant in Arizona. The Court strictly scrutinized
this type of effect, noting: "The nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more significant than its extent."' For the unanimous
Court, Justice Stewart indicated that the nature of the Arizona
law's effect made it "virtually per se illegal,"' 89 justifiable only when
"a more compelling state interest" can be shown.'
2
Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell, 91 cited approvingly in Pike,1'
the Court held unconstitutional, as a violation of the commerce
clause, a South Carolina statute that required owners of shrimp
boats licensed to fish in state waters to unload and pack their catch
in-state before "shipping or transporting it to another state."'9 3 The
Court noted that, apart from the extensive burden on commerce
caused by the statute, there resulted a diversion into South Carolina
of "employment and business which might otherwise go to Georgia."' 4 The consequence was imposition of an "artificial rigidity""'1
on commerce, advantageous to the regulating state and harmful to
competitors. The Court therefore held the statute invalid,'96 despite
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 145.
Id.

190. Id. at 146.
191. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
192. 397 U.S. at 142, 145.

193. 334 U.S. at 403.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 404.
196. Accord, Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
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the acknowledged interest of the state in collecting a tax19 7 and in
conserving its shrimp, which earlier cases198 had held were the property of the state. "9
In summary, then, discrimination under a traditional negative
commerce clause analysis can be found by reason of a number of
effects of state regulation on commerce. Clear-cut facial lack of
evenhandedness or a finding of discriminatory purpose will support
such a finding, but absent these factors, discrimination may be
found when the state unduly interferes with the natural function of
the market to the disadvantage of politically underrepresented, outof-state commercial interests. This interference occurs when state
regulation gives preferential treatment to local consumers in the use
or exploitation of natural resources, when a state seeks to protect
its own industry from out-of-state competition by barring or impeding access to the state market, and when a state's regulation has the
purpose or effect of pressuring or requiring businesses to relocate
within the regulatory state.-"' This concept of discrimination will
now be considered in the context of taxation, rather than regulation,
cases.
(2) Taxation Cases
In the state taxation area, as in the regulatory field, the Court
initially prohibited "direct" taxation on interstate commerce, effectively insulating interstate transactions*from state taxation. Over
time, this "tax-free haven"20 1 approach gave way to the notion that
interstate commerce could legitimately be expected to bear its fair
share of the costs of running government. This philosophy was articulated in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue 0 2 as follows: "It
was not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to relieve those en197. 334 U.S. at 406.
198. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
199. For a recent decision on the problem of discriminating against out-of-state residents with respect to hunting of wildlife, see Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mont. 1976). The Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction in that case, sub noma. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977),
and has recently affirmed the district court decision, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978). See note 478 infra.
200. See generallyL. Tams, supranote 37, at 334. Professor Tribe describes two forms
of this relocation phenomenon: "(a) regulations which induce business relocations by
prohibiting exports of local resources unless certain processes have occurred locally; or (b)
regulations which induce business relocations by prohibitingimports of out-of-state products
unless certain processes have occurred locally."
201. See J. Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 337.
202. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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tax burgaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state
21 3
1
business.
doing
of
cost
the
increases
it
den even though
By 1959, in the well-known case of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,2 °' the Court (over Justice Frankfurter's strong dissent) permitted states to tax directly the net income from interstate business. Reflecting the emerging consensus,
Justice Clark concluded that "it is axiomatic that the founders did
not intend to immunize such commerce from carrying its fair share
of the costs of state government in return for the benefits it derives
from within a state." ' s The Court's attention thus turned away from
an examination of whether the incidence of a tax fell on interstate
commerce directly or incidentally; rather, the Court was concerned
with considerations of proper apportionment, the risk of multiple
taxation by different states, sufficient relationship between the taxable event and the taxing jurisdiction, and nondiscrimination
against interstate commerce. The Court did not expressly overrule
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor,"' which held that states could
not tax the privilege of transacting interstate business, but on the
same day that it decided NorthwesternStates PortlandCement, the
Court clearly began the process of eroding the Spector rule by holdgoing-concern value of a
ing that a state could legitimately tax 2the
7
business as measured by gross receipts.

1

The Spector standard was premised on "a blanket prohibition
against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction, ' 2 and in this regard was fundamentally inconsistent with the

underlying theory of Northwestern States Portland Cement."9 In
203. Id. at 254 (upholding a state statute taxing gross receipts received from the sale of
advertising by a magazine publisher and carrying on business within the state, even though
some of the advertisements were obtained from other states and the magazine was circulated
to subscribers outside the state). See Brown, supra note 29. See also Colonial Pipeline v.
Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975); W. Hellerstein, supra note 97.
204. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
205. Id. at 461-62.
206. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
207. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (REA U). There the
Court upheld a Virginia tax, levied on an express agency, which was based on a percentage
of gross receipts. The Court distinguished its decision in Railway Express Agency v. Virginia,
347 U.S. 359 (1954) (REA I) (holding a state tax on gross receipts invalid as a "privilege"
tax) on the grounds that the latter Virginia tax was imposed in lieu of other property taxes
and the use of gross receipts was only part of the formula to reach this end.
208. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
209. One commentator has stated that "[c]ontinued adherence to Spector. .. after
Northwestern States Portland Cement, cannot be justified." 70 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 835, 854
(1975).
Nevertheless, the Court appears to have been willing in the state taxation field to allow
doctrines to survive even though in parallel cases their conceptual underpinnings may have
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two 1975 decisions, the Court further distinguished Spector1 and
finally in 1977 overruled it forthrightly in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady."
In Complete Auto Transit, Mississippi levied what it called a
privilege tax on doing business within the state. Complete Auto
Transit was a Michigan corporation that transported motor vehicles by motor carrier for General Motors, which assembled the vehicles outside of Mississippi and shipped them by rail into the state.
These vehicles then were loaded onto Complete Auto Transit's
trucks for transportation from the railhead in Jackson, Mississippi,
to the dealers elsewhere in the state.
The Mississippi tax was equal to five percent of the gross income for this transportation and operated much like a sales tax in
that Complete Auto Transit was required to add the tax to the gross
sales price and to collect it at the time the sales price was collected.
For purposes of its analysis, the Court assumed that the transportation was in interstate commerce, 212 but nevertheless upheld the tax,
overruling Spector explicitly. For a unanimous Court, Justice
Blackmun indicated that, with the demise of the philosophical underpinning of Spector-that "interstate commerce should enjoy a
been eroded. Thus, the Spector rule arose despite the Court's earlier decision in Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948), which appeared to reject the idea that interstate
commerce is immune from state taxation and in that sense presaged the Court's subsequent
decision in Northwestern States PortlandCement about a decade later.
In Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948), the Court rejected a commerce clause challenge to a Mississippi tax imposed on capital used, invested, or employed
within Mississippi at the rate of $1.50 per $1,000.00 of the value of the capital used. The tax
had been imposed with regard to a national gas pipeline running 135 miles through Mississippi. The corporation owning the pipeline did no intrastate business and had no offices or
employees in Mississippi except to the extent necessary to maintain the pipeline. The Court
recognized that a state tax may be invalid because levied "upon the privilege of doing
interstate business within the state," an approach similar to that utilized in Spector, but
concluded that the Mississippi tax was not a tax on privilege and was valid. Id. at 88.
Consequently, even when Spector was decided there were cases that seemed to raise
questions about the premise on which Spector turned. It now seems, however, that the Court
has reached a consensus on the vitality of a principle of state taxation and is overruling cases
inconsistent with that premise. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977) (overruling Spector); Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring
Cos., 98 S. Ct. 1388 (1978) (overruling Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
302 U.S. 90 (1937) and Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947)).
210. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Standard Pressed Steel Co.
v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975). For a discussion of these cases, see W.
Hellerstein, supranote 43, at 149.
211. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
212. Id. at 276 n.4. The Court stated "[t]he Mississippi courts, in upholding the tax,
assumed that the transportation is in interstate commerce. For present purposes, we make
the same assumption."
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21 3
sort of 'free trade' immunity from state taxation" -the Spector
rule had "no relationship to economic realities" and stood "only as
a trap for the unwary draftsman." 2" Justice Blackmun therefore

concluded that the formalistic Spector rule "served only to distract"
from the basic inquiry whether the results from a particular tax were
"forbidden by the Commerce Clause. '215 "Simply put, the Spector
the problems with which the Commerce
rule does not address
216
concerned.
is
Clause

In rejecting the Spector approach, the Court sought to articulate guidelines that would direct attention to impermissible effects
21 7
of state taxation and "not the formal language of the tax statute. 218
At three separate places in the Complete Auto Transit opinion,
Justice Blackmun set forth four factors that were not present in the
case. Presumably, had any of these elements been alleged and
proved, a prohibited effect would have been demonstrated. The four

factors are: (1) a substantial nexus between the taxed activity and

the taxing state;29 (2) fair apportionment of the tax;22 (3) a fair
relation between the amount of the tax and the benefits provided
the taxpayer;2' (4) an absence of discrimination against interstate
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 279.

218. First, Justice Blackmun indicates
appellant in its complaint in Chancery Court, did not allege that its activity which
Mississippi taxes does not have a sufficient nexus with the state; or that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce; or that the tax is unfairly apportioned; or that it is
unrelated to services provided by the state.
Id. at 277-78.
Later, Justice Blackmun indicates, after canvassing some earlier decisions, that those
decisions have
considered not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and
have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against the interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state.
Id. at 279.
Finally, Justice Blackmun notes again that "no claim is made that the activity is not
sufficiently connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly related to
benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce,
or that the tax is not fairly apportioned." Id. at 287.
219. See note 218 supra; National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization,
430 U.S. 551 (1977).
220. See note 218 supra; L. ThmE, supra note 37, at 367-69. See generally Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278 n.6 (1977), and cases cited therein.
221. See note 218 supra;Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
See generally L. Tamrs, supra note 37, at 354-59.
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commerce. 222 The Court's emphasis on these factors appears designed to supply guidance for ruling on future commerce clause
challenges to state tax legislation. The standards reflect the Court's
determination to concentrate on the practical economic consequences of state taxation in reaching an accommodation between
state and national interests.
The articulation of the first three criteria, which have much in
common with due process notions of fairness and jurisdiction, 2s is

very likely to result in a restrained reviewing posture in many state
tax cases. 2 ' This, of course, has been the trend, as state taxing
power has gradually increased in the forty years since the Western
Live Stock decision. 221 The Court has been increasingly sympathetic
to the revenue needs of states, provided that adequate jurisdictional
and fairness safeguards are maintained.
What remains, however, as a firm judicial commitment, is a
willingness to invalidate state tax legislation that discriminates
against interstate commerce, the fourth criterion mentioned in
Complete Auto Transit. Every decision expanding states' taxing
power, up to and including Complete Auto Transit, has made the
bar against discriminatory taxation explicit. Just as the Court
reached a unanimous consensus on a set of comprehensive criteria
in Complete Auto Transit, it was also unanimous during the same
1976-77 term in reaffirming the 2 nondiscrimination principle by invalidating a discriminatory tax.

7

While the antidiscrimination principle emerges as one of the
few certain precepts in the constitutional review of state taxation
legislation, 22s the determination of what constitutes discrimination
222. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 335-36 (1977).
223. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), in which a shareholder brought an
action against nonresident corporate officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duties and
sequestered defendants' property in the state. The statutory situs of the property in the state,
it was argued, provided a basis for the quasi in rem jurisdiction of the state court. The
Supreme Court held that (1) property unrelated to plaintiff's cause of action cannot alone
support state court jurisdiction; the "minimum contacts" rule of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), must be met, and (2) the state's assertion of jurisdiction
based solely on the statutory presence of defendant's property in the state violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
224. This view conforms with the view expressed by Walter Hellerstein in his discussion
of StandardPressedSteel and Colonial Pipeline. See W. Hellerstein, supra note 43, at 19092.
225. See generally J. Hellerstein, supranote 43.
226. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
227. Id.
228. See generally Bison, supra note 166, at 593; Note, Developments in the
Law-FederalLimitations on State Taxation of InterstateBusiness, 75 Hnv. L. REv. 953,
962 n.44 (1962).
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has involved a continuing process of definition and has engendered
debate and confusion. As in the regulatory area, there is uniform
agreement that a tax levied only upon foreign commerce is patently
discriminatory and thus invalid. The first cases challenging state
taxes on the ground of discrimination, therefore, were instituted
against revenue measures that applied only to out-of-state businesses. For example, in the seminal case of Welton v. Missouri"' the
Court invalidated a license tax imposed only upon itinerant salesmen who sold goods produced outside the state. The Court in
Welton found that taxation scheme impermissibly discriminatory,
and the Welton rule has been uniformly adopted in subsequent
decisions.
Since the Court has so consistently set aside taxes laid solely
on foreign commerce because of its out-of-state source, 23° few current
statutes explicitly single out interstate commerce for taxation while
leaving intrastate business tax free.2sl Facial discrimination, however, is not necessary to support a finding of discriminatory effect.
A taxing statute that nominally treats all trade alike might discriminate in practical operation against interstate commerce by providing local business with a competitive advantage.2 32 Thus, beginning
with the decision in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,2
the Court invalidated a series of state "drummer statutes" that laid
license taxes on all salesmen soliciting orders for the purchase of
goods to be shipped interstate. Although the statutes arguably applied to all solicitors no matter what the source of their merchandise,21 the Court was sensitive to the need, peculiar to out-of-state
manufacturers, for drummers' services. 235 Finding that the statute
in fact put salesmen doing business interstate at a disadvantage
229. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
230. See generallyL. TRItE, supra note 37, at 355. See also Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64
(1963); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
231. But see Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
232. E.g., Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
233. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
234. The Tennessee tax set aside in Robbins was imposed on "[aill drummers, and
all persons not having a regular licensed house of business . . . offering for sale or selling
goods ... by sample." Id. at 490-91. The Court rejected the argument that the statute
applied equally to local and foreign solicitors and thus did not discriminate, noting that in
practice, only out-of-state merchants and manufacturers depended upon these agents to sell
their wares. Accord, Nippertv. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell,
311 U.S. 454 (1940).
235. In addition, the statute's apparent purpose--the protection of local merchants
from foreign competition-facilitated a finding of discrimination. See McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 56 n.11 (1940).
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when competing with local retail merchants making untaxed sales,
the Court made it clear that such discrimination would not be tolerated.25
Fifty years later, in Nippert v. City of Richmond,27 the Court
reaffirmed its drummer holdings in a case involving a variation on
the tax theme in those cases.218 The city of Richmond had imposed
license and earnings taxes on all itinerant solicitors of orders for the
sale of goods. Although noting that the tax was applied equally to
sellers of in-state and out-of-state goods,2ss the Court recognized
that foreign distributors of necessity employed solicitors to sell their
products, whereas local manufacturers could rely on sales by untaxed retail merchants. The "varied differences between interstate
and local trade" 20 thus made foreign commerce bear an unequal
share of the tax burden and rendered the tax unconstitutional.
236. See, e.g., Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Davis
v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914); Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401 (1913); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913); Caldwell v. North
Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902); Brennan v. City of
Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); Asher v. Texas,
128 U.S. 129 (1888); Corson v. Maryland, 120 U.S. 502 (1887). See generally Lockhart, The
Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HA v. L. REv. 617, 621 n.21 (1939).
237. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
238. In Nippert, the city of Richmond contended that the Court's decisions upholding
taxing on interstate sales (e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33
(1940)) had overruled the drummr cases. The Court, however, held that since the tax could
be used to discriminate against commerce, it was invalid despite the expansion of the state's
power to tax interstate sales. See West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 354
U.S. 390 (1957).
It is noteworthy, however, that the rationale of the drummer cases has not been applied
to taxes on peddlers, i.e., sellers who travel "from place to place within the state, selling goods
that are carried about with the seller for the purpose." Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S.
95, 101 (1919). In his treatise, Professor Tribe notes that so-called "peddler" taxes "are
usually upheld unless they are facially discriminatory." L. Tama, supra note 37, at 357. But
see Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389,395 (1952) ("The 'peddler'
cases. . . support state taxation only where no discrimination againstinterstate commerce
appears either upon the face of the tax laws or in their practical operation."). Professor Tribe
describes the differing treatment given the peddler and drummer cases by the interaction of
two factors:
(a) the Court has found peddling to be a local activity distinct from any interstate
movement which preceded it, and a nondiscriminatory license tax on peddlers is therefore 'a valid exercise of the power of the State over persons and business within its
borders;' [Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296, 322 (1895)]; and
(b) while drummers have been assumed to compete with local retail merchants operating from fixed locations [citation omitted], the Court has concluded [citation omitted]
that peddlers ordinarily compete with other peddlers, so that a tax structure not discriminating among peddlers may be assumed not to discriminate at all.
L. TRIBE, supra note 37, at 357-58.
239. In this regard, Nippert is distinguishable from the drummer cases since in those
cases the tax levied applied only to sellers whose merchandise came from outside the state.
240. 327 U.S. at 432.
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In determining whether a discriminatory impact exists, the
Court has compared the effect of a tax on out-of-state salesmen with
the existing tax on their competition, local retail merchants. Thus,

in Best & Company v. Maxwell,21 the Court examined a North
Carolina statute that imposed a 250 dollar tax upon "persons soliciting sales by display of samples in a hotel room. '242 In practical
operation this tax applied only to sellers of foreign goods, and since
local retailers were charged only one dollar each year for the privi-

lege of doing business, the Court held the solicitation tax unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 211 On the other hand, the use
tax now commonly imposed on interstate sales to state residents has

been upheld only because such taxes are designed to achieve parity
between local and out-of-state sellers.? 4 Although the use tax is
directed specifically at interstate sales, the Court has concluded

that it does not discriminate against interstate commerce, but
merely balances the sales tax burden on local transactions with an
equal burden on out-of-state acquisitions. 24 5 Since "equality is the
theme of the statutes," ' the use tax system has withstood constitu27
tional attack.
241. 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
242. Id. at 455.
243. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952). In that
case, a privilege tax imposed upon each person soliciting business for an out-of-state laundry
was held to violate the commerce clause because laundries not licensed in-state paid a tax of
$50 per truck. Seen as a tax on the solicitation of interstate business, the tax fell under the
drummer cases. Seen as a peddler case, however, see note 238 supra,the tax was held invalid
as discriminatory since the $50 fee on out-of-state laundry trucks exceeded the $8 per truck
fee paid by in-state laundries. Id. at 394-95. See also West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957).
244. GeneralTrading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Hennefordv. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
245. 300 U.S. at 583-84. See also Dunbar-Stanley Studios, Inc. v. Alabama, 393 U.S.
537 (1969); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961) (Court upheld state tax statutes that
on their faces discriminated against interstate commerce on the ground that local commerce
was subjected to an equivalent tax). In Dunbar-Stanley,the Court upheld a $5 per week tax
on itinerant photographers. Since Alabama photographers operating at a fixed location paid
an annual privilege tax of from $5 to $25, a North Carolina photographic firm that sent agents
into Alabama periodically failed to show that any transient photographers paid more than
the in-state license fee.
In Arctic Maid, the Court upheld a 4% tax on out-of-state salmon freezer ships that took
salmon from Alaska to other states for canning. Since the freezer ships were competitive with
Alaska canneries, which paid a 6% tax on all salmon they processed, the tax was held to be
nondiscriminatory.
246. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937).
247. In National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551
(1977), the Supreme Court recently restated the reasons for upholding sales-use tax schemes.
The Court noted:
All States that impose sales taxes also impose a corollary use tax on tangible property
bought out of State to protect sales tax revenues and put local retailers subject to the
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While an evenhanded tax may inadvertently place a heavier
burden on out-of-state than on in-state concerns and still not violate
the commerce clause,us it is nevertheless axiomatic that the Constitution will not tolerate discrimination against interstate commerce.
Thus the sales-use-tax system in HalliburtonOil Well Co. v. Reiy 2 1
was declared unconstitutional, not because the system itself was
objectionable, but because the tax as drafted was discriminatory.
The Louisiana use tax was applied to the full value of a
manufacturer-user's equipment that was produced in another state
and subsequently used in Louisiana. Had the manufacturer constructed his equipment in Louisiana, its labor and shop overhead
costs would have been excluded from the use tax base, so that the
manufacturer would have paid tax only on the materials used to
assemble the equipment. Recognizing that the provision favored the
local manufacturer-user over his out-of-state counterpart, the Court
found no adequate justification for the discrepancy and thus set the
tax aside.2O The Court also found that the sales-use pattern contained a more blatant form of discrimination against interstate
' the use tax
commerce, because as Louisiana "baldy admitted,"251
applied to products purchased in "isolated sales"rs2 that were exempted from the sales tax. 53 The Court held that the discriminatory
exemption made local isolated sales more attractive to Louisiana
purchasers than the same sales accomplished out-of-state. Finding
no justification&4 for this discrimination, the Court refused to allow
sales tax on a competitive parity with out-of-state retailers exempt from the sales tax
[citation omitted]. The constitutionality of such state schemes is settled.
Id. at 555.
248. For example, the Court intimated in Silas Mason that a state need not provide a
credit for sales tax paid to other states in order to preserve the constitutionality of its system.
300 U.S. at 587 (1937). See Note, ProblemsArising from Hennefordv. Silas Mason Co., 51
HARv. L. Ray. 130, 132 (1937).
249. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
250. The Court rejected the contention that, because the foreign manufacturer-user was
treated the same as the local retail purchaser of the oil well servicing equipment, the tax was
not discriminatory. Since the in-state manufacturer-user, the local entity most similarly
situated to the plaintiff, enjoyed a tax advantage (the exclusion of labor and shop overhead
costs) not provided the plaintiff, the tax was unconstitutional.
251. 373 U.S. at 73.
252. Id.
253. The sales tax was levied only on retail sales and exempted purchases from those
persons not in the regular business of selling the item in question. The use tax applied to all
items purchased in other states and imported to Louisiana and thus did not distinguish
between out-of-state isolated and retail sales. Cf. State v. Bay Towing & Dredging Co., 265
Ala. 282, 90 So. 2d 743 (1956) (holding that an Alabama exemption for in-state isolated sales
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause unless the same exemption was provided
for out-of-state sales).
254. Louisiana argued that it granted a sales tax exemption because any item sold in
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the mitigation of interstate competition achieved by the isolated
sales exemption.
The discrimination issue has most recently been raised in a case
involving state taxation of funds moving in the capital market. In
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,2ss six regional
stock exchanges challenged an amendment to New York's transfer
tax on the sale of securities.ss As originally enacted, the statute
applied one tax rate to any transaction, a part of which occurred in
New York.2s7 Thus a deal involving an in-state transfer and an instate sale was taxed in the same manner as was a transaction in
which an in-state transfer followed an out-of-state sale. In response
to a complaint from the New York Stock Exchange about competition from regional Exchanges that operated free from transfer taxes,
New York amended the statute. Under the amendments the transfer
tax was reduced if the taxpayer made his sale within the state.2 '
Since most stock is transferred in New York and thus is subject to
the transfer tax,2sB the tax reduction for transactions involving New
York sales operated to give the investor a financial incentive to sell
on the New York Stock Exchange. A unanimous Court struck down
the transfer tax as amended, adhering to the fundamental principle
that no state may discriminate against interstate commerce. In so
doing, the Court articulated a new test for determining whether a
an isolated sale already had been subjected to a sales and use tax, and further contended that
the use tax on an out-of-state isolated sale likewise could be abated by the amount of any
tax previously paid. The state, however, failed to produce any regulation allowing for such
reduction of the use tax. 373 U.S. at 74 n.8.
Although the state failed to advance the argument, the Court noted that administrative
difficulties in enforcing the taxing measure on out-of-state transactions could not justify a
discriminatory exemption since an extension of total exemption would eliminate the collection problems as well as the discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. at n.9.
255. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
256. N.Y. TAxLAw (Consol.) §§ 270 to 270-a (1976). The tax rate imposed depends upon
the selling price and the total number of shares sold.
Securities have been recognized as interstate commerce at least since 1946. In the case
of Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), the Court found that an Indiana tax on the proceeds
from a sale of securities transacted on the New York Stock Exchange was an impermissible
burden on commerce and held: "Of course this is an interstate sale. And constitutionally it
is commerce no less and no different because the subject was pieces of paper. . . rather than
machines." Id. at 259.
257. The tax attached to a transfer transaction if one of the following five elements took
place in New York: (1) a sale; (2) an agreement to sell; (3) a memorandum of sale; (4) a
delivery; or (5) a transfer. The entire transaction was subject to the tax regardless of how
many of the elements occurred in New York. 429 U.S. at 321-22.
258. The amendment placed a $350 ceiling on the tax on any sale made in New York
by a resident or nonresident. In addition, residents got a 50% reduction of the tax if they made
their sales in-state.
259. 1968 Public Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 553, quoted in 429 U.S. at
327 n.10.
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tax is discriminatory. Under the new standard, if an individual
faced with a choice between an in-state and an out-of-state transaction would make his decision without being influenced by the state
tax consequences, the tax is nondiscriminatory. Since the New York
transfer tax "foreclosed tax-neutral decisions" ' by offering a tax
incentive for keeping business in or bringing business into New
York,2 1 the Court held the tax wholly inconsistent with the freetrade purpose of the commerce clause. The Boston Stock Exchange
Court thus established that funds in the capital market, like goods
moving in commerce, are resources the state cannot hoard or divert
for its own use to the detriment of interstate commerce.
Thus in the area of taxation, as in the field of state regulation,
the Court vigilantly has protected interstate commerce against discrimination, be it in the form of a burden imposed only on foreign
commerce, or in the form of a disguised competitive advantage for
local busin'ess. Moreover, in the Boston Stock Exchange case, the
Court's finding of discrimination was enough. It did not then proceed to evaluate the state's independent interests as it had done in
the regulatory context in Hunt.22 In a tax case, discrimination, by
itself, appears sufficient to justify invalidation because other, nondiscriminatory means of raising revenue or of providing economic
incentives are readily available.
IV.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONISM IN DIFFRING CONTEXTS: COMPARING
THE COURT'S APPROACH IN NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CASES

The Court's firm stand in protecting national free-trade interests against excessively burdensome and discriminatory state legislation stands out even more dramatically when juxtaposed with the
Court's evolving weltanschauungin other areas. Perhaps most striking is the Court's differential standards for proving discrimination
in commerce clause and other cases.
Application of the "discrimination" label is important in a
commerce clause case because it appears to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to otherwise legitimate state legislation.2 13 Thus, when a state regulates "even-handedly," the statute
"will be upheld unless the burden imposed on .

. .

commerce is

260. 429 U.S. at 331.
261. Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948).
262. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
263. See generally id. at 353.
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clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

' 24

That

is, in balancing state police power interests against national freetrade needs, the Court requires plaintiffs to show either that the
national interests are overriding2 5 or that the incremental benefits
to the state are insufficiently consequential to prevail.2 8 Otherwise,
a plaintiff cannot show that the burden on commerce is "clearly
excessive," 28 ' given the local benefits. When, however, discrimination is found in a regulatory measure, the Court reverses the burden
so that it "falls on the [sltate to justify [the discrimination against
commerce] both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives

adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. "' 68 If the state

cannot sustain this burden, then its discriminatory statute falls.
In the state taxation situation, the significance of a finding of
discrimination against commerce is even more consequential. Of the
four criteria the Court articulated in Complete Auto Transit,58 only
the discrimination factor will involve the Court in active judicial
scrutiny of state taxation legislation,-0 and under the analytical
framework of the unanimous Boston Stock Exchange case,r2l a finding of discrimination is, of itself, fatal in a state taxation case.
Unlike the Court's treatment of discrimination in the regulatory
context of Hunt, the Boston Stock Exchange opinion declined to
balance state and national interests at all. The only mitigating argument the Court would seriously consider was that no discrimination existed, either because the New York tax was compensatory in
nature, and therefore analogous to a "use" tax, 2 2 or because the
effect on commerce would be insignificant.2 3 Thus, a finding of
264. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
265. E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
266. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). Cf Great Att. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)
(requiring state interests of substantial importance to justify a reciprocity regulation when
balanced against the devastating effect on interstate commerce).
267. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
268. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
269. See note 218 supra.
270. See text accompanying note 224 supra.
271. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The opinion of the
Court was written by Justice White.
272. Id. at 331-32.
273. Id. at 333-34. The Court rejected the view that geographical rather than economic
factors would be the major determinants of where transactions would occur. The Court,
however, indicated that its decision would be the same even if geographical factors were
important in choosing an exchange on which to transact business:
Whatever the current inclinations of New York investors, the Clause protects out-ofstate businesses from any discriminatory burden on their interstate commercial activi-
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discrimination in a commerce clause challenge to a state tax measure is tantamount to a holding of unconstitutionality.
In an analogous area, the Court has been faced with the problem of determining when state legislation, neutral on its face, is
racially discriminatory. The "race discrimination" label is important in equal protection cases for much the same reason as the
"discrimination against commerce" label is in commerce clause
cases-namely, it overcomes the presumption of validity normally
associated with state-made classifications., 4 Under modern equal
protection doctrine, state-imposed classifications that rely on race
-at least to the disadvantage of minorities275-are inherently
"suspect. 27 s This imposes what has been, since the Japanese relocation cases in 1944,27 an insurmountable burden of justification on

states 2ss to show that race classifications are necessary to promote
compelling state interests.7 9
In the early school desegregation cases,20 the problem of identifying racial classifications did not arise because Southern Jim Crow
ties. Even if the tax is not now the sole cause of New York residents' refusal to trade on
out-of-state exchanges, at the very least it reinforces their choice of an in-state exchange
and is an inhibiting force to selling out of state; that inhibition is an unconstitutional
barrier to the free flow of commerce.
Id. at 334 n.13.
The Court also held that discrimination "between two types of interstate transactions
in order to favor local commercial interests over out-of-state businesses. . . is constitutionally impermissible." Id. at 335.
274. See generally Developments in the Law: Equal Protection,82HAnv. L. Ruv. 1065,
1087 (1969).
275. The argument in so-called affirmative action cases, where race-based classifications are explicit, is that these do not suffer from the same defects as do racial classifications
that disadvantage minorities. See United Jewish Orgs. y. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161-62, 165-68
(1977). Compare Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976) with Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680, aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
276. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
277. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
278. The Court also has developed another strand of the strict scrutiny doctrine. When
a state law deprives a person of an interest labeled fundamental, the more searching review
also is triggered. At one time, it seemed that this standard, too, would be insurmountable,
as Chief Justice Burger once remarked. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Subsequent decisions, however, seem to acknowledge that the
compelling governmental interest necessary to override the individual interest at stake has
been demonstrated. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (demonstrating that the state's interest in prohibiting abortions becomes
more compelling as the pregnancy progresses).
279. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
280. See note 279 supra. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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laws were explicitly segregatory on their face. 8 , The difficulty came
when the Court confronted challenges to statutes that were not
explicitly segregatory, but that had a racially disproportionate im-

pact. The discrimination label was important because of the stricter
reviewing standard applied to racial classifications. In the seminal
decision of Washington v. Davis,282 the Court made clear that before
a finding of race discrimination can be sustained, more must be

shown than a disproportionate racial impact.2 Rather, the Court
required that a racially discriminatory purpose or intent be proven

in order to warrant strict judicial scrutiny:24 "Disproportionate

impact . . . [s]tanding alone . . . does not trigger the rule . . .

that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny
'28 5
and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
In part, the Court's apprehension of an impact or effect test
stemmed from the potentially sweeping consequences of such a rule.

The Court recited a long laundry list of statutes that might fall
under an impact analysis, indicating its dissatisfaction with the

implications for greater judicial oversight of legislative and administrative activity. 8 Explicitly, then, and partially for reasons of reticence relating to institutional role, the Court declined to adopt an
281. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 257 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist points out the difficulty of proving segregatory intent when a public
body performs an official act. The difficulty is increased when the official acts are spread over
a number of years and hence a number of different boards. Id. at 261-65. He also found fault
with the presumption of intent established by the majority, calling it "the product of judicial
fiat" and akin to a "principle of 'taint,' found in some primitive legal systems. . . ." Id. at
257. Seegenerally Blumstein, ConstitutionalPerspectiveson GovernmentalDecisionsAffecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAw & CoNTEW. PROB. 231, 289-93 (1976).
282. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
283. In a rather lengthy footnote in Davis, Justice White took the relatively unusual
step of disapproving a series of cases that had relied on a theory of disproportionate impact
in order to sustain a showing of race discrimination. Id. at 244 n.12.
284. The decision in Washington v. Davis was presaged in large measure by the Court's
earlier decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, in which the Court held that in a northern
school desegregation case, intent was the critical factor that had to be shown in order to prove
racial discrimination. The school desegregation cases, however, can lend confusion because,
where racial discrimination has been proven, the standard applied during the remedies portion of the case is effectiveness rather than purpose. Thus, there is language in cases such as
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), that indicates that if a remedy is not effective then it will
be inadequate, even absent the showing of intentional discrimination. The desegregation
cases, however, show a clear distinction between the establishment of a substantive violation,
where a showing of intent is necessary, and the remedies phase, where effect is the test. See
Blumstein, supra note 281, at 291 n.380.
285. 426 U.S. at 242.
286. 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14.
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effect or impact formula for determining the existence of racial discrimination." 7
This approach is in considerable contrast to the very justification for focusing on effect or impact in determining discrimination
in the commerce clause context. While recognizing that facial discrimination and impermissible purpose are disfavored in commerce
clause cases, the Court has noted that the absence of such factors
"does not end the inquiry." Rather, the Court will examine the
practical effects of state legislation even when a state does not
"artlessly" disclose "an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.

'28

The very reason for focusing on effect or impact

287. The rule for establishing sex discrimination is analogous to that for proving racial
discrimination. See Blumstein, supra note 281, at 293-97. The key cases are Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (which
followed the approach set out in Geduldig). In Geduldig, the Court sustained California's
decision not to include normal pregnancies as covered disabilities within the state-run disability insurance program. The Court rejected the argument that California's exclusion of
pregnancy reflected a sex-based classification. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart
concluded that the program drew distinctions between "pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes." 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. The Court explained:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.
Id.
Most recently in City of Los Angeles v. Manbart, 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978), the Court found
impermissible sex discrimination in a pension plan that required female employees to contribute large sums to receive equal pension benefits. The plan was primarily based on mortality tables showing that female employees had greater longevity than male employees and that
the total cost of a pension for the average female retiree was greater than for the average male
retiree because more monthly payments had to be made to the female. The Court concluded
that the antidiscrimination statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), required that "the existence
or nonexistence of 'discrimination' . . .be determined by comparison of. . .individual
characteristics." 98 S.Ct. at 1375. Justice Stevens for the majority held that the statutory
policy required a "focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." Id. at 1376.
Despite Justice Blackmun's conclusion that Manhart was an erosion of Geduldig and
Gilbert, id. at 1384, it seems more plausible to accept the decision in Manhartas a vigorous
assertion that sex-based classifications cannot easily be justified rather than a retreat from
the principles established in Geduldig for determining when a classification is in fact sexbased. As Justice Stevens asserted, "the question of fairness to various classes affected by
the statute is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address. Congress has decided
that classifications based on sex, like those based on national origin or race, are unlawful."
Id. at 1376. Even the dissenters (Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist) did not seriously
challenge the sex-based nature of the classification. Instead, they argued that the classification was justifiable (given the different longevity of men and women) and not explicitly
barred by the Act. Id. at 1384.
288. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)
(quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)).
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is that otherwise states would be permitted too much leeway to act
in furtherance of parochial interests at the expense of national free
trade. Indeed, the Court's doctrinal emphasis assures it of an active
role in vindicating federal interests when discrimination against
commerce is identified.
The Court's distaste for equal protection interventionism is also
reflected in its unwillingness to expand the select list of interests
deemed fundamental.2 81Paralleling the development of the suspect
classification doctrine, the fundamental interest analysis serves as
another vehicle for triggering a more activist judicial role. In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 1 a closely divided Court established a restrictive framework for determining what
interests would fall within the "inner circle. '21 For a five to four
majority, Justice Powell rejected a system whereby the Court would
decide on an ad hoc basis which interests were entitled to special
treatment. Justice Powell reasoned that decisions concerning the
"social or economic importance ' 12 of specific interests are legislative judgments, "not the province" of the Supreme Court,2 93 and

that the balancing of "relative societal significance"2 4 would involve the Court in a "legislative role. . for which the Court lacks
both authority and competence." 29 5 Thus, the "key" to
"discovering" whether an interest is fundamental "lies in assessing"
whether that interest is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution."2 51 The majority resolutely declined Justice Marshall's invitation to adopt a sliding scale of review, which would
have depended in part on the importance of the particular interest
at stake. 7
The type of interest balancing the Court has eschewed in the
equal protection area is precisely the kind of function it has performed in negative commerce clause cases. The retrenchment from
activism and the circumscription of the inner core of preferred inter289. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (welfare); Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (wdlfare).
290. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
291. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman employed the term "inner circle" to refer to those
"cases singled out upon substantive grounds for special scrutiny." Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CALia. L. Rzv. 305, 346 (1969).
292. 411 U.S. at 32.
293. Id. at 33.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 31.
296. Id. at 33.
297. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ests in recent equal protection analysis reflect a trend toward defer-

ence to state legislative and administrative judgments that does not
characterize the commerce clause decisions, especially the recent
ones. It seems apparent that, for the majority of Justices, the different institutional role of the Court in protecting national commerce
interests sufficiently distinguishes the situations, since the Court
has evinced its willingness to intervene aggressively to foreclose eco2
nomic balkanization. 98
V.

THE NEW FEDERALISM

To this point, I have shown a distinct disinclination on the part
of the new, ascendant Supreme Court majority to intrude on what
it perceives to be state prerogatives. The Court, in the comity cases,
has demonstrated an abiding respect for state court processes and
their integrity. 29 These cases also show an unwillingness to permit
expansive use of federal equitable powers to remedy perceived invasions of individual rights 0' when implementation would require detailed oversight or restructuring of state .goven-ment by federal

courts

01 The

Court's standing decisions0 2 reflect the Court's atti-

298. In addition to the equal protection line of cases, at least two other contrasting
examples highlight the relatively activist role the Court has adopted in commerce cases. With
respect to comity, the Court has grown increasingly unwilling to intervene when rights can
be vindicated through state courts. The seminal case here was Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). For examples of later decisions in this line, see Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434
(1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
See L. Tims, supra note 37, at 152-56; Fiss, supra note 1.
Standing is another striking area in which the Court has expressed reservations about
an interventionist stance. See notes 6 supra, & 324 infra. Justice Powell has been the most
articulate spokesman for the restrictive view. For ekample, in his concurrence in United
States v. Richardson, Justice Powell noted that restricting standing reflected a decision to
allocate power to a democratic forum of government and away from judicial authority. 418
U.S. 166, 188 (1974). For the majority in Richardson, Chief Justice Burger concluded that
there was a close relationship between the absence of standing and a finding of political
question. He noted that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate...
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance
of Congress, and ultimately to the political process." 418 U.S. at 179.
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the retrenchment from broad standing decisions
such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and even the
more recent decision in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), is apparent. Professor
Tribe has expressed strong objection to the Court's decision in Warth: "Nothing in article
III, in the canons of sound judicial administration or in the judicial precedents required so
harsh and bizarre a result." L. Taisa, supra note 37, at 97. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
299. See note 298 supra.
300. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
301. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
302. See note 298 supra.

NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

1978]

tude that many issues raised by public-interest-type lawsuits are
best left resolved by the political process. This theme is found in
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Richardson, in which he indicated that if, as a result of a narrow
standing ruling, nobody could challenge the secret funding of the
Central Intelligence Agency, then the matter likely had many characteristics of a political question.303 Similarly, in Warth v. Seldin,3 °
Justice Powell noted for the Court the close interrelationship between one's view of standing and one's view of the Court's appropriate institutional role in resolving constitutional disputes.3 °5 Notions
of standing, Justice Powell seemed to argue, were bottomed ultimately in the expansiveness with which one read Marbury v.
Madison. 6 Without self-imposed limits on access to the courts-not
required by the article III case or controversy requirement, but dictated as a matter of prudence or "judicial self-governance" 30 courts would become excessively involved in deciding "abstract
questions of wide public significance" better left to the politically
accountable branches of government." 8 The decisions in Warth
and subsequently in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization"9 give clear evidence of the Court's determination
increasingly to remit litigants to the political process for channeling
310
basic value conflict issues.
A.

The Usery Case

The Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Useryl,
represents another facet of the recent trend toward defining a new
framework for federalism. Unlike the equal protection, comity, and
standing cases, in which the Court invoked notions of judicial restraint to support its basic thrust toward federal disengagement, the
Usery case represents a more dramatic and activistic judicial blow
for states' prerogatives within the federal system. In Usery the Court
held invalid application of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 498.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
422 U.S. at 500.

308. Id.

309. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
310. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) ("Indeed, when an issue involves
policy choices as sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions,
the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature."). See generally
Note, supra note 48, at 1874-78.

311. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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(FLSA) to almost all public employees. Originally the FLSA had
required only that private sector employers pay their employees a
minimum hourly wage and one and one-half times their normal rate
of pay for work beyond forty hours per week. States and political
subdivisions were expressly excluded from coverage until, commencing in 1961, Congress gradually eliminated these exemptions
for public sector employers. FLSA coverage for employees of state
hospitals, institutions, and schools was upheld in Maryland v.
Wirt, 312 and in 1974 Congress broadened FLSA coverage so that
public agencies generally were considered employers subject to the
provisions of the Act. The Usery decision held invalid these amendments and overruled the Wirtz decision.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Darby313 had constitutionally endorsed the FLSA in its application to private employers.
In Usery Justice Rehnquist apparently did not seek to undercut the
general authority of Congress, under the commerce clause, to legislate when the means it chooses are "reasonably adapted to the end
permitted by the Constitution."3 '4 The Court found, however, that
congressional authority under the commerce clause differs when the
federal government deals with private individuals rather than with
states as states. Justice Rehnquist said that it would take a
"startling restructuring of our federal system" to allow Congress
"under its commerce power [to] deal with States as States just as
they might deal with private individuals."315 He noted further that
states have "attributes of sovereignty," ' which Congress cannot
impair.31 7 Without any elaboration, Justice Rehnquist concluded
312. 392 U.S.
313. 312 U.S.
314. 426 U.S.
241, 262 (1964)).
315. 426 U.S.

183 (1968).
100 (1941).
at 840 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,'379 U.S.
at 855 n.19. The Court also commented:

It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual
businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation
and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of

congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States. We
have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every

state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that manner.
Id. at 845.
316. Id.
317. The Usery decision terms the tenth amendment an "affirmative limitation" on the
federal commerce power; the holding, however, seems to indicate that there is an absence of
federal authority under the commerce clause. It is interesting tQ speculate what the theory
of the decision actually is, since the opinion is sufficiently ambiguous to be capable of either
interpretation. See note 48 supra; Note, supra note 48, at 1879 n.66. If the holding rests on
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that "[o]ne undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those whom
they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions,
what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be
provided when these employees may be called upon to work overtime. ' 31 1 The Court went on to determine that these employment
decisions are "essential" to the "separate and independent existence" 31 ' of states within the federal system and that congressional
displacement of state decisionmaking authority therefore "would
impair the States' 'ability to function effectively in a federal system.' "320 Accordingly, Usery held unconstitutional the FLSA to the
extent that it directly displaced the freedom of states "to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. 321 In short, under Usery "Congress may not exercise [the
commerce] power so as to force directly upon the States its choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral gov3
ernmental functions are to be made." 2
The decision in Usery is striking for a number of reasons. It
represents the first time in almost forty years that the Court has
intervened to protect state sovereignty interests against perceived
federal legislative encroachment. By invalidating the FLSA as applied to essential governmental functions, the Court actively asserted its views of federalism in opposition to a contrary congressional determination.3 2 In the court-access decisions, especially the
standing cases, the Court had invited Congress to change the balance the Court itself had struck when denying access in publicinterest litigation. 3 Usery constitutes a head-on confrontation with
the tenth amendment as an affirmative limitation, then there are broad implications for the
war power and spending power-areas of federal authority expressly not reached by the
decision. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The tenth amendment rationale would imply a broader limitation on federal power in these other areas. See Note, supra note 48, at 1884 & n.11.
318. 426 U.S. at 845.
319. Id. (quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869), as
quoted in Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
320. 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
321. 426 U.S. at 852.
322. Id. at 855.
323. Justice Brennan in dissent was particularly critical of this aspect of the majority's
decision, since he urged that the states were represented adequately in the political forum of
the Congress to protect their own interests in autonomy. Id. at 876. See also Choper, supra
note 51, at 1557-60.
324. Justice Powell has become the spokesman for the majority in the standing area.
See notes 6 & 298 supra. His concurrence in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180
(1974), marked the initial broad formulation of his position on standing. In Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975), and in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976),
Justice Powell spoke for the majority in standing cases. The Powell position, as developed in
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a coordinate branch in vindication of aspects of state sovereignty315-interposition of a form of state immunity against federal
legislative action.2 6 Usery's analytical style also appears to reflect
Warth, stresses the distinction between article IIf standing, which is the constitutional minimum, and prudential standing, which is based on principles of judicial self-restraint. The
article I1 minimum is the "injury in fact" that is articulated in such cases as Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152 (1970). This is the irreducible minimum; if no injury in fact is found, then Congress
cannot impose upon the Court an obligation to entertain the litigation. A failure to meet this
article Ill standard means that there is no "case or controversy" under the terms of article
I, and presumably a constitutional amendment would be necessary for adjudication of the
case or issues to take place in federal court.
In contrast, the principle of prudential standing contemplates that the litigant could seek
redress through Congress. When the Court declines to hear a case for prudential reasons, it
essentially invites Congress to augment its authority up to the maximum permitted under
article III. The Court's rationale, as articulated by Justice Powell (and earlier by Justice
Harlan), is that the judicial branch should be reticent to adjudicate constitutional issues on
important subjects by itself because of the risk of a head-on confrontation with the politically
accountable branches. Consequently, by inviting Congress to augment the authority of the
judiciary, the Court is acting in a more humble role. If it is to be the branch that ultimately
decides an important constitutional issue, at least it will have the explicit blessing of the
politically accountable branch.
Therefore, the Court's decisions in the standing cases are rather explicitly deferential to
the competence and legitimacy of Congress. In essence, the Court enters a dialogue with the
legislative branch, inviting it to grant the Court more power as the Congress sees fit-up to
the maximum limits imposed by article III. Although the Court in the standing cases has
declined to adjudicate issues raised by litigants who seek resolution of a fundamental constitutional question, the Court has not totally foreclosed litigants from a hearing-it has, however, required that the adjudication be blessed by the legislative branch. The Usery decision
is at quite some odds with the approach in the standing area, since it establishes a judiciallyimposed restriction on substantive decisions explicitly made by the Congress itself.
325. In this regard, since the confrontation is between the Court and Congress, the
Court's intervention in Usery is even more dramatic in some ways than its decision to adjudicate issues of legislative apportionment in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Indeed, in
Baker, one of the Court's major arguments was that the intervention was not as dramatic as
might appear because there was no direct confrontation between two coordinate branches of
the federal government.
326. There is a distinct tone in Justice Rehnquist's opinion that suggests the development of a states' rights counterpart to the individual right of privacy that has flourished in
the contraception/abortion line of cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The analysis suggests that state decisions concerning the
expenditure of tax-raised funds might be designated as a preferred power, subject to special
judicial safeguarding. Although not labeled as such, this notion is advanced in modified form
in Note, supra note 48, at 1888-91. That commentator suggests, in part, that when interests
in state autonomy are at stake, a court should require a "clear statement" from Congress that
it seeks to impinge on the protected interest. Id. at 1889. Moreover, where federal commerce
interests and state autonomy interests collide, the proposal is advanced that an accommodation give the "maximum scope to the autonomy interest which is consistent with the national
policy or purpose underlying the legislation. When an autonomy interest is implicated, Congress is required to choose the least intrusive means for accomplishing its goals." Id. See text
accompanying notes 416-20 infra.
For a very different perspective on the appropriate role of the judiciary in federalism
cases, see Choper, supra note 51.
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a groping on the part of the Court, or at least on the part of Justice
Rehnquist, the Court's spokesman on this occasion, in an attempt
to rediscover a formula by which the Court can become once again
a participant with the Congress in shaping the contours of federalstate relationships. Because the activism of the Usery decision (for
the protection of state autonomy) has much in common with the
Court's relative activism in the negative commerce clause cases (for
the protection of national economic interests) further discussion of
the analytical style in Usery is warranted.
Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court had taken an active
role in reviewing congressional legislation enacted under the commerce power 3 l Indeed, it was the Court's invalidation of major New
Deal initiatives that precipitated the Court-packing controversy
during President Roosevelt's second term.sss Although this direct
assault on the Court's integrity failed, the Court itself retreated
from its interventionist role, at first perhaps out of an instinct for
institutional self-preservation by an individual Justice or two, but
later by a transformation from within effectuated by new Roosevelt
appointees to the Court. Within a period of only four years, the
3 2
doctrinal retreat had been dramatic.
Prior to this transformation, one major technique of interventionism was the Court's insistence that federal legislation under the
commerce power concern activities having a "logical relationship"
or "logical nexus" with interstate commercesso Although earlier
cases had sometimes applied a "practical effects" test,"' which allowed federal regulation of state activities that in the aggregate
affected interstate commerce, the Court buttressed its interventionism on the logical nexus standard. Under that theory, practical
economic consequences were irrelevant to commerce clause analysis
of federal power. Rather, federal authority could only be founded on
an asserted logical relationship between the regulated activity and
commerce itself.3 - The logical nexus approach allowed the Court a
327. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
328. For a succinct discussion of the Roosevelt administration's Court reorganization
plan of 1937, see P. FREUND, A. SuTHERLAND, M. HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONsTrrnTIoNAL LAW
(CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS) 260-62 (4th ed. 1977).
329. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
330. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
331. E.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
332. A classic statement of this approach is found in the Carter Coal case, in which
Justice Sutherland wrote:
Whether the effect of a given activity or condition is direct or indirect is not always
easy to determine. The word "direct" implies that the activity or condition invoked or
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much greater opportunity for active review because it could reason
as well as Congress on logical relationships. When the practical
effects test superseded the logical relationship formula,", there was
considerably less room for judicial intervention since Congress as a
fact-finder presumably deserves deference, and the Court as an institution is at a comparative disadvantage in second-guessing Congress on that type of practical economic judgment.',,
Interestingly, in Usery the Court concluded that both the minimum wage and maximum hour components of the FLSA "will imblamed shall operate proximately-not mediately, remotely, or collaterally-to produce
the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition. And
the extent of the effect bears no logical relation to its character. The distinction between
a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the
effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought about. If the
production by one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate sale and shipment,
and actually so sold and shipped, affects interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does
not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed, or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by all combined. It
is quite true that rules of law are sometimes qualified by considerations of degree, as
the government argues. But the matter of degree has no bearing upon the question here,
since that question is not-What is the extent of the local activity or condition, or the
extent of the effect produced upon interstate commerce? but-What is the relation
between the activity or condition and the effect?
298 U.S. at 307-08 (emphasis added). See note 53 supra.
333. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941).
334. The multiplicity of variables that enter into a political or economic judgment call
for discretion of a type not easily reviewable by a court. This predictably has led the Court
to defer to the judgment of Congress. In this regard, it is no accident that subsequent to the
erosion of the logical nexus standard and its replacement by the practical effects test, the
Court did not disapprove of federal legislation enacted under the commerce clause for nearly
40 years.
Recognizing that "[fludicial validation of federal power as against states' rights has
often placed the Court at the center of a storm of controversy. . ... Choper, supranote 51,
at 1579. Professor Choper argues that the "federal judiciary should not decide constitutional
questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-A-vis the states; the
constitutional issue whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government
.. . should be treated as nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political branches."
Id. at 1557. Choper is concerned that the Court will use its political capital even when it
legitimates "the already-exercised authority of the Congressand President."Id. at 1581. This,
for Choper, is the "crowning injustice." Id. Professor Choper's suggestion that the Court
disengage from such validating decisions stems from his view that judicial intervention to
preserve federalism values "is unnecessary to effect the preservation of the constitutional
scheme." Id. at 1582. The Usery decision reflects an attempt on the part of the Court, it seems
to me, to develop a doctrine that will permit it to reinvolve itself in federalism issues of
federal-state power allocation. In essence, it recognizes the unworkability of the previous
standards of review in the commerce clause area for a Court that wishes to play a role in these
federalism, power-allocation issues. It has therefore sought a modest return to prior doctrines
that permitted a more interventionist judicial posture. Not surprisingly, given his interpretation of the Court's appropriate role in federalism matters, and the Court's track record in that
area, Professor Choper recommends that Usery be overruled. Id. at 1552.
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permissibly interfere with the integral governmental functions"ss3 of
state and local governments. The Supreme Court reviewed Usery on
appeal from a lower court's sustaining of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted.33 6 The
Court acknowledged that the "actual effects" 3 of the FLSA as
applied to state and local governments were a "matter of some
dispute among the parties"sss since the law had not yet gone into
effect. Nevertheless, even accepting the federal government's prediction of practical effect, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
"particularized assessments of actual impact" were not "crucial to
resolution of the issue presented." 39 Rather, the character or nature
of the decisions at stake was found determinative. This emphasis on
logical relationships-in this case what functions are integral or
essential to traditional state and local operations-represents a return to the pre-New Deal approach in commerce clause litigation,
an attempt to develop doctrine that would allow greater judicial
participation in defining state and federal power relationships.34
The Court's rejection of the need for "particularized assessments of
actual impact" and its reliance instead on the nature of the state
authority Congress sought to supersede are reminiscent of the analytical style of earlier interventionist decisions 3 41-a doctrinal groping for an appropriate participatory role for the Court in these commerce clause matters. 2
One other important technique used by the pre-New Deal
Court in invalidating federal commerce power legislation tacitly
reappears in the Usery decision. Since Chief Justice Marshall's
early dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland,343 the Court has wavered
in determining the permissible use of the commerce power to
335. 426 U.S. at 851.
336. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
337. 426 U.S. at 849.
338. Id. at 850.
339. Id. at 851.
340. See note 334 supra and accompanying text.
341. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
342. It is precisely this search for a participatory judicial role that is criticized by
Professor Choper, who urges that these federalism issues he declared nonjusticiable. See note
334 supra.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Usery claims that the majority's standard was based on a
"manufactured. . .abstraction without substance," 426 U.S. at 860, an "ill-conceived abstraction" at that. Id. at 867. He identifies the intellectual roots of Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in cases such as Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and ominously warns that the "eventual abandonment" of those "overly restrictive" cases "spelled
defeat for the Court-packing plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution." 426 U.S.
at 868. See notes 53 & 332 supra.
343. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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achieve general police power objectives. Chief Justice Marshall had
asserted that the federal government could not use an enumerated
power merely as a pretext for the accomplishment of other, unenumerated general welfare goals. This view stood at the heart of the
Court's short-lived decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart,341 in which
the Court struck down a federal statute that prohibited the interstate transportation of manufactured goods that had been produced
in factories employing child labor. Arguing that Congress could not
properly legislate to protect children under any enumerated power,
Justice Day found the predicate for federal action lacking since the
legislation sought not to regulate commerce, but to "standardize the
ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufactur34 That the pretext language of
ing within the States.""
McCulloch
governed in Hammer v. Dagenhartis clear from the dissent of Justice Holmes, who asserted that Congress could promote its own view
of public policy "by all the means at its command."' By prohibiting interstate transportation, Holmes argued, Congress was acting
on the flow of commerce, and its motive or "real" objective should
be constitutionally irrelevant.
Some points made in Usery implicitly reflect a revival of interest in the pretext notion, widely thought interred by United States
341 This revival
v. Darby,317 which overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart.
is especially apparent in the Usery Court's distinction of Fry v.
United States,,'" which upheld the Economic Stabilization Act of
197031 as applied to freeze temporarily the wages and salaries of
state and local government employees. The Court found the federal
interest in Fry more substantial because of the risk of severe inflation.35 ' Admittedly, Justice Rehnquist also saw the impact on state
functioning as less intrusive,52 but one must conclude from his opinion that he saw the federal program in Fry as embodying weightier
federal interests than the police power or general welfare goals promoted by minimum wage and maximum hour legislation.353 After
344. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
345. Id. at 271-72.
346. Id. at 281.
347. 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) ("The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate
commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.').
348. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
349. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
350. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976).
351. 426 U.S. at 853.
352. Id. ("The means selected were carefully drafted so as not to interfere with the
State's freedom beyond a very limited, specific period of time.")
353. Indeed, the Court in Usery concluded that Fry was "quite consistent" with the
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all, nationwide inflation involved macroeconomic considerations
that "only collective action by the National Government" might
counteract." 4 Implicitly, the Court's distinction of Fry, in which
Justice Rehnquist dissented, 3 5 represents a statement about the
relative propriety of federal action in the pursuit of national economic policy and in the pursuit of federal notions of fairness in
employment relationships. This theme is even more pronounced in
the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, who would rule differently in such areas as "environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential." '
Thus, the decision in Usery is consistent in some ways with the
activist trend in negative commerce clause cases because it restores
a judicial role in reviewing federal commerce power legislation. 37 It
revives an interest in doctrines that in an earlier era allowed for
greater judicial participation in defining boundaries of federal and
state power. On the other hand, Usery conforms to the growing
weltanschauung of the Court that states need breathing space in
which to operate, an area in which their judicial, legislative, and
administrative decisions have integrity, prevailing over even federal
interests in certain situations.
B.

The Hughes Case

While Usery reflects the Court's renewed interest in establishing bounds on federal authority under the commerce clause, the
contemporaneous decision in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.55
represents a narrowing of the Court's role in reviewing state actions
that arguably discriminate against interstate commerce. Hughes is
particularly noteworthy because it deals both with the negative
commerce clause, an area in which the Court's reviewing posture
has been relatively interventionist, and with an innovative state
highway beautification program that relied on governmental incentive payments to achieve environmental objectives and that can be
Court's holding. Id. On the other hand, the Court explicitly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), which had upheld application of the FLSA to schools and hospitals.
Despite the "obvious differences between schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the
fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded
their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled." 426 U.S. at 855.
354. Id. at 853.
355. 421 U.S. at 549.
356. 426 U.S. at 856.
357. But see Choper, supra note 51, at 1583.87.
358. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

VANDERRILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:473

analogized to a social welfare program. Faced with a potential conflict between the doctrine of its negative commerce clause cases,
which raised an almost insuperable presumption against state regulations that discriminated against out-of-state business,", and the
doctrine of its equal protection cases, which dictated judicial selfrestraint in the area of economics and social welfare programs, " ' the
Court held that the negative commerce clause analysis was inapplicable because the state's program was not "the kind of action
'
with which the Commerce Clause is concerned."361
Hughes involved an attempt by the state of Maryland "to deal
3 2
with the growing aesthetic problem of abandoned automobiles.
A legislatively commissioned study had concluded that "the root of
the problem was the existence of bottlenecks in the 'scrap cycle,' the
course that a vehicle follows from abandonment to processing into
scrap metal for ultimate re-use for steel mills." 36 3 Apparently,
wrecking companies would retain and accumulate vehicles in junkyards because the resale value of their spare parts was greater than
the profits that could be attained by delivery of the vehicles to scrap
processors" 4 The Maryland statute sought to intervene in this market by altering the economic incentives of wreckers so as to encourage them to deliver the vehicles for reprocessing. The mechanism
adopted was a system of bounty payments for the destruction by a
licensed processor of any qualified vehicle formerly titled in Maryland.365 Because of the processors' fears that they would be sued for
conversion by vehicle owners who could claim that they had not
abandoned their vehicles, the statute provided for appropriate documentation by which a processor could prove clear title and that the
processor had to present in order to receive the state bounty.6 However, these documentation requirements themselves imposed such
a significant impediment to the transferability of vehicles that the
legislature recognized a separate category of "hulks," vehicles over
eight years old and inoperable, for which no documentation was
required.6 7 Given the features of the market, virtually all bountyeligible vehicles actually processed were "hulks. 3 8
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See Section M(D) supra.
E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See Section IV supra.
426 U.S. at 805.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 800.
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As originally enacted, the Maryland program allowed out-ofstate processors to be licensed, and seven of the sixteen participating processors were located in Pennsylvania or Virginia."' The legislature, however, amended the statute to require title documentation
for processors to receive a bounty even for a hulk. This disadvantaged out-of-state processors because in-state processors could
claim their bounty by submitting a "simple document in which the
person who delivered the hulk certified his own right to it and agreed
to indemnify the processor for any third-party claims arising from
its destruction." 30 Out-of-state processors, on the other hand, could
not rely on such an indemnity agreement; they had to provide the
same documentation as was required generally for abandoned vehicles.37 ' This differential treatment of out-of-state processors resulted
in a "precipitate decline in the number of bounty eligible hulks"
supplied to out-of-state processors, primarily because of their inability to compete with in-state processors for hulks from unlicensed
2
wreckers.
The district court granted summary judgment to the processors, finding a violation of the commerce clause. 373 Although recognizing that the effect of the discriminatory amendment was to reduce interstate commerce and to encourage wreckers to deliver
hulks to in-state processors, the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting
the familiar analytical mode of commerce clause cases and finding
3
that analysis inappropriate under the facts presented.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell admitted that the district court's commerce clause analysis was "not without force if its
basic premise is accepted . . . . [i.e.] that every action by a State
that has the effect of reducing in some manner the flow of goods in
interstate commerce is potentially an impermissible burden.",,- Citing a number of its commerce clause cases, however, the Court held
them inapplicable because their
common thread ... is that the State interfered with the natural functioning
of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome
regulation. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks,
or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered
into the market itself to bid up their price. There has been an impact upon
369. Id. at 799.
370. Id. at 801.
371. Id.

372. Id. at 801-02.
373. Id. at 802. The district court also found the Maryland program to violate the equal
protection clause. Id. at 810.
374. Id. at 805, 807-10.
375. Id. at 805.
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the interstate flow of hulks only because, since the 1974 Amendment, Maryland effectively has made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose
of their hulks in Maryland rather than take them outside the State.'"

For the Hughes majority, the entry by the state into the market
was not the kind of coercive state action that threatened the unity
of the national marketplace. Justice Powell in four separate footnoteS377 emphasized the noncoercive nature of the discriminatory
state action. He also acknowledged that "any attempt by a State
to restrict or regulate the flow of commerce out of the State" is
"suspect," and that "[tihe same principle

. . .

makes equally sus-

pect a State's similar effort to block or to regulate the flow of commerce into the State." 378 Nevertheless, the Court declined to apply
commerce clause doctrine at all because it could not accept the
characterization of "Maryland's action as a burden which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect."3- 9
As a result, the traditional balancing analysis of negative commerce clause cases380 was not even entered into; the. commerce
clause did not require "independent justification" for a state's decision to enter the private market for environmental protection reasons.38 The reason, apparently, was that a state's entry into the
private market "as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of
commerce" does not create a burden on commerce "if the State
restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the
State." 82 Despite the shift in economic activity into the
state-normally considered impermissible when brought about by
a state taxation or regulatory provision 3"-Justice Powell found
that this was not a "trade barrier of the type forbidden by the
Commerce Clause."" 4 Hulks for reprocessing remained in-state "in
response to market forces, including that exerted by money from the
State. Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
forbids a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others."" 5
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

380.

See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978).

806.
803 n.13, 806 n.15, 810 n.20, 814 n.24.
808 n.17.

807.

381. 426 U.S. at 809.
382. Id. at 808.
383. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
384.
385.

426 U.S. at 810.
Id.

19781

NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued persuasively that the majority adopted a "categorical approach. . . which simply carves out
an area of state action to which. . the Commerce Clause has no
application.""' As Justice Brennan noted, the Court did not examine the state interest asserted, "the availability of reasonable and
nondiscriminatory methods for achieving the state interest," and
then conclude "with a reasoned and considered judgment under all
the circumstances of the permissibility of the action." 7 Rather, it
"recognized an area of state action absolutely immune from the
implied restraints of the Commerce Clause." '88
This categorizational approach has surfaced in a number of
other areas of the Court's jurisprudence as a technique for avoiding
a sensitive balancing of interests that established doctrine would
require. For example, in Kleindienst v. Mandel,389 the Court rejected
a first amendment challenge to a decision by the Attorney General
to deny a European Marxist academician a visa to lecture in the
United States. Despite acknowledging the existence of a first
amendment right to receive information,"' Justice Blackmun for
the majority held that when the executive exercises its statutory
authority to deny entry to a foreigner on "facially legitimate"
grounds, "the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First
Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication
with the applicant." 311 The Court's refusal to apply first amendment
principles in Kleindienst stemmed directly from its concern that
courts "would be required to weigh the strength of the audience's
interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the
particular alien applicant. . . . The dangers and undesirability of
making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size
of the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious." '92
Consequently, the Court concluded that, in the context of immigration, executive decisions which are "facially legitimate and bona
fide" are immune from first amendment scrutiny.1 3
The definitional or categorizational approach of Kleindienst,
386. Id. at 822 n.4.
387. Id.
388. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HIv. L. Rnv. 1, 60 (1976) [hereinafter 1975
Term].
389.

408 U.S. 753 (1972). See note 60 supra.

390. Id. at 762-64.
391. Id. at 770.
392. Id. at 769.
393 Id. at 770.
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which has been used in the areas of procedural due process, 94 prosecutorial immunity, 395 obscenity, 351 defamation," 7 corporal punishment,"' and possibly others, 39 9 is precisely the technique used in
Hughes. The Court found that the interests the state sought to
promote, environmental values, were legitimate; however, application of a commerce clause analysis would have required examination of nondiscriminatory alternatives1se The Hughes Court, of
course, never balanced state against national interests, just as the
Kleindienst Court declined to weigh the governmental interest
against that of the audience. Similarly, in the Kleindienst context,
traditional first amendment doctrine would have necessitated a
consideration of whether the governmental interest was of overriding or compelling importance and whether less restrictive alternatives were available to promote it."'1
The parallels between Hughes and such definitional cases as
Kleindienstare, therefore, clear. The question is what in the context
of Hughes led the Court to find that the state's action was beyond
commerce clause scrutiny, especially when it subsequently held
unanimously in Boston Stock Exchange1°2 that "a tax advantage
given to protect local industry is invalid. ' ' 1se
The Court's decision in Hughes noted that the ultimate state
objective was highway beautification, a legitimate environmental
goal, and that the discrimination had the reasonable consequence
of increasing the chance that payments made under the program
would be for cars actually abandoned in Maryland. Under an equal
protection analysis, this type of assumption might survive the minimal scrutiny the Court has given claimed inequalities under the
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the Court rejected an equal protection allegation in Hughes on the ground that Maryland "reasonably
could assume that a hulk destroyed by a non-Maryland processor
is more likely to have been abandoned outside Maryland than is a
394.

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972) (both cases were decided on the same day as Kleindienst).
395.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). See also Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct.

1099 (1978) (judicial immunity).
396. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
397. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
398. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
399. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 60 supra.
400. 426 U.S. at 805. See also id. at 821, 827 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
401. 408 U.S. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
402.

429 U.S. 318 (1977).

403.

Note, Taxes andBounties BurdeningInterstate Commerce: DistinguishingBoston

Stock Exchange from Alexandria Scrap, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 979, 992 (1977).
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' The
hulk destroyed by a Maryland processor, and vice versa."40
'
district court had found not a "scintilla of factual support" for this
assumption, but in reversing that finding, Justice Powell concluded

that "[tihe District Court demanded too much . .

. The State

is not compelled to verify logical assumptions with statistical evidence."40
While that extraordinarily deferential standard of review may
well conform to the equal protection line of cases, it is discordant
with the discrimination against commerce cases, which require a
more searching scrutiny of reasonably available nondiscriminatory
alternatives.0 ' The legitimate purpose of the bounty program in
Hughes is insufficient to distinguish it from cases in which a rigorous commerce clause analysis was applied.0 ' Moreover, there is
some question in Hughes whether the purpose of the challenged
amendment
was in fact protectionist or environmentalist in charac0
ter.4 '
Another explanation advanced has relied on the differential
market effects that stem from subsidies on the one hand and prohibition or regulation on the other. The emphasis of this argument is
on "the nature of the impact on interstate commerce resulting from
state subsidies," which is "different from that caused by either
prohibitory or regulatory forms of legislation."' 10 According to this
view,
[w]here a state acts effectively to foreclose out-of-state firms from competing
in its markets through regulations and prohibitions, consumers are denied the
opportunity to enjoy the lower prices or better quality which the competitor

could otherwise offer. Where a state favors local firms through subsidies or
purchasing power, on the other hand, the out-of-state competitor remains free
to offer his goods and the resident consumer remains free to prefer the out-ofstate firm in his own purchases. . . .Thus, while state interference with inter-

state commerce through prohibitions or regulations actually burdens both consumers and competitors, the only direct burden imposed by a subsidy or purchasing program is the out-of-state company's loss of a relative advantage in
competing for the resident market. " '

From that perspective, one would inquire whether the commerce
clause was designed to protect out-of-state competitors even when
404. 426 U.S. at 812.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 805.
408. See, ag., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977).
409. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
410. 1975 Term, supra note 388, at 60.
411. Id. at 61.
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the in-state consequences might not be excessive, 412 or whether it is
only aimed at providing consumers with the benefits of an unrestrained national market.413 The outcome of Hughes "makes sense
only if the narrower, consumer-oriented purpose of the Commerce
Clause is adopted, '414 but this view does
not seem consistent with
45
subsequent commerce clause decisions.

Probably the most plausible explanation of the Hughes decision
can be found in its emphasis on the state's role as purchaser. Justice
Brennan objected to reliance on a priorper curiam4 11Supreme Court
opinion, because in that case the state was purchasing as an ultimate consumer. The Maryland program involved in Hughes, however, was a subsidy to achieve environmental goals. Concededly, it
was not a direct purchase, as would occur when a state agency
decides to buy textbooks from in-state companies, but it did represent a governmental payment to achieve a legitimate police power
objective. In this way, the Court was able to draw a parallel between
payment of the bounty and other forms of governmental
"largesse,"417 which is paid to promote specified police power goals.
Seen this way, the government was pursuing a social and not an
economic policy, and surely a state can confine to state residents the
class of beneficiaries of its social services system. In Hughes the
state permitted out-of-state processors to benefit, although at a
comparative disadvantage in terms of the documentation requirement. The Court's frequent recitation that the state's action was
noncoercive would fit into this analysis, because it would stress the
role of the state as provider of funds to promote social policies, not
the role of the state as economic regulator through techniques such
as taxation, prohibition, and regulation, that are only available to
governments.
From this discussion, the question arises, as was suggested by
Justice Brennan,41 8 whether the federal government would be able
to legislate against the type of action taken by Maryland. Justice
412.

The validity of the assumption that in-state consumers will not be prejudiced by

discrimination against out-of-statl competitors is questionable because, presumably, out-ofstate competitors stimulate price And quality consciousness among the favored in-state businesses.
413. 1975 Term, supranote 388, at 61.
414. Id. at 62.
415. See, eg., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
416. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd mem., 409
U.S. 904 (1972).
417. 426 U.S. at 809. See note 326 supra.
418. Id. at 822 n.4.
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Powell expressly declined to deal with that issue,4 1" but posing it
helps place Hughes in the context of Usery. Since Hughes involved
expenditure of state funds in pursuit of an important governmental
function, it is plausible to conclude that Usery could restrict federal
authority, especially given the language in Hughes that the matter
was beyond the purview of the commerce clause. This would suggest
a rationale, consistent with Usery, that emphasizes the autonomy
of states in the expenditure of state monies, at least when state
discretion over spending priorities might be jeopardized by a searching application of negative commerce clause principles.2
Nevertheless, there is a troublesome disjunction between
Hughes and Usery. The Court's opinion in Usery relied heavily on
the deferential treatment to which states are entitled under the
commerce clause, in part presumably because of their constitutionally mandated roles. Fundamental to this special function, however,
is a state's ability to tax and regulate-to use coercive powers-that
justifies the kind of solicitude decreed in Usery.421 Yet, the Hughes
opinion strongly suggests that the commerce clause immunity there
conferred was dependent on the use of noncoercive techniques of
governmental intervention that pit the state in a role much more
like a private party.4
In sum, as others have recognized,2s Hughes is a complex case
whose significance will be felt only over time.44 The final section of
this Article will attempt to apply the overall commerce clause
framework developed in Sections I, 11, and IT to a specific case of
discriminatory taxation-exempting from taxation, income derived
from bonds issued by the state itself and in-state municipalities
while fully taxing, income derived from bonds issued by comparable
governmental units that are located out-of-state. The commerce
clause analysis arguably establishes a prima facie case of unconstitutionality for discrimination against out-of-state investments, but
the effect of Hughes and Usery must be considered to determine
whether the commerce clause analysis is applicable and, if so,
whether the discrimination can be adequately justified.
419. Id. at 810 n.19.
420. See notes 315-17, 326 supra.
421. See generally Blumstein & Calvani, supranote 53.
422. Of course, it is not unreasonable for the Court to emphasize different factors in
negative commerce clause cases than in commerce clause cases dealing with the scope of
federal power. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. It is the link suggested by Justice
Powell's footnote, 426 U.S. at 810 n.19, however, that raises the troublesome issue.
423. See, e.g., Note, supra note 403; 1975 Term, supra note 388, at 56.
424. See Friendly, supra note 47, at 1033 n.119.
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DISCRIMINATORY STATE INCOME TAXATION OF OUT-OF-STATE TAX-

EXEMPT BONDS

A. The Problem
The federal government exempts from federal income taxation
income derived from bonds issued by states, municipalities, and
certain specified state or local agencies. Although at one time, perhaps, this immunity could have been justified by a sense that exemption of income from state or local governmental entities was a
constitutional imperative1rs the exemption has continued largely
out of a federal commitment to help state and local governments
borrow funds at subsidized rates.
The tax exemption, as a means of subsidy, has been much
criticized because of its distributive effect, advantaging relatively
well-to-do, high-tax-bracket taxpayers for whom the tax exemption
is an especially attractive investment inducement. In addition to
the distributive consequences, critics of the tax exemption argue
that this form of subsidy is inefficient since federal revenue foregone
through the exemption exceeds in amount the subsidy conferred on
state and local governmental units.42 Despite these policy criticisms,127 the exemptions have survived, supported politically not

only by wealthy loophole-seeking beneficiaries but by state and
local governments as well. The principal reason for supporting the
tax exemption as a means of subsidizing state and local bond financing, it would seem, is that the major alternative-direct federal
subsidy-would entail at least two significant political risks to state
and local governments. First, a direct subsidy would be visible, and
the funds would flow through the budget and appropriations process
in Congress. The magnitude of the subsidy thus would secure additional scrutiny, and those funds would likely be seen more clearly
as competitive with other federal expenditures. Second, the tax ex425. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127 (1870), overruled in Graves v.
New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
426. See Surrey, Federal Taxation of State and Local Government Obligations, TAx
POL'y, May-June, 1969, at 3, 11. In 1969 the Treasury estimated that the federal government
suffered an annual revenue loss of 2.63 billion dollars, while savings on interest costs to local
government amounted to only 1.86 billion. The remaining .77 billion dollars was "leaked" to
high bracket taxpayers. In 1971 economists estimated that the exemption lost the Treasury
3.3 billion dollars and the states saved 2.5 billion in interest, thus leaving .8 billion dollars in
leakage. Housing & UrbanDevelopment Legislation-1971:Hearingson H.R. 9688 Before the
Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Ses.
pt. 2, at 852 (1972).
427. See generally L. FrrCH, TAXIG MuNmciAL BoND INcoME (1950); Note, The Continuing Debate over the Municipal Bond Exemption: Time for a New Approach by
Reformists, 25 SYRAcusn L. Rav. 953 (1974).
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emption provides for autonomy that a direct subsidy might not.
Control over the subsidy rests with the state and local issuers, who
determine the amounts to be borrowed, and the interest rates are
set by competitive market forces without federal administrative
oversight. This system results in minimal federal intrusion, actual
or potential, on state decisionmaking with respect to bond expenditures. Moreover, the threat of funds being cut off, the uncertainty
and anxiety of annual appropriation, and the risk of substantivereview of state expenditure priorities all inhere in the direct subsidy
alternative.
In 1976, despite the efficiency and equity criticisms, Congress
expanded the tax exemption rs by providing that a mutual fund may
pass through to its shareholders the tax exempt status of the qualified bonds in its portfolio." ' In response to this incentive, a number
of special funds, whose entire portfolios consist of tax-exempt
bonds, have been established to take advantage of the provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976.430 The expanded scope of the exemption
allows lower-income taxpayers to participate in the tax-exempt
market because of the lower initial investment required by such
mutual funds and because of their greater risk spreading through
diversification."'1
By spawning the growth of specialized, tax-exempt bond funds,
the 1976 revisions of the tax law have highlighted a long-existing
problem in the area of state taxation that has received virtually no
commentary. For many taxpayers, the tax-exempt feature of certain
bonds results not only in immunity from federal income taxation for
qualified income, but also in exemption from state income taxation
as well. For purposes of personal income taxation, states typically
exempt income derived from federally tax-exempt bonds, provided
they are issued by the state itself or by some other tax-exempt instate issuer. States typically do not extend this exemption, however,
to income derived from comparable tax-exempt issuers located out
of state. 3 2 This disparity in tax treatment between income derived
from in-state sources and that derived out-of-state has always been
428. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1930 (amending I.R.C. §
852(b)(5)(B)).
429. The pass-through of the tax exemption is allowed to any regulated investment
company as defined under I.R.C. § 852(a).
430. See Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1977, at 38, col. 1.
431. Some analysts suggest that the attempt to attract small investors has been less
than successful. See, e.g., Madrick, The MunicipalFunds Are No Sure Thing, Bus. WEEK,
Nov. 29, 1976, at 60; Lamb, A Wary Look at Those Tax-Exempt Mutuals, FORuMx, Dec.
1976, at 59.
432. See 2 CoRP. L. GumE (CCH) j 11,230-31 (1977).
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a problem for individual and corporate taxpayers. With the growth
of tax-exempt bond funds, however, the disparity of treatment takes
on even greater importance because federal law now contemplates
the existence of and the participation of financial institutions in the
tax-exempt market. Yet, the disparity in treatment between instate and out-of-state tax-exempt issues poses a real competitive
disadvantage to those funds whose portfolios include issues from
many states. Income derived through such a fund is likely to be fully
or partially taxed by the state of residence of a shareholder, whereas
income derived from the purchase of in-state tax-exempt bonds or
from the purchase of bond funds which hold exclusively bonds of a
single state will be exempt.433
Institutionally, however, the problem of establishing evenhanded treatment of in-state and out-of-state tax-exempt issues is
difficult to resolve. No state, on its own, could act in a nondiscriminatory manner without disadvantanging its tax-exempt issuers because of the current widespread disparity in tax treatment. In this
regard, the situation is much like the durational residency requirements for voting that were invalidated by federal statute for federal
elections and eventually by the Supreme Court for all elections. In
commenting on the need for some federal oversight, Justice Stewart
noted that
[flederal action is required if the privilege to change residence is not to be
undercut by parochial local sanctions. No State could undertake to guarantee
this privilege to its citizens. At most a single State could take steps to resolve

that its own laws would not reasonably discriminate against the newly arrived
resident. Even this resolve might not remain firm in the face of discriminations
perceived as unfair against those of its citizens who moved to other States.

Thus, the problem could not be wholly solved by a single State, or even by
several States, since every State of new residence and every State of prior
residence would have a necessary role to play.434

Federal action against durational residency requirements for
voting came from both legislative and judicial sources.43 Realistically, "[i]n the absence of a unanimous interstate compact,"4 '
only federal action can terminate the disparity in tax treatment,
433. Some states are adopting the new federal approach of allowing a pass-through of
tax exemptions by mutual funds. The in-state/out-of-state disparity is likely to be retained.
In Pennsylvania, for example, the state will give a tax exemption to only that portion of a
mutual fund dividend representing interest paid the fund on in-state bonds. Letter from Milt
Lopus, Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue, to James F. Blumstein (Mar. 24, 1977) (copy on

file with the VanderbiltLaw Review).

434. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 286-87 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring).
435. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Blumstein, The Supreme Court and
Voter Eligibility,in IssuEs OF ELExrORAL REFORM 33 (R. Carlson ed. 1974).
436. 400 U.S. at 287.
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and it is precisely this function that has fallen to the courts in the
application of the commerce clause in its dormant state. Indeed, the
Court recently has intervened to break down trade barriers that
were imposed in order to effectuate a reciprocity agreement between
states. The Court concluded that a state cannot bar products from
another state even when imposed as a means of promoting greater
mutual cooperation and thereby "advancing the identical national
'
Since mutual
interest that is served by the Commerce Clause."437
access is constitutionally compelled and would be judicially enforced, the restriction on entry was an impermissible trade barrier."'
Thus, the Court has recognized the propriety of and necessity for
intervening when national interests are threatened by parochial
state concerns, and the case for such intervention is even stronger
when only through federal o-ersight can economic balkanization be
thwarted.
While judicial intervention would therefore be appropriate in
this setting, the question of the effect of judicially mandated evenhandedness must be addressed. States could respond in one of two
ways to a constitutional rule of nondiscrimination in taxation of outof-state bonds that would be tax-exempt if issued by a comparable
in-state governmental borrower: they could extend the exemption
equally to all out-of-state issuers, or alternatively, they could withdraw the exemption entirely. From the perspective of the taxexempt bond fund, either solution would be preferable to the current discrimination against out-of-state issues. Naturally, from the
perspective of individual and corporate bondholders, the entire
elimination of the tax-exempt status for bonds for purposes of state
taxation would be a net detriment. On the other hand, if states
responded by extending the exemption to out-of-state issuers, these
bondholders would be free to search out the best returns in an open
market unimpeded by considerations of state tax policy. Only the
incentives specifically authorized by federal law-the distinction
between taxed and tax-exempt securities-would influence investment choices. Finally, from the perspective of tax-exempt issuers,
a state's decision to eliminate the tax exemption potentially could
437. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 378 (1976).
438. The Court held that "Mississippi may not use the threat of economic isolation as
a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement." Id. at
379. Moreover, if Mississippi were concerned that Louisiana might unduly burden commerce
"by erecting and enforcing economic trade barriers to protect its own producers from competition. . . , the Commerce Clause itself creates the necessary reciprocity: Mississippi and its
producers may pursue their constitutional remedy by. . .challenging Louisiana's actions as
violative of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 379-80.
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reduce the level of subsidy flowing to that governmental borrower.
Although this is politically uncertain, states wishing to continue to
subsidize borrowing presumably could allocate funds directly to
appropriate governmental borrowers to compensate for the higher
interest rates they would, of necessity, be forced to pay without the
state tax exemption.
It is interesting, also, to speculate about the impact of a nondiscrimination rule on the allocation of funds in the tax-exempt bond
market. Under the existing system, a discriminatory state tax exemption is a powerful incentive for investors in high marginal tax
brackets-those likely to seek out tax-exempt securities as a source
of tax relief-to keep their funds invested in the in-state tax-exempt
market. This incentive has the interesting consequence of, in effect,
creating a "captive audience" phenomenon for major in-state investors, especially where state marginal tax rates are the highest. Simultaneously, because of the similar discriminatory tax treatment
by other states, a strong disincentive develops for out-of-state investors to enter out-of-state tax-exempt markets. One can hypothesize,
therefore, that the beneficiaries of the existing system are those
states that are capital-rich and that also have high marginal tax
rates. The effect of the present arrangement could well be that
states with large concentrations of capital are better able to retain
those funds for in-state investment. At the same time, states that
seek to borrow for public purposes but that do not have a welldeveloped commercial banking industry must overcome the tax disincentive of the discriminatory taxation of out-of-state tax-exempt
securities if they are successfully to attract out-of-state financing for
public borrowing. Absent discrimination, relatively capital-scarce
states, whose bonds might be more attractive when viewed from a
43 perspective, could
"tax-neutral""
more easily compete for capital
funds concentrated in large commercial states.
Under the present tax regime, states seeking to attract both instate and out-of-state capital for public projects must sell their
securities in two distinct markets-a market enjoying only a federal
tax exemption and a market enjoying both federal and state tax
exemptions. To the extent that governments seek to attract a significant proportion of out-of-state lenders and to the extent that those
lenders face stiff taxation on income derived from such out-of-state
lending, the issuers must offer a high enough return to compensate
out-of-state investors for the tax disadvantages. Moreover, in offering this higher rate, governmental issuers are required to pay an
439. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977).
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inefficient premium to ipvestors from their own state who, presumably, would be willing to lend at a lower rate because of the combined
federal and state tax exemption. Therefore, only governmental issuers that feel confident that in-state lenders will comprise the vast
bulk of their market will accrue the full measure of benefit from the
subsidy built into the existing system. Indeed, assuming the existence of either a nondiscriminatory tax exemption or d system of
compensatory subsidization in the face of the elimination of state
tax-exempt status across the board, many governmental issuers
might well be able to market their securities at a lower interest cost
than they now do."'
Of course, the effect of imposing a constitutional rule of nondiscrimination is not the only issue to be considered in a constitutional
analysis, but it provides an important overview of the problem presented and a background against which to think through the constitutional analysis. The following portions of this section will discuss
related case law that arose under other constitutional theories. The
prima facie commerce clause case against the discriminatory tax
treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt bonds will then be discussed,
and in the final subsection, the impact of New Federalism principles, as articulated in Usery and particularly in Hughes, will be
considered.
B. PriorNon-Commerce Clause Case Law
In considering application of the commerce clause to the discriminatory treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt securities, one is
immediately struck with the gnawing feeling that the problem-so
apparent on its face, albeit exacerbated by the recent tax reform
legislation-must have been addressed before. Although courts have
dealt with related issues, apparently they have not faced this issue
squarely.
In 1881, the Supreme Court faced a related problem in.
Bonaparte v. Tax Court.44 In Bonaparte the Court addressed the
question "whether the registered public debt of one State, exempt
from taxation by the debtor State, or actually taxed there, is taxable
440. This possibility, of course, would make this a far different situation than Usery,
in which federally imposed minimum wage and maximum hour requirements would add
significantly to government's financial burden. Indeed, this was an important distinction
between Usery and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), which was distinguished but
not overruled by Usery. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976)
("Tihe Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets
rather than increase them.').
441. 104 U.S. 592 (1881).
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4'
by another State when owned by a resident of the latter State.""
The taxpayer, a resident of Maryland, held debt obligations of other
states and out-of-state municipalities. As part of her agreement
with the borrowing states, they had agreed not to tax the debt they
created. She argued that Maryland had a duty under the full faith
and credit provisions of article IV, section 1, to grant immunity from
taxation in recognition of the immunity conferred by the issuing
states. The Court rejected that claim, holding that the states are
independent and that the issuing state cannot impose a binding
obligation on sister states to grant a tax immunity. The Court focused on the relationship between the taxpayer and her state of
residence, Maryland:

All the obligations which rest on the holder of the debt as a resident of the
State in which he dwells still remain, and as a member of society he must
contribute his just share towards supporting the government
4 whose protection

he claims and to whose control he has submitted himself. 43

The Court recognized the advantages that a state could accrue from
a rule of universal exemption, but it could not find anything in the
full faith and credit provision that commanded such a result.
The Bonaparte challenge merits consideration only because it
involves taxation by one state of a debt instrument of another state.
The implications of the commerce clause were never raised or adjudicated in that case, however, and nothing in the opinion reflects
an element of discriminatory treatment of out-of-state debt issues.
At most, one could extrapolate from the Bonaparte case the inference that a state would be entitled to tax income derived from debt
issued by other states. The case could reasonably be used as a building block in drawing a conclusion that states need not confer a
special, preferential immunity on income derived from debt issued
by other states. Although such an immunity might once have been
a serious possibility, it is now beyond serious question that, without
running afoul of the commerce clause, a state can legitimately tax
income derived from debt issued by another state, provided it does
so evenhandedly. Beyond that, Bonaparte cannot be reasonably
pushed.
The question then, more broadly, is whether under the commerce clause disproportionate tax burdens can be levied on residents who invest funds out-of-state. In the contrary situation, the
Court apparently will permit some discrimination when the state's
actions advantage out-of-state business at the expense of local inter442. Id. at 594.
443. Id. at 595.
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ests. Thus, in Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,4" the Court
sustained an Ohio ad valorem tax exemption for the merchandise
or agricultural products of nonresidents if held for storage only in a
warehouse. The plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, kept a private warehouse where it held stocks of merchandise to be sold in its department stores. When Ohio levied a tax on its warehoused merchandise, plaintiff claimed that the nonresident tax exemption was a
violation of equal protection.4 ' Not surprisingly, the Court showed
great deference to the state's formulation of its tax system." 8 In an
equal protection context, the Court could not say that the promotion of commerce within a state was impermissible or arbitrary, and
it therefore declined to invalidate the distinction." 7
Justices Brennan and Harlan noted in their concurrence that
cases such as Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander"8 were distinguishable because in those cases Ohio taxed the property of non-Ohio
corporations differently than identical property of Ohio corporations."' When, as in Wheeling, the legislature is favoring in-state
interests, active judicial intervention may be appropriate, but
when, as in Allied Stores, the aggrieved commercial interest is
within the state and can seek legislative redress through the political process, federalism values are not threatened. 5 ' Of course, the
equal protection claim was a natural one to advance in the context
in which Allied Stores was raised, but the Court's rather chilly
response to the argument is not particularly surprising either, especially given subsequent equal protection taxation decisions,4 1 which
have been characterized by extraordinarily deferential judicial review.
While Allied Stores rejected a claim by an in-state corporation
of favoritism toward nonresident corporations, the decision in
Madden v. Kentucky 5 2 is much closer to the issue under consideration here. In Madden a Kentucky resident challenged a Kentucky
444. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
445. Id. at 522-24.
446. "[Ihe States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal
systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests," provided that they do not impinge
"upon the prerogatives of the National Government or violat[e] the guaranties of the Federal
Constitution .... "Id. at 526.
447. See generally San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
448. 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
449. 358 U.S. at 531-33 (Brennan, J. and Harlan, J., concurring).
450. Id. at 532-33; accord, Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945).
451. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
452. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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statute that taxed deposits in banks located outside the state at a
rate five times greater than comparable taxes on deposits in banks
located within the state. Clearly, in-state banks were accorded a
form of preferential treatment, but the challenge was not based on
commerce clause grounds. Rather, the issues raised were based upon
the due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
With respect to the classification, the Court noted the state's
"broad discretion as to classification.

. .

in the field of taxation" 453

and concluded that the "burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might
support it."' In order to overcome this "presumption of constitutionality," a taxpayer was required to demonstrate explicitly "that
a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against
' Thus, as in Allied Stores and
particular persons and classes."455
other subsequent cases, 5 the Court in Madden refused to interfere
under the aegis of due process or equal protection in a state taxation
scheme. " '
The other claim in Madden-based on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment-was perfectly plausible when considered in light of the then-recent precedent, Colgate
v. Harvey."'8 Colgate involved a challenge to a Vermont income tax
statute that taxed Vermont residents on dividends and interest
earned from out-of-state sources, but exempted similar income
earned from in-state sources. While rejecting an equal protection
claim, the Colgate majority held the Vermont taxes invalid as a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenthamendment. For the Court, Justice Sutherland held that it was a
privilege of national citizenship for a "citizen of the United States
to engage in business, to transact any lawful business, or to make a
lawful loan of money in any state other than that in which the
citizen resides . . ..." Therefore, "[a] state law prohibiting the
453. Id. at 87.
454. Id. at 88.
455. Id.
456. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
457. It must be remembered that in 1940, when Madden was decided, the Court was
just repudiating almost fifty years of activist judicial intervention in support of sundry economic interests under the substantive due process doctrine. Its special reluctance to interfere
in state legislative judgments in the taxation field was a direct response to the expansive
reading of the privileges and immunities clause, considered in the 1935 decision Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). See generally L. TmE,supra note 37, at 424-25.
458. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
459. Id. at 430.
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exercise of any of these rights in another state would. . be invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment."460
The majority opinion in Colgate drew a blistering rebuttal from
Justice Stone, who was joined in dissent by Justices Brandeis and
' an argument based on
Cardozo. He labeled as "[fWeeble indeed"461
the fourteenth amendment's "almost forgotten"462 privileges and
immunities provision. Justice Stone argued that the privileges and
immunities clause conferred no new rights on citizens and that there
were strong reasons not to expand the scope of protection under the
clause:
If its restraint upon state action were extended more than is needful to protect
relationships between the citizen and the national government, and it did more
than duplicate the protection of liberty and property secured to persons and
citizens by the other provisions of the Constitution, it would enlarge judicial
control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it to an extent difficult
to define, but sufficient to cause serious apprehension for the rightful independence of local government. That was the issue fought out in the SlaughterHouse cases [16 Wall. 36], with the decision against enlargement.0"

As Professor Tribe has observed, Justice Stone "feared that the
privileges or immunities clause, as interpreted by the majority,
would permit similar treatment of other laws controlling the power
of wealth, perhaps even after the substantive due process doctrine
itself had passed.""' ' In this way, the Colgate decision reflected a
considerable threat for "providing an additional means [other than
substantive due process] for the federal judiciary to review state
laws governing property rights."'6 5 This concern stemmed from Justice Stone's misgiving about the Court's use of substantive due process, an interventionism he saw potentially exacerbated by the fact
that Colgate was the first (and only) case to hold a state law invalid
under the privileges and immunities language of the fourteenth
amendment."'6
The Stone position in Colgate focused almost entirely on the
risk of judicial limitation on the freedom of states to exercise reasonable taxing discretion as a matter of state or local policy. Although
Justice Stone did not appear to question the vitality of the privileges
and immunities provision of article IV, section 2, "guaranteeing to
the citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of citizens
460. Id. at 430-31.
461. Id. at 443.
462. Id.

463. Id. at 445.
L. TzBF, supra note 37, at 425.
465. Id. at 424.
466. 296 U.S. at 445-46, 445 n.2; L. TRmsF, supra note 37, at 425.
464.
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in the several states, ' 467 he wished to limit the implications of the
privileges and immunities of national as opposed to state citizenship. With respect to the latter, as later expressed in Toomer v.
Witsell,46 the article IV, section 2 provision was "designed to insure
to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges
which the citizens of State B enjoy." '69 The situation in Colgate was
quite different. The Vermont resident was not venturing outside the
state, but rather was being taxed by his own state. What Stone
objected to was the creation of an immunity from taxation based
upon a constitutional privilege. The clear focus was on state power
to raise revenue and its ability to ask residents to make a fair contribution to the support of the state's services.
The Stone objection to the creation of a constitutionally based
immunity must also be viewed in the context of the state of commerce clause doctrine at the time. Colgate arose before the Court's
decison in Western Live Stock, which adopted the position that
"[ilt was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax
burden. . . . 'Even interstate business must pay its way.' ",470 Prior
to the evolution in commerce clause thinking and the demise of the
dual federalism concept, 4 1' one could reasonably fear that an expansion of federally protected principles of national citizenship could
withdraw power from state taxation or regulation and vest it exclusively in the federal sphere.
The doctrinal concern of the Colgate dissent resulted in a rapid
42
overruling of that decision five years later in Madden v. Kentucky. 1
For the majority, Justice Reed rejected the argument that the deposit of money in out-of-state banks is a privilege of national citizenship. He emphasized the need for courts to respect the "power
of states to manage their own fiscal affairs" 473 and concluded that
limits "the power of the state over taxation is
within constitutional
47
plenary.1 4
In overruling Colgate, Madden focused on the relationships between the state and its own citizens. As noted in earlier sections of
this Article, the Court has been reluctant to interfere in these eco467.
468.

296 U.S. at 445.
334 U.S. 385 (1948).

469.
470.

Id. at 395.
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).

471. See note 68 supra.
472. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
473. Id. at 93.
474.

Id.
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nomic relationships when there is a rationale for the state's exercise
of discretion, and in Madden the differential taxation at least arguably was justified because in-state and out-of-state bank deposits
may well have generated different problems and expenses in tax
collection.17 5 None of the cases, however, focused on the problem of
the potential distortion of investment in an interstate securities
market that can result from differential tax treatment.47 The recent
decision in the Boston Stock Exchange case, its emphasis on the
interstate commerce features of the national securities markets, and
its holding that discriminatory state taxation that "forecloses taxneutral [investment] decisions" 77 violates the commerce clause
would seem to leave open the commerce clause issue, which would
focus upon the economic effect of tax discrimination on the national
tax-exempt securities market, not upon the relationships between
a state and its own resident taxpayers under a fourteenth amendment framework. For the sake of the ensuing discussion, it is assumed that Madden would effectively foreclose a fourteehith amendment challenge. The analysis here will intentionally be restricted to
consideration of commerce clause issues as tempered by the New
Federalism.478
475. Id. at 89-90.
476. Indeed, the only significant commerce clause point in either Madden or Colgateis
a footnote in Colgate that summarily dismisses the commerce clause argument. 296 U.S. at
419 n.2.
477. 429 U.S. at 331.
478. Two other related lines of cases are worthy of mention. They do not seem to bear
directly on the commerce clause analysis, but the factual situations are sufficiently parallel
to warrant brief consideration. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently demonstrated
renewed interest in cases that touch on these issues, so some discussion is appropriate.
The first line of cases concerns the states' imposition of limitations on employee qualifications and on terms and conditions of employment. For example, in Atkin v. Kansas, 191
U.S. 207 (1903), state law established maximum hours for employees of state and local
government and for contractors performing services for state or local government. In upholding the Kansas statute, the Court took pains to emphasize that the issues presented were
quite different from those involved when government imposes a maximum hours rule on
private sector employees. Id. at 218-19. In the public sector context, the Court concluded that
no contractual liberty interest was unduly compromised. The Court's perspective was similar
to the framework later adopted in Hughes-thatis, it focused on the state's role as employer
and permitted the state as employer to effectuate its public policy. As an employer, the state
could prescribe the conditions under which the work would go forward. Id. at 224.
The distinction drawn in Atkin between public and private sector employees became
important in the famous decision two years later of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
in which the Court held invalid a ten-hour daily maximum and a sixty-hour weekly maximum
for employment by bakers. Clearly, the public sector versus private sector distinction with
regard to employment relationships that later surfaced in Usery was important in the economic substantive due process era as well.
Relying on Atkin for the proposition that a state can prescribe conditions of employment,
the Court held in Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1915), that New York could, in public
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works projects, limit employment to United States citizens and give preference to citizens of
New York State. The Court found Atkin controlling and found the distinction between a
maximum hours rule and an employee qualifications standard inconsequential, since both
situations involved state regulation of employment on state projects.
The public versus private distinction important in Atkin (as reflected in Lochner) again
was paramount in Heim. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), was decided just prior to Heim.
In Truax the Court struck down an Arizona law that required private employers with more
than five employees to hire eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of the
United States. . . ." Id. at 35. The foreclosure of opportunity to aliens was apparent, and,
unlike the situation in Heim, there was no special public interest to justify the restriction.
Id. at 39-40, 43. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643-45 (1973). Cf. Foley v. Connelie,
98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978) (upholding against an equal protection challenge a New York statute
requiring state police officers to be United States citizens); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (upholding a city rule that municipal employees must be
residents of the city in which they work).
The state's special interest in employment led in Atkin and Heim to results that would
have been different had the restrictive regulations been applied more generally to the private
sector. Of course, both cases raise issues of fair or evenhanded treatment by a state of its
residents. In this regard, they are much more closely parallel to Madden and serve only to
confirm that a fourteenth amendment challenge would be much more difficult to maintain.
The other line of analogous cases involves challenges to state restrictions on the access
of out-of-state residents to certain of the state's natural resources. For example, in McCready
v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), Virginia prohibited citizens of other states from planting
oysters in a stream when its own citizens had that privilege. Id. at 394. The Court upheld
the statute, basing its decision on the ground that "each State owns the beds of all tide-waters
within its jurisdiction, unless they have been granted away. ... In like manner, the States
own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership
while running." Id. This notion of ownership led the Court to reject both a privileges and
immunities clause (article IV, section 2) and a commerce clause argument. With respect to
the privileges and immunities clause, the Court said that citizens of one state "are not
invested. . . with any interest in the common property of the citizens of another State." Id.
at 395. With respect to the commerce clause, the Court held that the "cultivation and
production" of oysters did not involve "transportation or exchange of commodities" and was
therefore not interstate commerce. Id. at 396. See also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896) (upholding a statute prohibiting hunting of certain birds for the purpose of transportation out of state on the theory of common ownership of game).
The decisions in Geer and McCready were somewhat undermined in cases such as
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948). In Toomer, South Carolina required a license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat
owned by a resident and $2500 for each one owned by a nonresident. 334 U.S. at 389. The
Court found the discrimination against out-of-state fishermen to be a prima facie violation
of the privileges and immunities clause, id. at 395-99, and expressly rejected the claim that
the "ownership" analogy for shrimp was an exception to coverage of the clause under the facts
of that case. Chief Justice Vinson expressed great skepticism about the vitality of the
"ownership" or "common property" theory as articulated in McCready, indicating that it "is
now generally regarded as but a fiction." Id. at 402. Although the Court carefully refrained
from overruling McCready, pointing to distinctions between the cases, it nevertheless concluded that "the McCready exception to the privileges and immunities clause, if such it be,
should not be expanded to cover this case." Id.
In Takahashia California statute that barred the issuance of a commercial fishing license
to anyone not eligible for citizenship under federal law was challenged. In a suit brought by
a Japanese alien, California claimed it had a special public interest in banning noncitizens
from engaging in commercial fishing because its citizens were "the collective owners of fish
swimming in the three-mile belt." 334 U.S. at 420. Justice Black acknowledged that
McCready had been followed in Geer, but he also noted that it had been limited in FosterFountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), which has been cited approvingly in Pike

1978]

NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE

v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). See also Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16
(1928). In Takahashi, Justice Black concluded that "[t]o put the claim of the State upon
title is to lean upon a slender reed." 334 U.S. at 421 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 434 (1920)). Skeptical of the ownership concept, the Court held that, assuming the theory
was still viable, it was "inadequate" justification for California's discriminatory treatment
of aliens. 334 U.S. at 421.
Interestingly, in his concurring opinion in Teomer v. WitseU, Justice Frankfurter took
issue only with the privileges and immunities analysis of the majority. He preferred to rely
exclusively on the commerce clause because of his concern that the majority's approach-regarding any limitation on the privileges and immunities clause as "some unexpressed exception," 334 U.S. at 399, 407-did not treat the privileges and immunities clause
in its proper perspective. That is, Justice Frankfurter argued that the privileges and immunities clause must be "read in conjunction with the Tenth Amendment," id. at 407, which
"presupposes the continued retention by the States of powers that historically belonged to
the States, and were not explicitly given to the central government or withdrawn from the
States." Id. at 407-08. Therefore, while Justice Frankfurter could accept a privileges and
immunities doctrine that barred discrimination against nonresidents who seek to compete
with a state's residents, he thought it inconceivable that all special relationships between a
state and its citizens should be invalidated by the privileges and immunities clause.
Justice Frankfurter, consequently, looked much more favorably on the McCready case,
which he argued was "not an isolated decision to be looked at askance." Id. at 408. For him,
it was appropriate for a state to "care for its own in utilizing the bounties of nature within
her borders" because it either owns the resources or exercises control for the common good.
Id. Where the state failed in Toomer, however, was in its violation of the commerce clause.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). But see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896):
It is one thing to say that a food supply that may be reduced to control by a State for
feeding its own people should be only locally consumed. The State has that power and
the Privileges.and-Immunities Clause is no restriction upon its exercise. It is a wholly
different thing for the State to provide that only its citizens shall be engaged in commerce among the States, even though based on a locally available food supply. That is
not the exercise of the basic right of a State to feed and maintain and give enjoyment
to its own people. When a State regulates the sending of products across State lines we
have commerce among the States as to which State intervention is subordinate to the
Commerce Clause.
Toomer v. Witeell, 334 U.S. 385, 409 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Frankfurter position makes the commerce clause position somewhat distinct from
the privileges and immunities argument and suggests that the commerce clause challenge to
the discriminatory tax treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt bonds is not prejudiced even by
those who would advocate retention of McCready's vitality. Of course, it is true that Justice
Frankfurter did not mention Geer, which in following McCready rejected a commerce clause
challenge. And one must concede that Hughes seems to draw its intellectual roots (without
attribution) at least in part from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Toomer, but transferred to
a commerce clause context. The scope of Hughes and the impact of the New Federalism in a
negative commerce clause context are considered in Section VI (D) infra.For purposes of this
footnote, however, it should seem clear that the prima facie commerce clause analysis of
Section VI (C) infra, is unaffected by the common ownership doctrine of McCready, as left
by the somewhat critical but ambiguous opinion in Toomer.
There was some hope that before the end of its October 1977 Term the Court would
clarify the present state of both lines of cases discussed in this note. In Montana Outfitters
Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Mont. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978), the Court had before it a Montana
statute that requires nonresident hunters to pay twenty-eight times as much to hunt elk as
in-state elk hunters are charged. There was no commerce clause challenge, however, since
the plaintiffs relied on the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection
clauses.
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Recognizing the unsettled state of cases such as McCready and Geer, the district court
declined to choose a theory upon which to rest state regulatory authority. Given the constitutional claims advanced, however, it focused on the permissibility of the discrimination between resident and nonresident hunters, examining the nature of the claimed right asserted,
the state's legislative purpose, and its justification for the discrimination. Beginning with the
premise that some form of hunting restriction was necessary, the Court concluded that the
nonresident hunters' interest was "recreational in character," therefore not fundamental, and
thus not a protected privilege and immunity. 417 F. Supp. at 1009. Similarly, with respect
to equal protection, the nonfundamental nature of the interest allowed the state to choose
any rational means of allocating its scarce hunting days, and the discriminatory fee was
reasonable because of the fear that the state's voters would not keep up the elk management
program if the benefits were enjoyed equally by residents and nonresidents through a lottery.
Id. at 1010. Circuit Judge Browning dissented, finding an equal protection violation. Id. at
1010-12.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978). For the 6-3 majority,
Justice Blackmun emphasized the principle that evenhanded treatment of nonresidents was
the touchstone of a privileges and immunities analysis. However, not all distinctions based
on residence were impermissible. "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities'
bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens,
resident and nonresident, equally." Id. at 1860.
In determining whether Montana's distinction between resident and nonresident hunters
"threaten[ed] a basic right in a way that offends the Privileges and Immunities Clause,"
id. at 1862, the Court acknowledged that the ownership theory of McCready and Geer had
been modified by subsequent decisions: "[ihe States' interest in regulating and controlling
those things they claim to 'own,' including wildlife, is by no means absolute." Id. at 1861.
Justice Blackmun expressly recognized that "[s]tates may not compel the confinement of
the benefits of their resources, even their wildlife, to their own people whenever such hoarding
and confinement impedes interstate commerce." Id. This would seem clearly to confirm that
where interstate commerce is involved, the privileges and immunities analysis of McCready
and Geer will not control.
In Baldwin, however, the Court was unwilling to sap McCready and Geer of all existing
vitality: "The fact that the State's control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the
face of . . . certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is
meaningless in their absence." Id. But in Baldwin the Court found that the nonresidents'
interest in sharing equally with resident hunters Montana's elk supply for purely recreational
purposes was not "within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause" because "not
basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union." Id. at 1862.
Justice Brennan in his dissent objected to the analytical approach of the majority. Unlike
Justice Blackmun, he would not focus on whether the interest involved was basic or fundamental. The important component of a privileges and immunities analysis, according to the
dissent, is the discriminatory classification based solely "on the status of nonresidency." Id.
at 1869. For Justice Brennan,
an inquiry into whether a given right is "fundamental" has no place in our analysis of
whether a State's discrimination against nonresidents. . . violates the Clause. Rather,
our primary concern is the State's justification for its discrimination . . . [A] State's
discrimination against nonresidents is permissible where (1) the presence or activity of
the nonresidents is the source or cause of the problem or effect with which the State seeks
to deal, and (2) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial
relation to the problem they present. . . . This requirement that a State's unequal
treatment of nonresidents be reasoned and suitably tailored furthers the federal interest
in ensuring that a "norm of comity". . . prevails throughout the Nation while simultaneously guaranteeing to the States the needed leeway to draw viable distinctions between their citizens and those of other states.
Id. at 1869-70.
The Brennan approach to the privileges and immunities clause would build upon an
analogy from the suspect classification branch of equal protection analysis. A finding of a
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discriminatory classification solely on the basis of nonresidency would obligate the state to
justify the distinction by a stiffer standard than the relaxed equal protection rationality test.
Id. at 1868-69.
Instead, even though an important state objective. . was at stake, .. a classification
based on the fact of noncitizenship [would be] constitutionally infirm "unless there is
something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which
the statute is aimed." Moreover, even where the problem the State is attempting to
remedy is linked to the presence or activity of nonresidents in the State, the Clause
requires that there be "a reasonable relationship between the danger represented by noncitizens, as a class, and the. . . discrimination practiced upon them."
Id. at 1869. The majority, on the other hand, seems to rely on an analogy to the fundamental
interest branch of equal protection analysis, which requires finding an infringement of a basic
interest in order to trigger a more searching degree of judicial scrutiny. In a privileges and
immunities context, however, Justice Blackmun seems willing to include within the
"fundamental" category such things as commercial enterprise ("a means to the nonresidents'
livelihood," id. at 1862) that would not be deemed fundamental in an equal protection
setting.
The Court's decision in Baldwin, therefore, reinforces the position in the text that a
privileges and immunities claim, based either on the fourteenth amendment or article IV,
section 2, is analytically distinct from a commerce clause claim. Furthermore, the Court's
emphasis in Baldwin on the noncommercial, recreational components of that case makes the
commerce clause discussion of the discriminatory income tax treatment of out-of-state taxexempt bonds especially relevant.
The second case before the Supreme Court during its October 1977 Term, Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1977), reo'd 98 S. Ct. 2482 (1978), also reinforced the text's
distinction between a privileges and immunities and a commerce clause analysis, concluding
that it is "establishled] that the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer
its own citizens in the utilization of natural resources found within its borders, but destined
for interstate commerce." 98 S. Ct. at 2492. Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous Court
also seemed to downplay the significance of Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), questioning
whether it had "any remaining vitality" and suggesting that the Court in Heim was
"concerned almost exclusively with the statute's discrimination against resident aliens" and
thus did not consider seriously the privileges and immunities issue of discrimination against
out-of-state residents because "no out-of-state United States citizen challenged the law." Id.
at 2491 n.15.
Hicklin involved a challenge to the "Alaska Hire" law which, for petroleum and pipeline
jobs, gave preference to residents of Alaska. As amended, the statute required that:
all oil and gas leases, easements, or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipelines, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of any of these to which the state is a party, contain
a requirement that qualified Alaska residents be hired in preference to nonresidents. The
statute does not apply to other private employment, nor to public employment.
565 P.2d at 161. The challenge was based on alleged violations of the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses. No commerce clause argument was raised. Id. at 169.
With respect to the equal protection claim, the closely divided Alaska Supreme Court
declined to apply strict scrutiny. It rejected the claim that the right to travel was penalized
by a residency requirement, McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645,
646-47 (1976); the court held that the "right to work" was not fundamental in the equal
protection context; and it refused to declare the classification based on residency suspect. 565
P.2d at 166-67. Accordingly, the court applied the more lenient rationality standard and
concluded that the preference for Alaskans was reasonably related to the goal of "providing
economic benefit to residents." Id. at 167. The issue for the majority, therefore, was the
legitimacy of this purpose under the privileges and immunities clause.
The majority of the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the privileges and immunities argument, relying essentially on what it described as the "McCready 'natural resources exception'
to the privileges and immunities clause." Id. at 169. Justice Connor noted that McCready
had been distinguished but never overruled and"it states the principle applicable to the
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decision of this case." Id. at 168. He argued that Alaska's natural resources "belong" to the
state and its citizens in a way that "Alaska's society and economy in general do not." Id. at
169. In short, the Court considered the Alaska hire law to be "an economic measure justified
by the 'natural resources exception,' the principle that a state may prefer its residents in
dealing with natural resources it owns." Id.
The court did not mention the Heim-Atkin line of cases in further support of its decision,
see id. at 172 n.4, despite that suggestion in a 1972 consultant's report to the Joint Pipeline
Impact Committee of the Alaska State Legislature. See Alleyne, ConstitutionalRestraints
on the PreferentialHiring of Alaskan Residents for Oil Pipeline Construction, 2 UCLA-A.As.
L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1972). Since the preferential hiring law was limited to jobs in which the state
is a party, Hicklin could have served well as a vehicle for determining not only the status of
the McCready-Geerbut also the Heim-Atkin line of cases. Compare Foley v. Connelie, 98 S.
Ct. 1067 (1978) with Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643-45 (1973). Although no commerce clause claim was raised, the case also helped shed some light on the scope of Hughes
because:
The kind of competitive leasing arrangements under which the pipeline will be
constructed will not require a cash outlay of public funds, as in the usual public works
context. Some state land will be leased. The difference is merely the nature of the asset
distributed by the State: cash in return for construction services in one case; land in
exchange for the royalty benefits accruing to the State as lessor in the other.
Alleyne, supra, at 9. The Court's treatment of this issue could have provided a further insight
into the importance to Hughes of the budgetary outlay factor discussed in Section V (B)
supra.
The dissenters in Hicklin argued that the majority relied "on an antiquated line of
authority

. .

." 565 P.2d at 171. They contended that Toomer "severely limited" the

McCready-Geer line of cases, id. at 172, and, additionally, that Alaskan oil will not be
restricted to in-state use but will be shipped to other states by means of the pipeline constructed to Valdez. Id. Moreover, the dissenters saw the Alaska statute as considerably more
restrictive than the limitation in McCready and distinguishable on that basis, if McCready
retained its vitality. Id. at 172-73.
The majority in Hicklin, like Justice Frankfurter in Toomer, explicitly distinguished
between commerce clause cases and claims such as privileges and immunities or equal protection that focus on a state's duty to provide evenhanded treatment to certain classes of people.
The Hicklin majority did not deal successfully with such nondiscrimination cases as Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S.
229 (1911), except to note that they "were decided under the commerce clause, not the
privileges and immunities clause," and that "[o]ne of the principal reasons the United
States Constitution was written, to replace the old Articles of Confederation, was to make
the United States a single economic unit, without barriers to interstate trade." 565 P.2d at
169.
In reversing the Alaska Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
view that McCready created an exception to the privileges and immunities clause. 98 S. Ct.
at 2489. Quoting its recent decision in Baldwin, the Court noted that it "has recognized that
the States' interest in regulating those things they claim to 'own'.. . is by no means absolute." Id. at 2489-90. State ownership is not necessarily determinative but it is a factor "to
be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates
the Clause." Id. at 2490. In the "Alaska Hire" situation, the state's proprietary interest was
too attenuated to justify the preference, especially given the relatively broad sweep of the
statute's coverage.
Interestingly, Justice Brennan bolstered the privileges and immunities analysis by drawing a parallel to commerce clause cases that restricted a state's ability to prefer its own
citizens when the "state owned resource is destined for interstate commerce." Id. at 2492.
He made the point that discrimination against nonresidents did not, "of itself, disable the
State from preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that resource," even if interstate
commerce was involved. The privileges and immunities clause apparently continues to allow
some forms of preference for a state's residents; but the commerce clause standard, which
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C. The Commerce Clause Analysis
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,"' a unanimous Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[tihe prohibition against
discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably
from the basic purpose of the [Commerce] Clause."4 ' The Court
found that New York's stock transfer tax was discriminatory, favoring the New York Stock Exchange, because "the choice of exchange
by all nonresidents and by residents engaging in large transactions
is not made solely on the basis of nontax criteria.""48 By foreclosing
seems stiffer, in some way "does inform analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
as to the permissibility of the discrimination the State visits upon nonresidents based on its
ownership of the resource." Id.
The Brennan opinion does mention the Heim line of argument, if only in a footnote. Id.
at 2491 n.15. With respect to a state's ability to discriminate against aliens, Justice Brennan
questions the value of the Heim precedent in light of Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 623, 64345 (1973). But see Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978). Of course, that form of discrimination was not involved in Hicklin. With respect to the facet of Heim that involved the public
works employment preference for citizens of New York, Justice Brennan facilely notes that
the Court expressed no view on the privileges and immunities issue because "no out-of-state
United States citizen challenged the law." 98 S. Ct. at 2491 n.15.
From this footnote in Hicklin, one might conclude that the public-private distinction
made in Heim and Atkin has been relegated to a subtle nonexistence. While that inference
would strengthen the position developed in Part VI(C) and lend strong support to the ultimate conclusion reached in Part VI(D), it seems unlikely that by a single footnote the Court
would be signaling its retreat from the initiative it took in Hughes. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 n.6 (1978); Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
More realistically, the formulation of the footnote in Hicklin is probably reflective of the
position of Justice Brennan, the author of the Hicklin opinion. The entire Hicklin opinion
seems to be a negotiated compromise with currents and countercurrents that seem to coexist
in an uneasy truce. It may be that the Court has reached a consensus on dropping entirely
the Heim-Atkin, if not the McCready, line of analysis. It would be imprudent, however, to
rely on the Hicklin footnote as the final word on the matter.
With respect to the McCready-Geer line of cases, the Baldwin decision indicates that
McCready and Geer survive, but Hichlin shows that their application has been narrowly
circumscribed. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). The Hicklin opinion and the
almost contemporaneous footnote in City of Philadelphia,98 S. Ct. at 2537 n.6, show that
the Court has not yet reached a consensus on how much weight to accord to the ownership
theory, and Baldwin demonstrates a striking disagreement on how issues under the privileges
and immunities clause should be approached analytically. The assignment of the Hicklin
opinion to Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Baldwin, is puzzling in that regard.
Finally, the problems raised in the lines of cases discussed in this footnote are only parallel to the commerce clause issue discussed in the text, and even those Justices who advocate
retention of the earlier doctrines expressly distinguish the commerce clause analysis from the
privileges and immunities or fourteenth amendment analysis. Since this Article focuses on
the commerbe clause, and the text explicitly eschews consideration of privileges and immunities or equal protection issues, these cases, as those discussed in text, cannot be reasonably
viewed as controlling.
479. 429 U.S. 318 (1977). See notes 255-62 supra and accompanying text.
480. Id. at 329.
481. Id. at 331.
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"tax-neutral 4 82 investment decisions, the New York law advantaged the exchange in New York and imposed a "discriminatory
burden on commerce to its sister states."48 3 The Court rejected the
argument that New York's tax affected only "a local event at the
' concluding that the commerce
end of interstate commerce,"484
clause protects income derived from an interstate transaction from
burdens imposed "by reason of its foreign origin."4 5Thus, "absent
an undue burden on interstate commerce,""48 a state can evenhandedly tax income of its citizens derived from out-of-state sources, but
"the tax may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of
487
some interstate element.2

The bar on discriminatory taxation in Boston Stock Exchange
focuses on the distortion imposed on the securities market by New
York's policy and on the harm to the non-New York Exchanges
themselves. As in that case, the disparity of treatment of out-ofstate tax-exempt securities is apparent on its face. There is no need
to rely on a finding that the effect is discriminatory because the
discordant treatment is evident on the face of these state taxing
statutes. The question, thus, is whether the facial discrimination
can be justified under traditional commerce clause principles or, if
not, whether the New Federalism would be expanded in scope to
withdraw this discriminatory taxation from the purview of the commerce clause.
One argument, raised in Boston Stock Exchange, would be
that, although the tax disparity appears discriminatory on its face,
it is not so in practice. The source of this argument is the Court's
upholding of use taxes, applied exclusively to out-of-state transactions, as compensatory." ' As Justice White noted in Boston Stock
Exchange, the "common theme" of state use tax cases is "[e]qual
treatment of interstate commerce.""48 The rationale of the use tax
is that it places in-state merchants on an equal footing with out-ofstate competitors who might attract customers solely because the
sales tax in their state was lower than in a competitive state. The
objective of the use tax is to bring about "nondiscriminatory treat482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 332 n.12.
Id. (quoting Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876)).
429 U.S. at 332 n.12.
Id.
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
429 U.S. at 331.
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ment of in-state and out-of-state purchases.
tion

49 0

In the use-tax situa-

an individual faced with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase
could make that choice without regard to the tax consequences. If he purchased in State he paid a sales tax; if he purchased out of State but carried
the article back for use in State, he paid a use tax of the same amount. The
taxes treated both transactions in the same manner. 491
It is difficult to see how the analogy of the use tax cases-with
their emphasis on the compensatory nature of the tax and the lack
of discrimination when the total scheme of taxation is considered-could reasonably be applied to the case of disparate treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt bonds. The most plausible argument is that, for any state, discrimination against out-of-state taxexempt issuers is necessary to keep it on an even footing because
virtually all states discriminate in this way. As a practical matter
this is true, provided that such discrimination is permissible at all.
As was discussed in Section VI(A) of this Article, however, the Court
in the A&P case rejected a similar claim advanced to justify a Mississippi milk reciprocity provision.112 The Court noted in A&P that
a state cannot fight discrimination with compensatory discrimination. Rather, the Court's function is to step into just such disputes
to put an end to the original discrimination itself. Lowering trade
barriers, not the erection of compensatory (i.e. retaliatory) restrictions is the path mandated by the commerce clause.493 This is the
clear teaching of the Court's commerce clause cases, especiallyA&P
and Boston Stock Exchange.
Another argument in support of the facial discrimination in tax
treatment might be that all persons who purchase bonds from taxexempt issuers of a state are exempt from taxation by that state.
Thus, all purchasers of New York's tax-exempt bonds are exempt
from taxation by New York, and therefore all similarly situated
persons are treated alike. This argument is too facile for several
reasons. The perspective is limited to equal treatment for taxpayers
rather than equal treatment for interstate commerce. The focus of
a commerce clause analysis must be the impact of state tax legislation on investment decisions-whether they can be made "solely on
the basis of nontax criteria." 49 ' Of course, the decision to invest in
the tax-exempt market is itself influenced by tax incentives de490. Id.
491. Id. at 332.

492. 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
493. Id. at 378-81.
494. 429 U.S. at 331.
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signed to encourage certain kinds of investments, but this is done
as a matter of national policy and is therefore unrelated to the
commerce clause concern that investment decisions in a securities
market be made on a "tax-neutral 495 basis without the distorting
influence of discriminatory state taxation.
The argument of equal treatment could be more persuasive if
the source of the constitutional analysis were the equal protection
or privileges and immunities clause, because the leeway granted for
classification is considerable in those contexts.41 The critical shortcoming of the discriminatory exemptions, however, is the disproportionate impact they have on interstate transactions in the taxexempt bond market-that they "discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.""49 The impact on
commerce and the competitive disadvantage confronted by funds
which market shares in a multi-state, tax-exempt bond portfolio are
the focal points of a commerce clause analysis. The superficial evenhanded treatment by a state of all purchasers of its tax-exempt
securities does not, therefore, respond to the commerce clause concern. Furthermore, there is an element of unreality or even disingenuousness to the claim, since a state has no jurisdiction to tax the
income of nonresidents; instead, the problem is that by its tax system a state is acting to keep investment funds in-state that might
otherwise flow in interstate commerce. This is a form of economic
protectionism, which is designed to and has the effect of disadvantaging out-of-state tax-exempt issuers and, simultaneously, of keeping investment capital of state residents within the state. Precisely
this kind of curtailment of natural competitive markets has characterized the discriminatory taxation an'd regulatory legislation held
invalid in negative commerce clause cases." 8
A fair reading of the Boston Stock Exchange case would end the
commerce clause analysis once discrimination against interstate
commerce were found.49 During the same term as Boston Stock

Exchange, however, the Court indicated that in a regulatory context, once discrimination is shown, "the burden falls on the State
to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
495.

Id.

496. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). See also note 478 supra.
497. 429 U.S. at 332 n.12.
498. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2
(1940). See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535-38 (1978).
499. But see 429 U.S. at 330 n.11 (suggesting that New York eliminate the "competitive
edge enjoyed by the regional exchanges. . . by simply declaring that sales would not be a
taxable event.").
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statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives,
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."5 ' A reasonable
conclusion is that in the taxation context, where revenue raising is
the rationale for taxation, adequate and reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives are readily available. This distinction between
taxation and regulatory cases was recognized by Justice Frankfurter
in Freeman v. Hewit:
A police regulation of local aspects of interstate commerce is a power often
essential to a State in safeguarding local interests.... State taxation...,
on the other hand, can only be justified as designed to make such commerce
bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.
But revenue serves as well no matter what its source. To deny a State a
particular source of income does not impose a crippling limitation of a State's
ability to carry on its local function.'
Placing the insight of Hewit in the modern context, one could conclude that a finding of discrimination against commerce by a taxing
measure is sufficient to support a holding of unconstitutionality
because of the inherent existence of alternative sources of revenue.
While the taxation of income derived from investing in out-ofstate tax-exempt bonds and the simultaneous exemption of similar
income from in-state sources cannot be justified as a revenue collection measure, the special characteristics of the beneficiarya-the
state and its political sub-units-might be deemed sufficient by the
Court to warrant consideration of other legitimate state interests.
One rationale for the exemptions is that they subsidize governmental entities that can, in turn, provide desired governmental
services. Under a commerce clause analysis, however, this policy
must be subjected to the nondiscriminatory alternative requirement
of Hunt and Dean Milk."2 One readily available alternative, discussed in Section VI(A) of this Article, is direct subsidy by the state
to currently tax-exempt issuers. Objections to replacement of the
federal tax exemption with direct subsidies would undoubtedly be
raised in the state context as well, but for a number of reasons they
are less forceful. The major concern has been the risk of the loss of
autonomy if tax exemption is eliminated."' While that argument
500. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
But cf. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (1978). ("Where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected.").
501. 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
502. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
503. See, e.g., Morris, Tax Exemptions for State and Local Bonds, 42 GEo. WASH. L.

Ray. 526, 530 (1974); Panel Discussionson GeneralTax Reform Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8 at 1172 (1973).
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may have considerable force with respect to federal-state relationships, it is constitutionally less significant in the state context.
First, the states themselves float a considerable amount of taxexempt issues. In this context, the loss of autonomy argument is
irrelevant since, assuming full taxation, the state would pay higher
interest rates, but would compensate by direct appropriations. With
respect to bonds issued by sub-units, a risk of increased state interference exists, but the relationships between the states and their
political subdivisions are of little constitutional significance. 0 Typically, local power stems from an explicit state statutory or constitutional source,m5 so limits on state interference could be negotiated
between state and local officials through state administrative, legislative, or constitutional processes. The fear of diminished local autonomy vis-A-vis the states, therefore, is not a constitutionally substantial factor.
Furthermore, instead of imposing a uniform tax on hitherto
tax-exempt in-state issues, a state could reasonably respond by extending the existing exemption to all federally tax-exempt issues.
This would allow many state and local political units to benefit from
lower interest costs by competing effectively for out-of-state investors. In this way, the same or even an additional subsidy could be
provided, as is done under the existing system, without the need for
direct subsidy. Since other states likewise would be required to terminate their discriminatory tax treatment of out-of-state taxexempt securities, many states could comfortably rely on competitive pressures from a broader range of potential lenders to keep
interest charges down.
In sum, under a conventional commerce clause analysis, the
present tax exemptions discriminate against interstate commerce
and, in view of the availability of reasonable, nondiscriminatory
alternatives, the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground
that the statutes further a legitimate state purpose. s Remaining for
504.

City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,

207 U.S. 161 (1907). See generally J. NowAx, L RoTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW
425 n.47 (1978).
& D. NErscH, STATE AND LocAL GoVEMMa IN A FE
505. E.g., D. MILxEnau
SYsTEM 148-51 (1977).

506. The states might attempt to justify the discrimination inherent in the tax exemption statutes on the ground that, apart from any economic protection of municipalities, they
have an interest in having their own residents hold state bonds. According to this view, a state
or local government legitimately could prefer having creditors with a stake in the wellbeing
of their debtor. Also, state citizens would gain a sense of solidarity by sharing in government
enterprises financed by their bonds.

This justification, however, is also questionable. First, the means chosen by the state to
accomplish its purpose are not entirely rational or sufficiently narrowly drawn. Since the tax
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consideration is whether the New Federalism, as developed in Usery
and Hughes, is broad enough or could reasonably be expanded to
require a contrary conclusion.
D. The Impact of the New Federalism
In his foreword to a recent symposium on federalism, Judge
Friendly cautioned that "[ijt would be dangerous . . . to regard

the Hughes case as having much doctrinal significance. The Court
did not even mention it in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Commission . .., when it unanimously struck down, under the
Commerce Clause, an amendment to the New York stock transfer
tax which gave advantage to sales made within New York. 50 7 Nevertheless, if the traditional commerce clause analysis, which culminates in the Boston Stock Exchange decision, is to be held irrelevant
in the context of discriminatory tax treatment of out-of-state taxexempt securities, the distinction must be found in some principle
that would withdraw the discrimination at issue from "[tihe rule
which prohibits states from enforcing their laws in a way which...
discriminates against interstate commerce. .. ,,s
Of course, what makes the matter interesting at the outset is
that the disparity in tax treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt securities results from differential treatment when the ostensible beneficiary is the state itself or a sub-unit of local government. The other
tax cases, in which the Court "has seldom hesitated to strike down
statutes discriminatory on their face,"' ' involved tax disadvantages
for out-of-state businesses that were competing with local enterexemption is offered to all state citizens who buy bonds of any state subdivision, a municipalIty is by no means assured of attracting bondholders from its own locale. Indeed, out-of-state
investors nay have a greater interest in a given municipality than'do in-state purchasers. For
example, it certainly is arguable that New Jersey or Connecticut residents who work in New
York City have a far greater interest in its economic welfare than do citizens of up-state New
York. Accordingly, they should be the preferred holders of Big Mac bonds and attracted by
a subsidy. Second, it is open to question whether municipalities in fact benefit from friendly
creditors. Again taking New York City as an example, arguments certainly could be made
that arms-length creditors would have preserved the city's fiscal stability better than union
creditors who could bargain with the threat of bond foreclosure to achieve their own economic
objectives. The securing of friendly bondholders becomes an even less valid state goal when
it implicates federal interests as when, for example, the federal government is called upon to
bail out a city whose local creditors have allowed it to overextend itself. See, e.g., the New
York City "bailout" legislation, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (Supp. V 1975). Moreover, the less
discriminatory alternatives part of the analysis poses insuperable obstacles to this line of
argument.
507. Friendly, supra note 47, at 1033 n.119.
508. Bison, supra note 166, at 593. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S.Ct.
2531, 2537 n.6 (1978).
509. Note, supra note 228, at 962 n.44.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:47/3

prise. Given Hughes, and to a lesser extent Usery, one must at least
stop to inquire whether this distinction does or should make a difference analytically.
In the Boston Stock Exchange case, a clear purpose of the unconstitutional New York tax was to provide additional tax revenue
to New York. The state was concerned with external competition
and also with the threat of the Exchange to leave New York. The
competitive disadvantage of the New York Exchange meant "a loss
of stock transfer tax revenue to New York City,"510 and the continued presence of the New York Exchange was seen as important for
New York's future economic strength and prosperity."' Moreover,
the nondiscriminatory alternative suggested -by the Courtelimination of stock sales as a taxable event 512 -was unacceptable
to New York because "taxation revenue would no longer be forthsale occurs in New
coming from the situation where the securities
513
out-of-state.
occurs
transfer
the
but
York
Thus, it is clear that New York's compromise with the New
York Stock Exchange was governed by a desire to maintain or increase tax revenues, and this goal was explicitly held outweighed by
the national interests in commerce. Moreover, the less restrictive
alternative the Court suggested for assuring competitive equity
among various stock exchanges was a device that would have had
significant revenue effects on the state and city governments. For
this reason, the purported distinction of the tax-exempt bonds case
on the ground that the beneficiaries are governments and not businesses is not persuasive. The critical issue is the effect on commerce,
not the beneficiary of the discriminatory tax. Moreover, a distinct
and identifiable industry that is fostered by federal tax policy-taxexempt bond funds-suffers competitive disadvantage by the uneven tax treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt issues. Thus, the effect
on competitors, as well as the impact on the allocation of resources
within the bond market, is clear.
In Hughes, the Court and Justice Stevens in his concurrence
argued that the commerce involved was generated by the state as a
subsidy. Arguably, the borrowing of funds by state and local governments is also generated by governments and should be exempt from
commerce clause strictures. The discriminatory treatment at issue,
510. Statement of Robert W. Haack, March 4, 1968, quoted in Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 324 n.7 (1977).
511. Public Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 553 (1968), quoted in 429 U.S. at
327 n.10.
512. See 429 U.S. at 331 n.1l.
513. Note, supra note 403, at 986 n.34.
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however, is not related directly to the borrowing transaction itself.
Rather, it is the tax consequence of income derived from the investment that is made to depend on the in-state or out-of-state character of the investment. At one time it might have been plausible to
argue that a state's sovereignty interests were involved when taxation was imposed (or, by implication, disallowed) on incomes derived from loans to governmental entities," but that concept has
long been interred.515 It is no longer reasonable to contend that the
state's sovereignty interests as borrower extend to the taxation of
income derived from governmental loans.
Hughes would have to be extended considerably to include loan
transactions, since the subsidy involved in that case was a direct
expenditure of tax-raised funds. In a loan transaction, a state or
local governmental unit enters a preexisting capital market to compete with other potential borrowers for funds held by potential lenders. The federal tax code has created a special market for taxexempt securities in which state and local governments compete
with each other and with the nonexempt market. Thus, the state
would be acting in a capacity that much more clearly affects commercial intercourse when it enters the money market than when it
acts to subsidize directly businesses that act in the public interest.
Furthermore, this market is created by the private sector or by the
federal government's tax decisions, not by the state, and it is unclear whether the imposition of tax evenhandedness for all governmental issues would actually result in any increase in costs for many
governmental borrowers-the reverse possibly could result for
most.51 1
More important, though, the difference between Hughes and
the taxation of out-of-state tax-exempt bonds turns on the mechanism employed by government to serve its ends. In Hughes, Justice
Powell repeatedly emphasized the noncoercive aspects of a subsidy
program favorable to in-state business. He expressly noted that
other commerce clause cases had involved state interference "with
the natural functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation. ' 5 1 7 The state's decision

in the transaction itself-the decision "to favor its own citizens over
514. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
515. See Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling Collectorv. Day); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
516. This was the ground upon which Fry was distinguished in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976).
517. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976).
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others" 5 8-distinguished the transaction in Hughes. The noncoercive purchase, and the concomitant element of subsidy, placed the
state in a different role than when it operates through more traditional coercive means, such as prohibition, regulation, or taxation."'
In the bonds situation, there is no state purchase and there is
no state policy to prefer its own citizens over others. Similarly situated state residents are taxed differently based solely on the locus
of their investments. Hughes probably would permit state and local
governments to prefer in-state lenders, for example, by giving them
preference in underwriting, even paying a noncompetitively higher
fee. Other such advantages might come within Hughes, justified as
the exercise of state social policy in a market environment. Even the
state's use of a direct subsidy approach rather than a tax exemption
would seem permissible under Hughes. It is the use of the tax system, with its exercise of traditional governmental coercive authority, that runs afoul of the commerce clause and distinguishes
Hughes from traditional regulatory and taxation cases, such as
Hunt and Boston Stock Exchange.
In sum, the state and local governments are not declining to
borrow from out-of-state sources or even giving local investors a
competitive advantage in the market; indeed the loan transaction
itself is uninvolved. Rather, the state is exercising its taxing power
on income derived from comparable tax-exempt issues solely because of the out-of-state character of the issuing body. This use of
the taxing power places the transaction beyond the Hughes exemption and within the Boston Stock Exchange rationale, and since
there is no preference to state citizens, which would permit an attendant welfare analogy, the bonds situation falls outside the largesse approach that probably best explains Hughes.
If the decision in Hughes is distinguishable from the disparity
in tax treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt bonds, the question
must be faced whether Hughes should be broadened to engraft another exemption from the traditional commerce clause cases. The
argument would be that, although the largesse conferred in Hughes
was consummated through a state as purchaser, the critical feature
was the subsidy itself, not the mode of subsidization. Thus, the state
518. Id. at 810.
519. Id. at 810 n.20. This view is supported by a footnote to the very recent decision in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 n.6 (1978). In that case, the Court
held invalid a New Jersey law that prohibited the "importation of most 'solid or liquid waste
which originated or was collected outside. . . the state. . . ."' Id. at 2532. In the footnote,
Justice Stewart noted that the Court expressed no opinion on a state's "power to spend state
funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses. ... " Id. at 2537 n.6.
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would argue that it has chosen to exempt one source of income-that from tax-exempt in-state bonds-and this subsidy for
in-state investment should be treated as if it were achieved by a
direct grant or other such noncoercive method. The analogy to a tax
expenditurel2 might be used to further the argument; that is,
whether a subsidy represents a direct appropriation or an exemption
from income taxation should be deemed irrelevant since they are
functional equivalents.
On this reasoning, the beneficiary and purpose of the subsidy
would be determinative, not its nature. In Hughes the beneficiaries
of the subsidy were the in-state processors; in theory, the goal was
to benefit the state's environment, an independent police power
objective. In the bonds situation, the beneficiary is the lender of
funds to in-state governmental borrowers; the purpose of diverting
capital market funds to in-state investment as a form of subsidy,
however, is not so clearly unrelated to the interests prohibited by
the commerce clause.2 1 Moreover, it is not so clear that the state or
local governments actually derive any benefit, except when the bulk
of the bonds are bought by in-state lenders. If a substantial out-ofstate sale occurs, then the interest coupon that governments must
pay will be sufficiently high to attract out-of-state investors, who
must pay state taxes on the interest. Because of this, the overall
yield to in-state investors will be an above-market premium (i.e., a
windfall) when the tax exemption is added. In these situations any
governmental benefit is questionable522
The recognition in Boston Stock Exchange of the important
national commercial features of the securities market also strengthens the argument against extension of Hughes to the tax-exempt
bonds situation. An important, federally fostered tax-exempt bond
industry faces a competitive disadvantage because of the discriminatory state taxation rules. These rules cannot be dealt with effec520. A "tax expenditure" is a form of subsidy generated by incentives or preferences
built into the taxation system. See S. SURMY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM (1973). For a criticism of the tax expenditure concept, see Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in
the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969). See also the reply to Professor Bittker by
Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, id. at 528, and a rebuttal by Professor Bittker, id. at 538.
521. See text accompanying notes 185-200 supra.
522. If a state could separate the market, it theoretically could establish differentrates
of interest for in-state and out-of-state lenders. Given the existence of an interstate taxexempt bonds market, it is unrealistic to expect this separation to work. Of course a local
unit could float issues at different yields, hoping to attract in-state lenders for the lower
interest coupon, but if a higher yield were to appear in a float aimed for out-of-state investors,
it is difficult to see why in-state lenders would not subscribe to the higher-yield issue, thus
forcing a uniform rate by competitive pressures.
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tively on a state-by-state basis through the political process,523 but
rather require a national solution-by the courts if the context is a
negative commerce clause case. At present, states may well be discriminatory against out-of-state tax-exempt issues for defensive
purposes, on the theory that at least for smaller floats the tax advantage creates an in-state market that will allow borrowing at lower
cost. This may be especially true for capital-rich states that expect
in-state funds to be adequate to cover the float, but the discrimination obviously disadvantages other governmental issuers. Whereas
a state might be permitted leeway in favoring its own citizens over
nonresidents in the dispensation of largesse, it is not clear why the
dictates of the federal commerce clause should be held in abeyance
to allow states and their sub-units to disadvantage the securities of
sister states and municipalities. Principles of comity would caution
against the kind of retaliatory tax practices that have become an
imperative if a capital-poor state is to assure a fair market for its
own securities. Moreover, the free flow of private sector investment
funds is an important policy goal of the commerce clause. Elimination of parochial barriers to the interstate flow of investment capital
is precisely the role the Court has adopted in negative commerce
clause cases and is consistent with the principles of comity embodied in the full faith and credit provisions.su
Finally, for important reasons of policy and principle the kind
of subsidy accepted in Hughes should be preferred to the discriminatory tax exemption under discussion. Most fundamentally, there
is a safeguard to interstate commercial interests when the state
chooses to favor its own citizens through a purchase decision that
requires a visible political choice and an actual, appropriation of
funds. In that situation, at least, there are some substantial political checks on the process of subsidization, with in-state taxpayers
being asked to contribute directly, by tax-raised and appropriated
funds, to the state's subsidy program. On the other hand, a tax
exemption tends to blur the political issues involved, and the absence of explicit expenditure of funds circumvents an annual political review. The subsidy is hidden and, since it need not be voted
on annually, would tend to be continued without intensive scrutiny.' a Thus, there are likely to be more restraints on the state's
523.

See text accompanying notes 433.38 supra.

524. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
525. The same phenomenon also exists with respect to many state regulatory programs
in which internal subsidies exist but are hidden from public political scrutiny and accountability. See, e.g., Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENM Sci. 22
(1971).
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ability to subsidize when actual appropriations must be made in
competition with other claims on the state's funding resources. As
long as the state is acting in ways closely analogous to its welfare
function (as a provider of either social services or other forms of
largesse) or to its proprietary function (as a participant in the economic marketplace), it may well be appropriate to impose fewer
constraints under the negative commerce clause.5 6The discriminatory treatment of out-of-state tax-exempt securities, however, does not seem reasonably to fall within even an expanded Hughes. The taxation element and the use of coercive governmental authority to channel investment funds, especially in the
presence of such a significant private interstate securities market,
make the more traditional commerce clause cases closer on point.
Moreover, the basis of taxation is so clearly the interstate character
of the investment-such a clear breach of the "tax-neutral" rule of
Boston Stock Exchange-that application of the traditional commerce clause analysis seems more reasonable. In Hughes, at least,
the largesse analogy could be made, justifying the drawing of a
legitimate distinction between in-state and out-of-state residents,
but in the bonds case, the tax disparity does not affect taxpayers
based on their residence, but only on the "basis of some interstate
element" 5 2 in the investment decision. This weakens the largesse
analogy and strengthens the case for treatment under commerce
clause principles, particularly in light of the likely positive consequences of universal abolition of such discrimination and the availability of reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives if states do
choose to respond by eliminating state tax exemptions entirely.
Ultimately, remembering that Hughes left open the question of
federal power to "prohibit the type of selective participation in the
market undertaken by Maryland," 5 s one must be very wary of extending Hughes if federal power simultaneously would be curtailed.
One interesting observation that supports the point made in text is that a prudent
investor might decide to leave well enough alone and not challenge the discriminatory taxation of out-of-state tax-exempt issues. Fearing that a state might respond to a rule of tax
neutrality by eliminating the existing immunity, an investor might be satisfied to accept the
status quo as a prudent compromise against the possibility of losing all opportunity to shelter
bond income from state income taxation. It is this very perverse political incentive not to rock
the boat that distinguishes the tax discrimination under discussion here from the direct
appropriation involved in Hughes. Since the creation of the tax-exempt bond funds under
the 1976 tax law amendments, however, there is an actor that has a commercial stake in
bringing suit, although the political check of Hughes still is not presentin the tax expenditure
context.
526. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
527. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 n.12 (1977).
528. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 n.19 (1976).
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In Usery the governmental decision held beyond federal power involved the disbursement of funds and was distinguished from traditional constraints on taxation and regulation of private parties.
Hughes also involved governmental disbursements,52 and the possibility of foreclosing federal action may be understandable in that
context. However, while it may seem plausible that Congress should
not be able to require a state to deal with scrap processors evenhandedly when the state establishes a bounty program for abandoned vehicles, it seems entirely unrealistic to conclude that Congress would be constitutionally unable to prevent the kind of tax
discrimination under discussion in this Article-the very kind of
authority it has traditionally exercised to dismantle state-imposed
barriers to interstate commercial enterprise. Perhaps looking at the
bonds situation from a different perspective-from the Usery side
of Hughes-is the most persuasive argument against extending
Hughes to that context.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problem of the disparity in the state tax treatment of income derived from in-state and out-of-state tax-exempt bonds has
been used in this Article as a vehicle for discussing the intersection
of two important trends in recent Supreme Court decisions. In the
negative commerce clause area, the Court has acted boldly to protect the national interests in commerce against restrictive or discriminatory state legislation. In the so-called New Federalism area,
the Court has been deferential to state interests, even when they
come into conflict with federal legislation (as in Usery) or with
generally applicable negative commerce clause principles (as in
Hughes). The discussion has shown that the Court's vigorous action
in negative commerce clause cases has been in distinct contrast with
its more reticent approach in areas such as equal protection and
standing.
This differential tax treatment of income derived from in-state
and out-of-state tax-exempt bonds brings into focus a problem at
the frontier, where these two somewhat conflicting approaches
meet. It provides a useful vehicle for analyzing the negative commerce clause cases in the areas of regulation and taxation, and for
discussing them in the context of the New Federalism. The ultimate
conclusion, however, is that in this context the traditional negative
529. The importance of the budgetary outlay feature of Hughes was highlighted in City
of Philadelphiav. New Jersey. See note 519 supra.
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commerce clause style of review is more appropriate, especially in
light of the unanimous Boston Stock Exchange decision, and that
the ruling in Hughes, exempting certain discriminatory state purchasing decisions from commerce clause scrutiny, should not be
extended to cover this situation.

